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Carlos E. Gonzalez
Abstract
This article begins by reviewing the axiomatic principles that govern courts when
dealing with cases in which two legal norms are interpreted as standing in conflict.
The article then makes three distinct contributions.
First, the article explicates the central justification behind the use and perpetuation
of the extant principles. In briefest terms, the extant principles are best justified
as an attempt to resolve cases in which legal rules stand in conflict in a way that
enhances or preserves the democratic legitimacy of law. They do this by favoring
norms created by entities of relatively strong democratic legitimacy over norms
created by entities of relatively weak democratic legitimacy. For example, under
the extant principles, a statute will trump a conflicting regulation. Statutes are
the product of legislatures, while regulations are promulgated by administrative
agencies; the former boasts stronger democratic legitimacy than the latter. In this
way, the extant principles work to enhance the democratic legitimacy of law.
Second, the article explains the central problems that the extant principles en-
gender. Despite the fact that the extant principles are justified by their tendency to
enhance the democratic legitimacy of law, in many instances their rigid formalism
will produce the opposite effect. For example, where a special interest statute of
low democratic legitimacy stands in conflict with a popular regulation of strong
democratic legitimacy, under the extant principles the former will trump the latter.
This sort of anti-democratic outcome produces another problem - an incentive for
courts to manipulate their interpretive discretion in order to avoid anti-democratic
outcomes. For example, rather than allow a special interest statute to trump a
popular regulation, courts will use their interpretive discretion to adopt strained
norm interpretations that avoid any conflict. One problem with this practice is
that judicial opinions rationalize outcomes as following from neutral rules of le-
gal interpretation, when in fact outcomes are driven by factors not addressed or
mentioned in opinions.
Third, and most importantly, the article compares the extant principles with sev-
eral suggested alternative sets of principles and explains the advantages that these
alternatives offer over the extant principles. The article offers numerous alterna-
tive sets of principles that could minimize both the anti-democratic outcomes,
and the incentive to manipulate the meaning of legal norms, produced by the
extant principles. In short, the article explains the problems engendered by the
understudied principles governing conflicts between legal norms, and then offers
numerous alternative sets of principles aimed at alleviating these problems. The
ultimate conclusion of the article is that no set of principles for dealing with cases
of conflicting norms is ideal. All systems imply particular mixes of good and bad
features. The bad features of the extant set of principles, however, do not seem to
outweigh whatever good features they exhibit.
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2I. Introduction
The late Summer of 2003 saw the eruption of a news media firestorm over the fate of the 
much publicized national >do not call= registry.1  The registry, a product of Federal Trade 
Commission (AFTC@) regulations, prohibited telemarketers from calling telephone numbers 
placed on a national list.2  Weary of ceaseless telemarketing calls, Americans placed over 50 
million telephone numbers on the list.3  Much to the dismay of the public, however, an 
Oklahoma Federal District Court struck down the regulations as beyond statutorily authorized 
agency regulatory powers just days before they were to go into effect.4   Two days later, a 
Colorado Federal District Court held that the regulations violated First Amendment free speech 
rights.5  Luckily for the telemarketing-weary public, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
1
. A Westlaw search performed by the author revealed 238 articles and editorials 
containing the phrase Ado not call list@ published in major U.S. newspapers during 
September of 2003.  Internet and television news media also featured heavy 
reporting on the >do not call= registry.   
2
. See Telemarketing Sales Rule,16 C.F.R. '' 310.1-310.9 (2003) (FTC regulation); 
Bloomberg News, Court Allows U.S. to Enforce No-Call Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
8, 2003, at C6 (discussing and explaining do-not-call registry regulations); Dave 
Barry, Call Hating: Avast, Telemarketers, Ye Scurvy Dogs, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 
2003, at W40 (explaining details of the do-not-call registry regulations).
3
. James P. Miller, FCC to Enforce >Do-Not-Call=: Agency Fares Better in Court 
Than FTC, Has O.K. to Carry Out Rules, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2003, at 1 (Stating 
that >do not call= registry is Ahugely popular, with over 50 million numbers 
registered@).   
4
. U.S. Security v. F.T.C., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1291-92 (W.D. Okla. 2003) 
(explaining that FTC Aasserted jurisdiction to promulgate a do-not-call registry@
under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994 
(ATelemarketing Act@ or TCFAP@) and holding that TCFAP statutory authority to 
regulate abusive telemarketing did not authorize >do not call= registry regulations). 
5
. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160-68 (D. Colo. 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art7
3eventually stepped in to save the regulations by finding that they did not go beyond the scope of 
statutorily delegated regulatory power and did not violate the First Amendment.6
Though the media and the public naturally focused on whether the >do not call= registry 
would ultimately be implemented, the litigation turned on a cluster of understudied legal issues 
related to conflicting legal norms.  Both district court opinions found that the regulations stood in 
irreconcilable conflict with either statutes or the Constitution.7  The Tenth Circuit found that 
there existed no conflict between the regulations and the statutes or the Constitution.8   Taken 
together, the opinions epitomize and illustrate three key elements present in all cases in which 
2003) (holding that FTC >do not call= registry regulations violate First Amendment 
Free Speech protections).  Ironically, the district court of Colorado held that the 
>do not call= registry regulations were within the FTC=s statutory authority.  Id. at 
1168-70.
6
. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 
2004) (holding that >do not call= registry regulations did not violate First 
Amendment and were not beyond statutorily granted agency regulatory authority). 
 Congress also played a role in saving the >do not call= registry regulations.  After 
the Oklahoma Federal District Court found the regulations beyond the FTC=s 
statutorily granted regulatory powers, Congress quickly passed The Do-Not-Call 
Implementation Act.  The Act definitively granted the FTC authority to create 
>don not call= registry regulations, and directed the Federal Communications 
Commission (AFCC@) coordinate its regulatory authority with the FTC in the 
creation of >do not call= registry regulations.  See Do-Not-Call Implementation 
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat.557 (2003); Restrictions on Telemarketing and 
Telephone Solicitation, 47 C.F.R. '' 64.1200 (c)-(e) (2003) (FCC regulations).  
The statute eliminated any doubt over whether the FTC and/or FCC were 
empowered to promulgate the regulations.  Mainstream Mktg, 358 F.3d at 1250 
(stating that new statute Aerased@ any doubt over scope of regulatory power).  Still, 
the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act did not resolve the issue of whether the FTC 
had possessed statutory authority to promulgate the regulations under then 
existing statutes or whether the regulations violated the First Amendment.  
7
. See supra notes 4, 5. 
8
. See supra note 6.
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4legal norms may be read as standing in irreconcilable conflict.  
First, courts dealing with these cases must decide whether two norms stand in conflict.  
This step involves the familiar judicial task of norm interpretation.  Whether two norms stand in 
irreconcilable conflict very often depends on how broadly or narrowly a court interprets the 
norms.  If a court determines that no conflict exists, all of the legal norms in question will remain 
in force.  This was the outcome of the >do not call= registry litigation in the Tenth Circuit.  
If two norms are judged to stand in conflict, a second element comes into play.  A set of 
rigid, formalistic axiomatic legal principles operates to resolve the conflict by determining which 
norm will be nullified.  These axiomatic principles dictate, for example, that a regulation always 
and without exception will be nullified by a conflicting statute or conflicting constitutional norm. 
 Had either of the district court opinions stood, the axiomatic principles would have nullified the 
>do not call= registry regulations.
Third, a feedback mechanism between the first two elements may exert itself.  Stated 
most simply, the nature of the principles used to resolve conflicts between legal norms may 
influence or bias the way courts interpret legal norms.  The principles offer courts no flexibility 
or discretion.  Courts know that if they find two legal norms in conflict, the principles will 
inescapably nullify a particular legal norm.  Thus, if a court finds that a statute and a regulation 
stand in conflict, the principles will dictate that the statute inescapably trumps and nullifies the 
regulation.  The rigid, discretion-denying nature of the principles, however, can prompt courts to 
manipulate whether a particular legal norm will be nullified by manipulating the meaning of legal 
norms and whether legal norms stand in conflict. 
In the >do not call= registry litigation, for example, the rigidity of the principles may have 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art7
5driven the Tenth Circuit to find that the regulations did not stand in conflict with the relevant 
statutes or the Constitution.  Had the court found a conflict between the regulations and the 
statutes or the Constitution, the rigid principles would have inescapably nullified the regulations. 
 Rather than allow the principles to strike down the hugely popular >do not call= registry,9 the 
court may have used its interpretive discretion to read the First Amendment and relevant statutes 
in a way that avoided any conflict with the regulations.  If this was the case, the rigidity of the 
axiomatic principles provoked the court to circumvent them by using flexible interpretive 
discretion to insure survival of the popular >do not call= registry regulations.10
9
. After the district court rulings striking down the >do not call= registry regulations 
were reported, the media was flooded with public negative reactions.  See, e.g., 
Sick of Telemarketers?  Call Judges= Homes, USA TODAY, September 30, 2003, 
at A22 (letter to editor expressing Aextreme displeasure@ with district court judges 
for striking down >do not call= registry regulations and urging citizens to call 
judges= homes at dinner time to voice displeasure over rulings); Editorial, Bad 
Calls, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2003, at A18 (quoting President Bush when 
signing the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act as stating that the American people, 
Congress, and the Executive Branch have concluded that a >do not call= registry is 
needed); Jim Hughes, Judges= Phones Ring Off The Hook Over No-Call Cases, 
DENVER POST, Sept. 28, 2003, at B2 (reporting that citizens annoyed by district 
court rulings striking down the >do not call= registry regulations called both judges=
chambers to complain to the point that judges= had to turn down ringers); Courts 
Are Not the Bosses, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 2003, at B9 (letter to the 
editor reacting to district court rulings striking down the >do not call= registry 
regulations by arguing that AIf the people and a >Do Not Call= list, they can have it. 
 Fifty-million Americans can tell the courts what they want, not vice versa.  I am 
getting very tired of the courts assuming they run this country!@) .
10
.  We can never know for sure whether the Tenth Circuit=s norm interpretations were 
influenced by the desire to avoid nullification of the popular >do not call= registry 
regulations.  Close examination of the opinion, however, does not inspire great 
confidence in the Tenth Circuit=s interpretive approach.  The FTC claimed 
authority to create the regulations under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud 
and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994's (ATelemarketing Act@ or  ATCFPA@) 
requirement that the FTC Aprescribe rules prohibiting...abusive telemarketing 
practices.@  Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
6Though all cases similar to the >do not call= registry litigation involve three basic 
elements, legal scholars usually focus only on the first B judicial interpretation of norms.  This 
Article will focus on the second and third elements B the axiomatic principles and the potential 
feedback effect those principles work on the way courts interpret legal norms.  The Article 
explains the axiomatic principles, the justification for their use, and the pathologies they foster.11
 Most importantly, the Article compares the principles with several alternative sets of principles 
or systems that could serve the same function.12  The goal is to evaluate and compare the 
U.S.C. ' 6102(a) (1994); U.S. Security v. F.T.C., 282 F. Supp.2d 1285, 1291 
(W.D. Okla. 2003) (explaining that FTC Aasserted jurisdiction to promulgate a do-
not-call registry@ under the Telemarketing Act of 1994).  The main congressional 
committee report on the Telemarketing Act, however, reveals that Congress 
contemplated a narrow meaning for Aabusive@ telemarketing practices, and did not 
contemplate prohibition of telemarketing merely because recipients had placed 
their phone numbers on a list.  H.R. REP. NO. 103-20, at 8 (1993) (listing Athreats 
or intimidation, obscene or profane language, refusal to identify the calling party, 
continuous or repeated ringing of the telephone, or engagement of the called party 
in conversation with an intent to annoy, harass, or oppress any person at the called 
number@ as examples of Aabusive telemarketing activities@ subject to regulation).  
The Tenth Circuit did not even mention the House Report.  With scant analysis 
and in conclusory fashion, the Tenth Circuit held that the Telemarketing Act=s 
provision for regulation of abusive telemarketing practices authorized 
promulgation of the >do not call= registry regulations.  Mainstream Marketing 
Services, Inc., 358 F.3d at 1250 (holding that FTC had authority to promulgate >do 
not call= registry regulations).  The problem with the Tenth Circuit=s interpretation 
of the Telemarketing Act is not that it is necessarily incorrect or implausible.  The 
problem is that the court fails to even mention the evidence of legislative intent 
that contradicts the court=s interpretation of the Act.  This failing raises the distinct 
possibility that the court was ends oriented in interpreting the scope of regulatory 
powers granted by the Act.  Ignoring the House Report enabled the court to hold 
that the Telemarketing Act could reasonably be read as empowering the FTC to 
promulgate the >do not call= registry regulations.  
11
. See infra Sections II.-III..
12
. See infra Section IV.
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7strengths and weaknesses of the extant principles alongside the strengths and weaknesses of 
alternative sets of principles. 
As we will see, the principles that now govern conflicts between legal norms are plagued 
by serious drawbacks.  They are best justified by their tendency to produce outcomes that, in a 
narrow and particular way, enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy of law.13  Yet the 
discretion-denying rigidity of the principles often can undermine this democratic legitimacy 
enhancing or preserving effect, and lead to decidedly anti-democratic outcomes.14  Moreover, as 
may have been the case with the Tenth Circuit treatment of the >do not call= registry litigation, the 
principles can bias or distort the way courts interpret legal norms.  Rather than norm 
interpretations driven by applicable rules of legal interpretation, norm interpretation may be 
driven by the desire to avoid anti-democratic outcomes called for by the principles, and then
rationalized as the unbiased product of applicable rules of legal interpretation.15  The feedback 
mechanism produced by the extant principles, in short, corrupts and contaminates the judicial 
task of norm interpretation.      
Yet when we turn to alternatives to the extant principles we will find no easy solutions.  
Some of the alternative principles or systems for adjudicating cases involving conflicting legal 
norms would be superior in some ways to the extant principles.  Some alternatives may be 
superior in terms of producing outcomes that enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy of 
13
. See infra Section II.B.
14
. See infra Section III.A. 
15
. See infra Section III.B.
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8law.16  Some alternatives can also minimize the feedback mechanism whereby the principles 
contaminate the way that courts interpret legal norms.17  Each of the alternative systems 
discussed herein, however, suffers serious problems of their own.  Some of the alternatives might 
fail to constrain judicial discretion and open the door to judicial willfulness.18  Relatedly, some 
alternatives may undermine the rule of law features of the current principles and lead to legal 
instability and unpredictability.19  Others may unsettle traditional institutional roles and 
relationships, and fail to protect separation of powers values.20  Others may ask courts to perform
tasks beyond their competence.21
Ultimately, no set of principles or system governing adjudication of conflicting legal 
norms can maximize along all dimensions.   At the end of the day, structuring a system for 
adjudication of cases involving conflicting norms involves hard choices between competing 
values and attributes.  It is clear that the extant set of principles presents a host of serious 
problems.  Alternatives to the extant set of principles, however, would present other problems.   
In the end, the optimal system will depend on one=s personal preference for maximization of 
certain positive attributes and minimization of other negative attributes. Much of the article 
consists of  an elaboration on these fundamental themes.      
16
. See, e.g., infra pp. 87, 105-06, 120-21.
17
. See, e.g., infra pp. 87-88, 106, 127-28.
18
. See infra p. 72.
19
. See infra pp. 57-60.
20
. See infra p. 91-92.
21
. See infra p. 74.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art7
9Part II of the article explains and summarizes the extant principles governing adjudication 
of cases in which legal norms are read as standing in conflict.  Part II will also explain the 
peculiar democracy-reinforcing effect that the principles produce.  Part III turns to the nature and 
scope of the pathologies the principles produce.  Part IV considers alternative systems  for 
resolving conflict between legal norms.  Seven alternative systems are considered.  Finally, Part 
V offers concluding remarks.
II. The Framework for Adjudicating Conflicts Between Legal Norms
Both rules of legal interpretation and extra-legal factors, such as the ideology of a judge, 
can influence outcomes in cases where legal norms might be read as standing in a posture of 
irreconcilable conflict.22   This article, however, focuses on another set of factors important in 
these cases B the axiomatic principles, or what I have elsewhere called axiomatic meta-norms, 
that govern adjudication once a court determines that two legal norms stand in a posture of 
22
. Legal scholars have done much to understand the influence of both interpretive 
norms and extra-legal factors, such as ideology, on judicial decision making.  
Regarding the influence of extra-legal factors, see Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. 
Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court Forecasting 
Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1157 (2004) (describing scholarship 
advancing the Aattitudinal" model and idea that judges decide cases based upon 
ideological views and are not constrained by legal materials).  For the vast recent 
scholarship regarding norms of statutory interpretation, see Gregory Scott Crespi, 
The Influence of a Decade of Statutory Interpretation Scholarship on Judicial 
Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 9, 22-29 (2000) (appendix 
listing recent law review articles on statutory interpretation).  For a brief overview 
of constitutional interpretation scholarship, see Gerard J. Clark, An Introduction to 
Constitutional Interpretation, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 485 (2000). 
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irreconcilable conflict.23  Part II.A briefly describes these meta-norms.  Part II.B explores the 
tendency of the meta-norms to produce outcomes that in a particular way enhance or preserve the 
democratic legitimacy of law.  Subsequently, Part III will explain the limits of this democracy-
reinforcing narrative and explain the problems that the extant meta-norms engender.  Part IV will 
survey several alternative systems for adjudicating cases in which legal norms stand in conflict.
A. The Axiomatic Meta-Norms
To understand the axiomatic meta-norms, consider two conflicting legal norms and how 
the meta-norms would resolve the conflict.  Assume that one legal norm prohibits vehicles from 
entering the park, while another legal norm permits bicycle races in the park on the last Sunday 
of each month.  Further assume that a court has interpreted the prohibition on vehicles in the park 
to include a prohibition on bicycles.  Finally, assume that the norm prohibiting vehicles in the 
park (including bicycles) was created by a legislature, and that the norm permitting >last Sunday 
of the month= bicycle races was generated by an administrative agency.24   Which of these two 
irreconcilably conflicting norms will survive and which will be nullified?  
The outcome is obvious and inescapable.  The statute prohibiting vehicles (including 
23
. Carlos E. González, Popular Sovereign Generated Versus Government Institution 
Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment Not 
Amend the Constitution?, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 127, 138 (2002) (discussing meta-
norms)
24
. Such definitional conundrums are common.  See, e.g., Lalomia v. Bankers & 
Shippers Ins. Co., 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (determining that 
motorized bicycle not considered a motor vehicle for purposes of insurance policy 
even though considered a motorized vehicle for purposes of state vehicle and 
traffic code).  
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art7
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bicycles) in the park will trump and nullify the regulation permitting bicycle races.  The 
axiomatic meta-norms that make the outcome obvious and inescapable, however, are themselves 
not at all obvious.  The meta-norms are four in number and can be stated as follows:
1. The source axiom:  Legal norms emanating from different norm-generating 
institutions or entities belong to different legal categories; legal norms emanating 
from the same norm-generating institutions or entities belong to the same legal 
categories.
2. The hierarchic axiom:  Legal categories populated by legal norms emanating from 
norm-generating institutions or entities of relatively greater democratic legitimacy 
are hierarchically superordinate to those legal categories populated by legal norms 
emanating from norm-generating institutions or entities of relatively lesser 
democratic legitimacy.  
3.  The categoric axiom:  Legal norms belonging to legal categories of superordinate 
hierarchic status always and unconditionally trump irreconcilably conflicting legal 
norms belonging to legal categories of subordinate hierarchic status.  
4.  The chronologic axiom:  Whenever two irreconcilably conflicting legal norms 
belong to the same legal category, the more recently created norm always and 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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unconditionally trumps the preexisting norm.25
How would the axiomatic meta-norms govern the >no vehicles in the park= illustration?  
First, apply the source axiom.  The two norms emanate from different norm-generating 
institutions.  The first is the creation of a legislative body while the second is the product of an 
administrative agency.  Under the source axiom the two norms would belong to different >legal 
categories.=   The first would be a member of the category >statutory norms;= the second would be 
a member of the category >administrative norms.=
Next, under the hierarchic axiom, the legal category >statutory norms= (along with all 
members of that category) is hierarchically superior to the legal category >administrative norms=
(along with all members of that category).  This is so because the members of the former 
category emanate from legislatures while the members of the latter emanate from administrative 
agencies; legislative bodies boast greater democratic legitimacy than do administrative agencies.  
Thus, the norm prohibiting vehicles (including bicycles) in the park would be hierarchically 
superior to the norm permitting >last Sunday of the month= bicycle races.  
Finally, under the categoric axiom the norm belonging to the hierarchically superordinate 
category B the statute prohibiting vehicles (including bicycles) in the park B would trump the 
norm belonging to the hierarchically subordinate category B the administrative regulation 
allowing >last Sunday of the month= bicycle races in the park.  If we were to suppose that both 
norms were statutes, the last step in the analysis would change.  Rather than the categoric axiom, 
25
. González, supra note 23, at 160 (cataloguing source, hierarchic, categoric, and 
chronologic axioms).
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art7
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the chronologic axiom would apply.  Where both norms emanate from a legislative body, both 
are members of the same category (source axiom) and are of equal hierarchic status (hierarchic 
axiom).  Under the chronologic axiom the most recently created norm will trump the preexisting 
norm.  
If we cut through the formalities of the four axiomatic meta-norms we see that they 
reflect the fundamental character of the American legal system=s formula for managing cases in 
which legal norms stand in irreconcilable conflict.  That formula boils down to the following:  
First, the system chops up the universe of legal norms into four different categories B
constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law B depending on the four principal 
sources of legal norms B We the People, legislative bodies, administrative agencies, and common 
law courts.  Next, the system arranges the categories into a hierarchic layer cake, with the norms 
created by more democratically legitimate institutions in the top layers and the norms created by 
less democratically legitimate institutions in the bottom layers.  Finally, the system grants norms
from a higher layer a trump over conflicting norms from any lower layer, and grants newer norms 
a trump over  conflicting preexisting norms from the same layer. 
At this juncture two points must be stressed.  First, the axiomatic meta-norms are legal 
rules.  No lawyer or judge will cite them.  They will not be discussed at oral argument.  You will 
not find them inscribed in a constitution, statute, or regulation, or even in judicial 
pronouncements in reported cases.  They are not the result of any positivistic act of norm creation 
of the sort that produces constitutions, statutes,  regulations, or common law rules.  Despite their 
>invisible= profile the axioms count as secondary conduct regulating legal rules just as much as 
do, for example, the statutorily codified Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the judicially 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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developed rules of statutory interpretation.  
The nub of what I am suggesting is the following:  There exists a class of legal meta-
norms that are nowhere to be found in inscribed legal texts and that indeed may not even be the 
result of positivistic acts of norm creation.  This special class of legal meta-norms becomes part 
of the law=s fabric by emerging organically over time to become so deeply and invariably 
ingrained into the unconscious background assumptions of all members of the legal community 
that they take on the character of inviolable legal rules.  Precisely because they are part of 
unconscious givens and assumptions they are >invisible= on the surface of legal discourse. 
Though somewhat similar to extra-legal factors which influence outcomes in litigated 
cases B the ideology of the judge, for example B  the meta-norm axioms decidedly belong to the 
legal, rather than extra-legal, universe.26  Unlike the ideology of a judge or other extra-legal 
factors, the axioms are  universally and unvaryingly internalized and ingrained in all members of 
the legal community.  When a set of principles has become so internalized and ingrained as to be 
hardwired into the conceptual framework of all members of a legal community, those principles 
become part of the legal framework in that legal community.  The four axiomatic meta-norms 
enumerated above exemplify this phenomenon.  There is no irregularity, dissent, argument, or 
26
. Like extra-legal factors, the meta-norm axioms both impact outcomes and are not 
directly memorialized or superficially evident in constitutional, statutory, 
administrative, or common law legal texts.  Nonetheless, crucial differences 
indicate that the axioms count as legal norms, rather than extra-legal factors, that 
influence outcomes.  First, the presence or absence of inscribed words in legal 
texts does not determine whether something counts as a legal rule.  Such inscribed 
words may provide evidence that a legal rule exists, but it is not the sin qua non of 
the legal or non-legal nature of a factor influencing judicial decision making.
Moreover, whether a factor impacts outcomes in litigated cases is also not 
dispositive on whether that factor counts as law rather than an extra-legal factor.  
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art7
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diversity regarding how the meta-norms impact outcomes.  To take the simplest example, no 
judge would seriously dispute the chronologic axiom B the notion that between two conflicting
legal norms of the same kind, the more recent norm trumps the preexisting norm.  Given a 
particular case or circumstance, all judges will (reflexively and unconsciously) apply the 
chronologic axiom in exactly the same unvarying way and with the exact same impact on the 
outcome.  
Compare the ideology of a judge.  Ideology will vary from judge to judge, with some 
being conservative and others liberal.  This variation translates into judges of different 
ideological stripes reaching different outcomes in the same cases.27  The degree of influence 
ideology exerts will also vary from judge to judge.  For one judge ideology can be a major factor 
in how the judge decides cases, while for another judge ideology plays only a minor role.28
These kinds of irregularities simply are not present when we consider the four axioms.  The 
axioms are universally and consistently applied by all judges in the exact same way.  For 
27
. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the 
Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 24, 87-99, 125 
(forthcoming 2005 available in SSRN) (recent empirical study finding that in 
labor and employment cases conservative Supreme Court justices are likely to join 
pro-business opinions while liberal justices are likely to join pro-employee 
opinions, and arguing that neutral canons of statutory construction are deployed to 
reach ideologically motivated outcomes); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) 
(empirical study of D.C. Circuit decisions finding that ideology of judges affects 
outcomes in environmental law cases).  
28
. See Ruger et.al., supra note 22, at 1173-74 (statistical analysis suggesting that 
votes of some current Supreme Court justices are more predictable than other 
current justices using the political ideology of the justices as a metric, and that 
votes of ideological outlier Supreme Court justices are more predictable using 
ideology as a metric than votes of centrist justices).  
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example, when faced with a case in which two statutes stand in irreconcilable conflict, all judges 
will resolve that conflict in accord with the chronologic axiom in exactly the same way and 
without room for debate.  All judges will rule that the newer statute trumps the older statute.29
A second issue that must be highlighted relates to the level of generality and abstraction 
at which the axioms are articulated.  The four above enumerated meta-norms represent the most 
generalized statements possible that can explain and predict outcomes of cases involving 
irreconcilably conflicting legal norms.  Abundantly familiar legal principles stated with less 
generality can also explain and predict at least some cases in which legal norms stand in conflict. 
  All lawyers, for example, would easily recognize and accept that, as a matter of extant legal 
principle, a constitutional norm will trump and nullify a conflicting statutory norm.30  The 
categoric axiom is stated at a higher level of generality than this easily recognizable principle.  It 
encompasses not only the rule that constitutional norms trump conflicting statutory norms, but 
also encompasses a range of more specific (and commonly recognized) rules, such as the rule 
that a statute will trump a conflicting administrative regulation and the rule that a statute will 
29
. Let me be perfectly clear in this point.  Judges may differ on the meaning of legal 
norms and whether two norms stand in a posture of conflict.  Once two statutes 
have been interpreted as standing in a posture of irreconcilable conflict, however, 
all judges will agree that the newer statute trumps the older statute.
30
. Though so fundamental that it need not be explicitly stated, courts sometimes 
enunciate this rule.  See, e.g., Cole v. Cent. States S.E. and S.W. Areas Health and 
Welfare Fund, No. 00-11573, 2002 WL 31319656 (D. Mass. Aug.  26, 2002) 
(A[A] statute cannot trump the requirements of the Constitution...@); Associated 
Contract Loggers, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (D. Minn. 
2000) (A[I]t is axiomatic that a statute cannot trump the Constitution, which is the 
supreme law of the land...@); United States v. Ailemen,  893 F. Supp. 888, 904 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (A[I]n cases of conflict, the Constitution always trumps 
statutes...@).
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trump a conflicting common law principle.31
Stating the axioms at a higher level of generality than is commonly used in everyday legal 
parlance brings particular benefits.  Most importantly, by stating the four axioms in the most 
generalized terms possible, the essential features of our system for managing cases in which legal 
norms irreconcilably conflict become abundantly obvious.  The narrowly drawn rules or 
explanations, in contrast, obscure many of these features.32
How is this so?  Return again to the >no vehicles in the park= illustration.  A statute 
prohibiting vehicles (including bicycles) in the park will trump and nullify an administrative 
31
. The same analysis applies to the chronologic axiom.  All members of the legal 
community will recognize and acknowledge the notion than a new statute trumps 
a preexisting conflicting statute.  See SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION '
34.01, at 31 (5th ed. 1984) (recognizing general rule that statutes continue in force 
unless abrogated by a subsequent statute).  Likewise, all will recognize and 
acknowledge that a constitutional amendment will trump a preexisting conflicting 
constitutional provision, and that a new regulation trumps a conflicting 
preexisting regulation.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing Eighteenth 
Amendment); Nat=l Family Planning and Reprod. Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (AIt is a maxim of administrative law that: >If a 
second rule repudiates or is irreconcilable with [a prior legislative rule], the 
second rule must be an amendment of the first=@).  The chronologic axiom 
embodies all such chronology-based rules.
32
. In addition, general explanations are usually preferable over narrowly drawn 
explanations, assuming that predictive power is not diminished.  The categoric 
and chronologic axioms explain and predict a broader range of events (a broader 
range of case outcomes) than do the narrow rules, for example, that constitutional 
norms trump conflicting statutory norms, or that between two conflicting statutes 
the more recent statute will prevail. 
Narrowly drawn explanations should not be ignored.  Rather, one seeking 
to understand a given event should consider both general and narrowly drawn
explanations.  The legal community already fully understands the narrow rule that 
constitutional norms trump conflicting statutory norms, or the rule that between 
two conflicting statutes the more recent statute will prevail.  The more generalized 
categoric and chronologic axioms can only add to understanding by offering a 
new perspective which reveals previously obscured issues.
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regulation permitting >last Sunday of the month= bicycle races.  The standard way to explain and 
understand this outcome is that the first norm trumps the second norm because there exists a 
familiar rule stipulating that statutory norms trump conflicting administrative norms.  More 
simply, the statutory norm trumps the conflicting administrative norm because there is a rule 
which demands just that.  End of story.  At best, one might question whether the statute over 
regulation rule makes sense.33
An explanation based on the more generalized four axioms, however, forces us to see that 
it is not just that statutory norms trump conflicting administrative norms.  It is also that our legal 
system divides legal norms into different categories; that our legal system places those categories 
in a particular hierarchic ordering; and that our legal system grants norms belonging to categories 
33
. The Chevron doctrine arguably can dilute the statute over regulation ordering.  
Where a statute is ambiguous, a plausible agency interpretation will trump the 
most likely (but not entirely certain) legislative command.   Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (elucidating Chevron doctrine under 
which courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes "[i]f . . . Congress has not 
directly addressed the precise question at issue@).  One justification for this 
weakening of the statute over regulation ordering is that where a statute is 
ambiguous, permitting expert administrators to fashion policy makes for better 
policy than adherence to judicial conjecture regarding the most probable 
legislative intent.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 
90 COLUM. L.  REV.  2071, 2086-90 (1990).  A similar strain of thought has 
recently emerged that implicitly challenges the constitutional norm over statute 
ordering.  Some argue that permitting the political branches of government a large 
role in the interpretation of constitutional norms will alleviate the counter-
majoritarian difficulty.  See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional 
Interpretation, 50 DUKE L. J. 1335, 1358-94 (2001) (advocating enhanced 
congressional power to interpret constitutional norms).  Though not necessarily 
formally overturning the Constitution over statute ordering, permitting political 
branches a role in constitutional interpretation would produce a dynamically 
changing Constitution.  Rather than conforming new statutes to the Constitution, 
the possibility of conforming the Constitution to new statutes would become a 
possibility.  Id. at 1359-81.     
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higher in the ordering a trump over conflicting norms belonging to categories lower in the 
ordering.  Rather than merely the restricted issue of whether statutory norms should trump 
conflicting administrative norms, the more generalized explanation based on the axioms pushes 
an entirely new range of questions to the foreground.  
Consider a few of these new questions:  Why should the legal system chop up the 
universe of legal norms into different categories or kinds?  If it should, why should the categories 
be the ones that have emerged  B constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law B
rather than some other possible categorization?  Why should the legal system arrange the 
different categories in a rigid hierarchy rather than, to throw out one possibility, a flexible 
continuum?  Why should the hierarchic ordering be based on the democratic legitimacy of the 
institution that creates a particular kind of legal norm?  Why not instead base the hierarchic status 
of a given legal norm on the democratic legitimacy of the particular legal norm?  If we are to 
have a hierarchy, why grant legal norms belonging to superordinate legal categories an 
unconditional trump over legal norms belonging to subordinate legal categories?  Why not 
instead offer legal norms belonging to superordinate legal categories nothing more than a 
rebuttable presumption that they will trump conflicting legal norms belonging to subordinate 
legal categories?  
If we think on the level of everyday legal parlance, we are stuck with, for example, the 
particularized rules that constitutional norms trump conflicting statutes, or that statutes trump 
conflicting administrative regulation.   Focus on the particularized rules obscures all of the novel 
and interesting questions.  Once we see that the constitutional norms over statutes and statutes 
over regulations rules, along with other similar particularized rules, are merely part of a more 
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universal and generalized set of axiomatic meta-norms, all of the interesting questions jump to 
the fore.  We do not need the four meta-norms to predict how a court would resolve the conflict 
presented by the >no vehicles in the park= illustration.  Obviously, the statute will trump the 
conflicting regulation.  We do need the four meta-norms, however, to open our eyes to a range of 
previously hidden foundational issues and questions that deserve scrutiny.
B. The Democracy-Reinforcing Justification Undergirding the Axiomatic Meta-
Norms
Taken together, the four axiomatic meta-norms constitute a coherent system governing 
the adjudication of cases in which legal norms have been interpreted to stand in irreconcilable 
conflict.  What justifies use of the extant system rather than some other possible system?  
Because the system emerged organically, there are no well thought out rationalizations to justify 
its use and perpetuation in official legal texts.34  However, a common justificatory theme 
underlying the various particularized rules that the axioms encompass can be detected.  Each of 
the particularized rules, as well as the extant system as a whole, is best justified by a tendency to 
generate outcomes that, in a particular way, enhance or at least preserve the democratic 
legitimacy of law.  The particularized rules and the more generalized meta-norms produce other 
salutary effects which might validate their use and perpetuation. The tendency to produce 
34
.  Justifications underlying legal norms are usually advanced by those who advocate 
their adoption.  The axioms emerged organically and are not the product of any 
discrete, identifiable act of positivistic norm creation promulgating or adopting 
the axioms.  We can point to no single grand architect (or even group of 
architects) who designed and pushed for promulgation of the extant system.  As a 
result, there was never an event or opportunity for law creators to explain and 
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outcomes which can be seen as enhancing the democratic legitimacy of law, however, is the 
overarching and bottom-line grounding for the extant system.35
The extant system produces this effect by preserving legal norms generated by entities of 
greater democratic legitimacy and nullifying conflicting legal norms generated by entities of 
lesser democratic legitimacy.  The >no vehicles in the park= illustration posits a conflict between a 
statute and an administrative regulation.  Legislatures, which are subject to periodic electoral 
checks, claim greater democratic legitimacy than do administrative agencies, which are only 
loosely controlled by democratically elected legislatures and chief executives.36  The extant 
system will preserve the legal norm created by the legislative body B the statute B  over the legal 
norms created by the administrative agency B the regulation.37  More to the point, the system 
justify adoption of the extant system. 
35
. For example, the extant system enhances the stability of law and protects 
separation of powers boundary lines between norm-generating institutions.  When 
we compare the extant system to possible alternatives, however, we will see that 
the tendency to produce democracy-enhancing outcomes is the paramount 
justification undergirding the extant system.  See infra pp. 65-70. 
36
. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed=n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465, 1473 
(D. Colo. 1988) (agency regulation in conflict with statute must be nullified 
because Avalue judgments which amount to changes in a statute, which are what 
the new regulations represent, should be made by the elected, accountable 
Congress and not by the Executive branch [agencies]@)
37
. Consider again how the four axioms would produce this outcome.  First, under the 
source axiom, the two norms will be treated as different in kind or as members of 
distinct legal categories.  The norm emanating from the legislative body will 
belong to the category >statutory norms.=  The norm emanating from the 
administrative agency will belong to the category >administrative norms.=  Second, 
under the hierarchic axiom, the category >statutory norms= (and all of its members) 
will be treated as hierarchically superior to the category >administrative norms=
(and all of its members).  Third, under the categoric axiom, the norm belonging to 
the superordinate legal category will be granted a trump over the norm belonging 
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preserves the legal norm created by the entity of greater democratic legitimacy, and nullifies the 
legal norm created by the entity of lesser democratic legitimacy.
The extant system works a similar effect in cases involving conflict between other kinds 
of legal norms, such as cases involving conflicts between constitutional and statutory norms.  We 
the People, the ultimate source of constitutional norms, command the strongest possible claim to 
democratic legitimacy.  The legislative stand-ins, creators of statutes, possess only a second best 
claim to democratic legitimacy.38  By privileging a constitutional norm over a conflicting statute, 
the extant system preserves the norm created by the entity of greater democratic legitimacy.
The same holds true in a case of conflict between norms of the same kind or category.  In 
a conflict between two statutes, for example, the extant system would preserve the newer statute 
and nullify the preexisting statute.  Legislatures with a recent electoral sanction claim stronger 
democratic legitimacy than do long-retired legislatures whose electoral sanctions have long since 
to the subordinate legal category.  As a result, the legal norm produced by the 
legislative body (the entity of relatively greater democratic legitimacy) will be 
preserved, while the conflicting legal norm produced by the administrative agency 
(the entity of relatively lesser democratic legitimacy) will be abolished. 
38
. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 123 (Max Farand ed., 
Yale, rev. ed. 1937) (James Madison=s notes) (James Madison at Philadelphia 
constitutional convention explaining that legislatures could not ratify the 
Constitution in the name of We the People because legislative ratification would 
not equal ratification by Athe supreme authority of the people themselves@).  See 
also Carlos E.  González, Representational Structures Through Which We the 
People Ratify Constitutions: The Troubling Original Understanding of the 
Constitution=s Ratification Clauses, __ U.C. DAVIS L.  REV. __, at __ [manuscript 
Section III.] [forthcoming February 2005] (detailing historical evidence on 
original understanding that legislatures could not ratify the Constitution in the 
name of We the People because legislatures are considered agents of We the 
People rather than embodiments of We the People).
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gone stale.39  As such, the extant system ensures the survival of the norm created by the more 
democratically legitimate incarnation of the legislature.  In this way, the system works to 
reinforce the democratic legitimacy of law.     
We find evidence of the democracy-reinforcing theme not as explicit justifications for the 
generalized axioms themselves, but as a series of uniform or parallel rationales for the more 
particular and recognizable legal principles.  Thus, the superior democratic legitimacy of We the 
People over our legislative agents justifies constitutional norms trumping conflicting statutory 
norms.40   Similar rationales justify, for example, the statute over regulation, statute over 
common law, and regulation over common law rules.41  A parallel justification is at work in 
39
. See Karen Petroski, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 487, 488 (2004) (stating that A[L]egislature=s most recent enactments 
are more likely aligned with the electorate=s current political preferences than are 
earlier enactments to the contrary@).  
40
. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-180 (1803) (holding that a 
statute conflicting with the constitution is void and unenforceable); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(arguing that judicial review is justified when courts are enforcing constitutional 
norms over statutory norms because constitutional norms emanate from the 
People while statutory norms emanate from a legislature); Thomas E. Baker, 
Exercising The Amendment Power to Disapprove Of Supreme Court Decisions: A 
Proposal for A ARepublican Veto,@ 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 325, 326-27 (1995) 
(suggesting that under the Marshallian view, judicial review involves 
constitutional norms generated by the popular sovereign trumping conflicting 
statutory norms created by legislatures).
41
. See, e.g., F.D.A. v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (questioning whether Abackground canon@ that policy should be made 
by democratically elected Congress rather than by unelected agency administrators 
applies in particular case); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984) (holding that agency interpretation must prevail over common law-like 
judicial gloss on ambiguous statute because A[j]udges are not part of either 
political branch of the Government@ and policy choices are responsibilities of 
political branches of government); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers, 
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cases involving conflicts between the same kinds of legal norms.  The superior democratic 
legitimacy of the recent legislature over the long-retired legislature, for example, justifies a new 
statute trumping a preexisting conflicting statute.42
The particularized justifications behind each of the particularized and commonly 
recognized rules are all variations on the same democracy-reinforcing theme.  This is not 
coincidence.  We do not have a jumble of discrete and independent rules governing conflicts 
between the Constitution and statutes, or statutes and administrative regulations, or statutes and 
common law rules, to name just three.  We instead have a coherent system composed of four 
overarching axiomatic meta-norms that unify all of these recognizable particularized legal 
principles as similar expressions of a single essential theme:  The preservation of legal norms 
created by entities of greater democratic legitimacy over conflicting legal norms created by 
451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (stating that federal judicially developed common law 
principles are Asubject to the paramount authority of Congress@); Parham v. 
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (A[A] court is not free...to substitute its 
judgment for the will of the people...as expressed in the laws passed by their 
popularly elected legislatures@); In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 1240 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (recognizing that statutes overrule common law precedent because Ain 
a democracy the legislature may be the more appropriate branch to draw 
classifications based on public policy. As a popularly elected body, the legislature 
is in a position to tap the thinking of its constituency and has the resources to 
secure data generally not available to the courts@); Planned Parenthood Fed=n of 
America, 680 F. Supp. at 1473 (agency interpretation in conflict with statute must 
be nullified because Avalue judgments which amount to changes in a statute, 
which are what the new regulations represent, should be made by the elected, 
accountable Congress and not by the Executive branch@).
42
. In holding that a new statute trumps a preexisting conflicting statute, courts rely 
on the the greater democratic legitimacy of the newer legislature over the earlier 
legislature.  See Petroski, supra note 39, at 488 (stating that new statutes trump or 
repeal preexisting conflicting statutes Abecause the legislature=s most recent 
enactments are more likely aligned with the electorate=s current political 
preferences than are earlier enactments to the contrary@). 
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entities of lesser democratic legitimacy.43
43
. Some Bill of Rights cases may at first glance appear not to fit the overarching 
democracy-reinforcing theme.  In recent decades the Supreme Court has used 
interpretations of Bill of Rights clauses which probably do not enjoy majority 
support to nullify sub-constitutional norms and government actions that probably 
do enjoy majority support.  First Amendment holdings protecting flag burning 
may exemplify this phenomenon.  See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
(striking down state law prohibiting desecration of United States flag).  Modern 
justifications for such holdings center not on any pretense of enhancement of the
democratic legitimacy of law, but rather on protection of minority rights against 
majority tyranny.  See Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1131, 1132 (1991) (stating that Athe Bill of Rights...according to conventional 
wisdom, was [intended] to vest individuals and minorities with substantive rights 
against popular majorities@ but arguing that contrary to conventional wisdom, Bill 
of Rights was intended more as majority right protecting set of norms than 
individual or minority rights protecting set of norms).  Unpopular First 
Amendment free speech and press protections, for example, have been justified as 
protecting the Arights of paradigmatically unpopular individuals or groups to speak 
out against a hostile and repressive majority.@ Id. at 1147.  In other words, the 
outcomes in these sorts of cases have been justified precisely because they are 
anti-majoritarian (and perhaps even anti-democratic).  
None of this is at odds with the notion that the extant system is justified by 
its tendency to produce outcomes that, in a particular way, enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of law.  The extant system works to preserve legal norms created by 
entities of greater democratic legitimacy over conflicting legal norms created by 
entities of lesser democratic legitimacy.  In the end, even if unpopular, all parts of 
the Constitution are treated as emanating from We the People. Martin v. Hunter=s 
Lesee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (AThe constitution of the United States was 
ordained and established...as the preamble of the constitution declares, by the 
>people of the United States=@).  When a court strikes down a popular statute 
because in violation of an unpopular Bill of Rights provision, the implicit 
justification, as in any case of judicial review, is that the Bill of Rights emanates 
from We the People, while the conflicting statute emanates from Congress.  See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 40, at 467; Baker, supra note 40, at 326-27.  
If anything, cases in which the Bill of Rights is used to strike down currently 
popular sub-constitutional norms highlights the limited and narrow way in which 
the extant system can claim to enhance the democratic legitimacy of law.
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III.   The Nature and Scope of the Problems Generated by the Extant System
Before turning to possible alternatives to the extant system, it is important to understand 
the nature and scope of the problems the extant system produces.  An understanding of these 
shortcomings furthers our understanding of the nature of the extant system and provides a basis 
on which to build alternative systems.  The problems fall into two main groupings.  First, despite 
its democracy-reinforcing underpinnings, the extant system can produce outcomes that arguably 
degrade the democratic legitimacy of the law.  Second, in cases where the extant system threatens 
to produce outcomes of suspect democratic legitimacy, it encourages unconscious and conscious 
bias, and even outright judicial dishonesty, with a consequent lack of transparency in judicial  
opinions.  
A.  Problem One: The Failure to Deliver Democracy-Reinforcing Results
As soon as we identify the democracy-reinforcing justification we can see it limitations.  
In many cases, the extant system will do an exceedingly poor job of achieving the democracy-
enhancing ends that purportedly serve to justify its use and perpetuation.  The nub of the problem 
lies in the following: The extant system preserves legal norms emanating from entities of 
relatively greater democratic legitimacy and nullifies conflicting norms emanating from entities
of relatively lesser democratic legitimacy.  The democratic legitimacy of a given norm-generating 
entity, however, is but one of many factors and considerations relevant to assessing the 
democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms.  As a result, the extant system regularly 
produces outcomes that, all things considered, will be perceived as the very antithesis of 
democracy-enhancing or -preserving.  It nullifies individual legal norms of perceived strong 
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democratic legitimacy and preserves individual legal norms of perceived suspect democratic 
legitimacy.   
The evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms is contestable and complex.  
Does a particular legal norm boast greater democratic legitimacy than another because the first 
emanates from We the People while the second emanates from a legislature, an administrative 
agency, or a common law court?  Or does a particular norm boast relatively greater democratic 
legitimacy than another because it better reflects current majoritarian sentiment (perhaps 
expressed in recent electoral contests) than some other norm, regardless of which entities created 
the two norms?  Or does a legal norm boast strong democratic legitimacy when it closely  
approximates the policy that would be favored by a majority of the electorate if the electorate 
were well informed and could fully deliberate on the underlying policy issues?  Or is it that one 
legal norm boasts relatively greater democratic legitimacy than another legal norm because the 
first conforms to core values on which society has maintained strong consensus for a generation, 
whereas the latter reflects nothing more than an incongruent, transient, and uninformed majority 
impulse that has not yet stood the test of time?  
Competing conceptions of democratic legitimacy waft through our legal and political 
discourse.44   Different conceptions imply different admissible considerations for evaluating the 
democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms.  The extant system, however, oversimplifies 
44
. Disagreement on the meaning of democracy manifests itself with regularity.  See, 
e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dimensions of Democracy, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1725, 1723-33 (2003) (explaining and comparing the standard Aone dimensional@
conception of democracy based on majoritarianism and electoral results, the 
author=s idea that democracy involves four elements apart from majoritarianism 
and elections, and Professor Rubenfeld=s notion that democracy requires 
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this complex question by fixating on one factor alone B the democratic legitimacy of the entities 
and institutions that create legal norms.   By fixating on one factor the extant system hinders a 
rich and multifaceted evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms 
incorporating a  range of relevant factors.  
Due to its cramped focus on the entities that create legal norms, the extant system will, 
for example, preserve the statute serving narrow special interests and nullify the conflicting 
administrative regulation that ameliorates those special interest benefits and is more in line with 
current majority preferences.  Similarly, the extant system will preserve the new special interest 
oriented statute, passed only because its was a rider to a larger bill or part of a legislative logroll, 
and nullify the conflicting preexisting public-regarding statute that had passed on its own merits 
with broad bi-partisan support and which still reflects majoritarian preferences. 
The justification on both instances would be that where conflicts arise, the norms created 
by more democratically legitimate entities B either the legislature over the agency or the recent 
legislature over the long-retired legislature B should trump the norms created by entities of lesser 
democratic legitimacy.  It is far from clear, however, that the special interest statute can rightly 
claim greater democratic legitimacy than the regulation aimed at minimizing special interest 
benefits.  Likewise, it is far from clear that a new special interest oriented statute can rightly 
claim greater democratic legitimacy than a preexisting public-regarding statute.   Entities of 
relatively high democratic legitimacy regularly generate legal norms of suspect democratic 
legitimacy.  Likewise, entities of relatively low democratic legitimacy will regularly produce 
legal norms of strong democratic legitimacy.  The extant system incorporates no mechanism to 
adherence to commitments over generations).
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accommodate this reality.45
The system=s fixation on the sources of legal norms and exclusion of other relevant 
considerations leaves it open to a series of Ayes, but...@ rejoinders.  Yes, legislatures are more 
democratically legitimate than administrative agencies.  But in this particular case the legislature 
has passed a special interest statute, while the agency has promulgated a regulation more in line 
with majoritarian preferences.  Or yes, today=s legislature is more democratically legitimate than 
the legislature retired half a generation ago.  But in this particular case today=s legislature has 
passed a statute at odds with current majoritarian preferences, while the long-retired legislature 
created a statute still sanctioned by broad public support.  Or yes, We the People are the more 
democratically legitimate source of legal norms than legislative bodies, administrative agencies, 
or courts.  But in many cases, statutes, agency regulations, or even common law norms more 
closely match current majoritarian sentiments, what would be majoritarian sentiment given 
sufficient information and public deliberation, or long held societal consensus, than do 
45
. Relatedly, the extant system incorporates no mechanism for dealing with the 
effect of time on the democratic legitimacy of legal norms.  Even if, for example, 
a statute enjoyed unimpeachable democratic legitimacy from all perspectives 
when first passed, over time its democratic legitimacy may vanish.  The majority 
coalition that favored the statute=s policy may shatter.  Law or social 
circumstances may move on and leave the stationary statute=s policy out of step.  
A recently created administrative regulation may more closely approximate 
current majoritarian sentiment than does the antiquated statute.  See GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-7 (1982) (outlining 
dilemma of statutes that no longer command majoritarian support but which are 
not likely to be repealed).  The extant system fixates on the democratic legitimacy 
of the sources of the conflicting norms alone and ignores the temporal element.  
As a result, the system will work to preserve the outmoded statute carrying a 
claim to democratic legitimacy that has long since expired, over a conflicting 
administrative regulation of recent vintage that is in line with current majority 
sentiment.  
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constitutional provisions sanctioned by We the People over two centuries ago.
There may be rational reasons for the extant system=s strategy of fixating on the 
democratic legitimacy of the sources of legal norms.  In other words, there may exist reasons for 
truncating a multifaceted evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms.  It 
must be recognized, however, that fixating on the sources of legal norms exacts a price B the 
preservation of individual norms of relatively low democratic legitimacy and the concordant 
nullification of individual norms of relatively high democratic legitimacy.  Moreover, the price 
exacted runs contrary to the very democracy-enhancing narratives that justify the use and 
perpetuation of the extant system for resolving cases of conflict between legal norms. 
B. Problem Two: The Incentive for Bias and Manipulation of Interpretive 
Discretion
A second problem engendered by the extant system grows out of the first.  The extant 
system regularly puts courts to a Hobson=s choice:  Either interpretive honesty with consequent 
degradation of the democratic legitimacy of law, or bias and dishonesty in interpretation allowing 
enhancement or preservation of the democratic legitimacy of law.  
As already discussed, the extant system can nullify individual legal norms of strong 
democratic legitimacy and concordantly preserve norms of weak democratic legitimacy.  Thus, 
where a new regulation of strong democratic legitimacy stands in conflict with a special interest 
oriented statute of weak democratic legitimacy, the extant system demands nullification of the 
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former and preservation of the latter.46
The rigidity of the axiomatic meta-norms composing the extant system leaves a court 
facing such a case with two stark options, both of which are problematic: First, a court can 
straightforwardly and honestly admit that the two norms stand in irreconcilable conflict.  Because 
the rigid and exceptionless axioms composing the extant system afford courts no discretion or 
flexibility, this path leads inexorably to a problematic outcome B  nullification of the regulation, 
the norm of stronger democratic legitimacy.  Second, aiming to avoid this problematic outcome, 
a court can use its interpretive discretion to preserve the regulation.  In order to avoid the anti-
democratic outcome, however, a court must resort to bias or outright judicial dishonesty in the 
interpretation of norms.  The rigidity of the extant system denies courts a way to legitimately 
avoid the anti-democratic outcome, and thereby provokes courts to deploy bias and dishonesty in 
norm interpretation.47
46
. For the remainder of the Article I will rely heavily on examples involving statutes 
and regulations.  Most of the points demonstrated using these examples also are
applicable to conflicts involving other kinds of legal norms.  Thus, just as a 
particular regulation may make a stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than a 
particular conflicting statute, so too might a particular statute make a stronger 
claim to democratic legitimacy than a particular conflicting constitutional norm.  
Similarly, a particular old regulation might make a stronger claim to democratic 
legitimacy than some new regulation.  
47
. Thus, when faced with the prospect of a special interest statute trumping a 
regulation of strong democratic legitimacy, no court can challenge the categoric 
axiom and the statute over conflicting regulation ordering.  A court, however, can 
use and abuse its interpretive discretion to manipulate the meaning of the statute 
and regulation, whether the statute and regulation stand in conflict, and therefore 
whether the statute will trump the regulation.  If a court interprets the norms such 
that the statute and regulation stand in conflict, the statute will trump the 
regulation.  If a court interprets the norms such that the statute and regulation do 
not stand in conflict, the statute will not trump the regulation.       
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1.  An Illustrative Regulation
In order to more clearly explicate the Hobson=s choice, and the incentive for dishonest 
application of interpretive discretion, I will introduce a fictional but plausible chronicle of the 
birth and possible death of an administrative regulation.  The fictional regulation is inspired by 
the FTC=s >do not call= registry regulations discussed in the introduction.48  Visualize the 
following scenario: Hoping to bolster the President=s position leading into the next election cycle, 
the President=s domestic advisors decide to pursue, among several other domestic initiatives, 
controls on unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail, commonly known as Aspam@ e-mail.49  While no 
election will turn on the spam issue, the President and his advisors correctly perceive that a new 
law substantially restricting spam e-mail would meet with very strong popular approval.    
The legislative route appears uncertain.  Congressional committees that have considered 
the spam e-mail issue have focused on an >opt-out= policy similar to the national >do not call=
registry used to control unwanted telemarketing solicitations.50   The opt-out policy would permit 
the sending of spam e-mail unless the user of a particular e-mail address specifically opts-out of 
48
. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10.
49
. Spam e-mail has been defined in various ways.  See Bill Husted & Ann Hardie, 
Spam Wars: Spam Q&A, ATLANTA J.  CONST., Dec.14, 2003, at A12 (pointing to 
different definitions of spam e-mail); Bob Sullivan, Do Not Spam Lists Won=t 
Work, FTC Says, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5216554 (updated June 15, 
2004, 2:01 p.m. ET) (on file with author) (providing various definitions of spam 
e-mail).  In this Article I consider spam e-mail to be unsolicited commercial bulk 
e-mail. 
50
. The national >do not call= registry is a product of FTC and FCC regulations.  The 
regulations prohibit telemarketers from calling phone numbers placed on a 
national registry.  See supra text accompanying notes 1-6 and notes 1-6.
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spam e-mail by placing his or her e-mail address on a national registry.  Most Internet analysts 
believe that the opt-out strategy would be far less effective in the spam context than in the 
telemarketing context and would produce only a minimal reduction in the volume of spam e-
mail.51   Not only would such a statute be ineffective, it could also preempt more effective state 
laws regulating spam e-mail and foreclose adoption of an effective federal statute for the 
foreseeable future.52
51
. See Saul Hansell, F.T.C. Rebuffs Plan to Create No-Spam List, N.Y. TIMES, June 
16, 2004, at C1 (discussing the FTC recommendation against creating a do-not-e-
mail registry); Sullivan, supra note 49, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5216554 
(explaining that opt out list would actually exacerbate problem since it would give 
spammers list of valid e-mail addresses they could use to send more spam). 
52
. Preemption of more effective state anti-spam laws apparently came to fruition in 
2003 when Congress passed the CAN-SPAM Act in December of 2003.  CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699, 4-6 (2003) (codified in 
various sections of 15, 18, 28 and 47 U.S.C.).  The CAN-SPAM Act preempts 
roughly thirty state anti-spam regulations, many of which are fairly stringent.  See 
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. ' 7707 (b) (2003) (preemption of state law 
provision of CAN-SPAM Act); Editorial, Congressional Spam Filter, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at A18 (explaining defects in federal anti-spam legislation 
including preemption of state anti-spam laws). 
The CAN-SPAM Act creates civil and criminal sanctions for the sending 
of spam e-mail deceptive in source or content, and requires that spam e-mail 
include mechanisms allowing recipients to opt out of further spam e-mail 
communications from the sender.  CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
187, 117 Stat.  2699, '' 4-6 (2003) (codified in various sections of 15, 18 and 28 
U.S.C.).  The law authorizes enforcement by the FTC and other federal agencies, 
as well as by states and civil suits brought by Internet service providers.  CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. ' 7707(b) (2003).  Suits have already been 
brought under the Act. See Mylene Mangalindan, Web Firms File Spam Suit 
Under New Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at B4 (describing four major 
Internet service providers= suits against spammers as first major legal action 
under CAN-SPAM); Mike Brunker, E-mail Giants Sue Alleged Spam Sender, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4496759, (updated Mar. 10, 2004, 4:56 p.m. ET) 
(on file with author) (detailing lawsuits by major Internet service providers 
against alleged violators of CAN-SPAM).  
Most commentators believe that the CAN-SPAM Act regulatory 
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Influenced by Internet advertizing lobbyists, key congressional committee chairs have 
stalled efforts to consider federal anti-spam legislation.  Seeing the legislative path blocked, the 
President=s advisors focus on the administrative level, where they have more influence and are 
less likely to lose control of the process.  Without delay, administration officials begin pushing 
the FTC to promulgate a new regulation adopting a comprehensive regulatory framework.
The comprehensive framework includes three elements.  First, it incorporates an >opt-in=
policy.  Under an opt-in regulatory scheme, spam e-mail may not be sent to an e-mail address 
unless the user of the e-mail address has specifically and knowingly opted in or consented to 
receipt of spam e-mail communications from a particular sender.  Consent may be secured by 
mail, telephone, or face-to-face communications.  Those who send spam e-mail without securing 
consent are subject to fines and civil damage suits.  Second, the comprehensive approach 
institutes a very small fee to be paid on a per recipient basis by any sender of commercial e-mail 
to 1,000 or more non-consenting e-mail addresses.  Because only a tiny fraction of spam e-mails 
approach will prove ineffective.  See Mangalindan, supra, at B4 (Aindependent 
analysts say there is little evidence yet that the tough new federal law reduces 
spam volumes@); Jennifer Wolcott, Will Spam Be Totally Canned?, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 2, 2004, at 13 (ACritics of the CAN-SPAM act say it=s 
not tough enough, as the law doesn=t actually make it illegal to send spam@); 
Editorial, Why Federal Anti-Spam Legislation Will Fall Short: It=s Up to 
Consumers to Press Lawmakers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 15, 2003, at 
Op.1; Brad Stone, Soaking in Spam, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 2003, at 66, 69 
(AAlmost everyone involved with the spam debate admits CAN-SPAM will do 
little@); Declan McCullagh, Spam Keeps Cookin= B Despite New Laws, at
http://www.msn-cnet.com.com/2100-1024-5160.html?part=msn-
cnet&subj=ns_5160503&tag=tg_home, (last updated Feb.17, 2004, 4:35pm PST) 
(on file with author) (FTC attorney stating that ACan-Spam is not going to solve 
the problem@).  One worrisome sign that CAN-SPAM will be ineffectual is that 
industry lobbyists supported its passage while consumer groups had hoped 
Congress would do nothing.  See Editorial, Congressional Spam Filter, N.Y. 
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result in economic benefit to the seller, the fee would make most spam e-mail communications 
economically non-viable.53  Finally, the comprehensive approach provides financial incentives to 
Internet access providers that apply technological solutions to the spam e-mail problem.  The 
comprehensive approach would produce a far more substantial reduction in the flow of spam e-
mail than would the opt-out policy under consideration in Congress.54
As three of the five FTC board members were appointed by the President and are of the 
same political party, the agency responds accordingly.  After an accelerated rule making process,
a comprehensive new anti-spam regulatory scheme incorporating the opt-in strategy, fees, and 
financial incentives is published in the Federal Register.  Upon promulgation the regulation 
proves both effective and wildly popular.  All is well across the land.  
All is well, that is, until an e-mail marketing industry group sues the FTC seeking to have 
the anti-spam e-mail regulations declared null and void.  The suit is based on a 12 year old statute 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at A18.
53
. As the fee would only apply when unsolicited commercial bulk e-mails are sent to 
a large number of recipients, it would not discourage the legitimate and ordinary 
use of e-mail communications.  It would, however, make spam e-mail 
commercially non-viable. See Stone, supra note 52, at 66, 69 (discussing micro-
payment strategy); Kevin DeMarrais, Updating the War on Spam: E-mail Skeptic 
Finds Reason for Optimism, THE [BERGEN] RECORD, Feb. 29, 2004, at B1 
(discussing the results of CAN-SPAM and other possible ways to combat spam 
including a postage method proposed by Microsoft); Stephan Parks, Editorial, 
What Spam Costs, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2003, at A22 (editorial discussing the 
possibility of a postage stamp system for e-mail).
54
. An opt-in policy alone would be ineffective.  See J. Trevor. Hughes, Sen. Test., 
2003 WL 11718270 (May 21, 2003) (testimony by president of Network 
Advertisers Initiative before Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Committee explaining various methods for combating spam).  A multifaceted
approach including legislation and technological tools would be most effective.  
Id.
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passed at the behest of the telemarketing industry.  The statute prohibits all but very limited 
regulation of commercial communications transmitted over phone lines or other wires.  Like 
spam e-mail, telemarketing has always been unpopular with the public.  The telemarketing 
industry, however, used access to key legislators, plus a healthy dose of congressional campaign 
contributions, to facilitate passage of protective legislation.  Strategically well placed campaign 
contributions to key committee gatekeepers over the years have inoculated the statute against 
amendments allowing more vigorous regulation.    
The statute states that AThe Commission [FTC] shall not issue regulations pertaining to 
unsolicited commercial communications over telephone and other wires, except that the 
Commission may issue regulations pertaining to intimidating unsolicited commercial 
communications and to abusive unsolicited commercial communications.@55  Though passed long 
before e-mail communication existed in any meaningful commercial form, and passed with 
telemarketing in mind, the text of the statute is broad enough to prohibit almost all regulation of 
spam e-mail.  Like telemarketing communications, spam e-mail travels Aover telephone and other 
wires.@56
The record of legislative history demonstrates that Congress uniformly understood the
statutory permission to regulate Aabusive@ communications as granting only the power to regulate 
acts such as the number of telemarketing calls in a given time period or the hours at which such 
55
. The fictional statute is comparable to the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and 
Abuse Prevention Act of 1994, which grants the FTC power to promulgate rules 
prohibiting Adeceptive@ or Aabusive@ telemarketing practices.  See supra note 10. 
56
. RON WHITE, HOW COMPUTERS WORK 344 (1999) (explaining that data commonly 
travels over the Internet through a modem connected to a phone line or cable 
connection to a network).
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calls could be made.  The permission to regulate Aintimidating@ communication was understood 
as permitting regulations aimed at controlling the use of the language associated with 
overzealous debt collection agencies.  All other forms of regulation, and in particular regulations 
constituting blanket prohibitions, were uniformly understood to be impermissible.  
In its suit against the FTC, the e-mail industry marketing group argues that the statute 
permits only regulation of Aintimidating@ and/or Aabusive@ communications.  The anti-spam e-
mail regulations fall well outside these narrow categories because they do not seek to regulate the 
time, quantity, or content of the communications.  Instead, the regulations set up a pervasive 
prohibition on simply engaging in commercial bulk e-mail communications.  In other words,
even if not Aabusive@ in terms of the number of communications sent to a particular recipient or 
other similar factors, the regulations would both forbid and impose cost prohibitive fees on most 
unsolicited e-mail communications.
2.  The Hobson=s Choice:  Anti-Democratic Outcomes and Incentives for 
Bias and Manipulation of Interpretive Discretion
How would a court respond to the suit?  The answer illustrates the Hobson=s choice 
precipitated by the extant system governing adjudication of conflicting legal norms.  If, as 
appears to be the case, the statute and regulation stand in irreconcilable conflict, straightforward 
application of the extant system leads to nullification of the regulation.  When two legal norms 
stand in conflict, the norm belonging to the superordinate legal category trumps the norm 
belonging to the subordinate legal category.  The rigidity of the axioms leaves the judge facing 
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conflicting legal norms no wiggle room, no flexibility, no opening for judicial discretion.57
This outcome, however, creates a problem.  Though promulgated by an agency, the anti-
spam regulation, as an individual legal norm, makes a strong claim to democratic legitimacy 
based on its coincidence with current majoritarian sentiments.  Simply stated, the public has 
wanted meaningful curbs on spam e-mail for some time.58  The regulation responds to that public 
consensus and has proved wildly popular.  But for the obstructionism of a few congressional 
committee gatekeepers, an effective anti-spam statute could very foreseeably have been enacted 
as a statute.  
The case for the democratic legitimacy of the statute as an individual legal norm is 
57
. A court might also nullify the regulation by finding that it violates the First 
Amendment.  Current commercial speech doctrine offers enough leeway to 
plausibly find either that the regulation is or is not an unconstitutional restriction 
on First Amendment free speech rights.  The key issue would center on whether 
the regulation would constitute a Areasonably tailored means@ of curbing 
unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail.  See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to hold ban on personal solicitation as applied to 
CPAs unconstitutional under the First Amendment because not directly linked to 
objective of protecting consumers from fraud and conflicts of interests); Cent. 
Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm=n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to hold that law prohibiting advertising by utilities violated First 
Amendment because not directly related to the substantial government interest of 
energy conservation).  The national >do not call= registry has been held 
constitutional.  Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 
2003).  Unlike the opt-out strategy of the national >do not call= registry, however, 
the anti-spam regulation would prohibit the initiation of e-mail commercial 
communications unless recipients opt-in to the receipt of such communications.  It 
also would place a fee on spam e-mail communications.  It is unclear whether 
such a regulatory approach would pass constitutional muster.
58
. See Dana H. Schultz, CAN-SPAM Really Be Stopped?, CAL. BAR JOURNAL, July 
2004, at 1 (citing study finding that 83 percent of respondents dislike spam e-
mail); Reuters, Survey: Americans Support >Do-Not-Spam= Registry, CHI. TRIB., 
Oct. 16, 2003, at  4 (stating that three fourths of those surveyed supported Senator 
Schumer=s plan for a do not spam registry).
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comparatively weak.  To the extent that the statute prohibits meaningful regulation of spam e-
mail, it goes against clear public preferences.  Moreover, initial passage of the statute and 
subsequent insulation from amendment have been the result of special interest politics.  The mere 
fact that the statute was created by Congress, rather than an administrative agency, hardly 
counterbalances these considerations.  
If the statute trumps the regulation, the norm of substantially stronger democratic 
legitimacy will have been nullified.  Most courts will not have missed the trick.  Regardless of 
the entities that created the statute and regulation, courts understand that preservation and 
extension of the special interest statute, and concordant nullification of the popular anti-spam 
regulation, in a very real way degrade rather than enhance the democratic legitimacy of law.  
They also understand that a judicial decision to nullify the popular regulation would be met with 
public bewilderment.  Why, the public would wonder, has an unelected judge annulled such a 
popular new law?
Yet there are ways around this unhappy result.  Though the regulation would seem to 
stand in clear conflict with the applicable statute, a bit of judicial prevarication would allow a 
court to avoid striking down the popular anti-spam regulation.   Given the rigidity of the axioms, 
a court will have to find that the statute and regulation do not stand in conflict.  If not in conflict, 
the axiomatic meta-norms (and their fixation on the democratic legitimacy of the sources of legal 
norms) do not come into play, and the regulation will remain intact.
In order to find that the statute and regulation do not stand in conflict, the court must find 
that the sending of spam e-mail without an opt-in by the recipient constitutes an Aabusive@
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communication and therefore is subject to regulation under the statute.59  Only a judicial sleight 
of hand at a crucial juncture, however, would enable this interpretation of the word Aabusive.@
The dishonesty does not involve the court=s interpretation of the word Aabusive@ per se.  A spam 
e-mail communication without pre-approval by the recipient could plausibly be construed as an 
Aabusive@ communication.  The dishonesty instead lies in the inescapable deception needed to 
avoid the evidence of legislative intent demonstrating that the word Aabusive@ in the statute 
means something far narrower.
Recall that by allowing regulation of Aabusive@ and/or Aintimidating@ communications 
over telephone and other wires, Congress intended only to permit regulations pertaining to the 
timing, frequency, and content of commercial communications.  Congress decidedly did not 
intend to allow regulations prohibiting the initiation of communications altogether.60  The anti-
spam regulation, however, does just that.  The opt-in feature, in particular, prohibits the initiation 
of unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail communications to most potential recipients.  In addition, 
the fee on spam e-mail constitutes a de facto prohibition.  If the court consults evidence of 
legislative intent, it will have to find that the regulations conflict with the statute and in turn will 
59
. The national >do not call= registry cases dealt with a very similar issue.  See supra
text accompanying notes 1-6.  The FTC used its authority under the 
Telemarketing Act to regulate Aabusive@ telemarketing communications to 
promulgate amended regulations creating the national >do not call= registry and 
prohibiting calls to numbers listed on the registry.  Supra note 10; see also 
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 283 F. Supp. 2d. 1151,1155-56 (D. Colo 
2003) (explaining history of >do not call= registry regulations).  Litigation 
challenged the FTC authority to promulgate these regulations.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 1-6. 
60
. In fact the intent was the opposite.  Congress intended to protect commercial 
communications against prohibitions and almost all limitations.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 56-57.
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be forced to nullify the popular regulations.  
The key, therefore, is to avoid reference to legislative history.61  A well-worn interpretive 
rule provides that courts may not refer to legislative history when the text of a statute is 
unambiguous.62  In order to avoid reference to legislative history, therefore, all the court need do 
is cite the interpretive principle and then find that the text of the statute B the meaning of the 
word Aabusive@ B  is unambiguous.63
61
. Avoidance of legislative history would be easy for the handful of federal judges 
who maintain that the record of legislative history is never or almost never a 
legitimate resource when interpreting statutes.  Justice Scalia is the most vocal 
and prominent advocate of this approach to statutory interpretation.  See Chisom 
v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404-17 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
text of the statute should be the main inquiry of a statutory interpretation case); 
see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3-47 (1997) (offering a 
defense of textualism).  
Scalia=s new textualist approach, however, has been largely rejected.  
When interpreting ambiguous statutes the vast majority of federal judges will 
consider legislative history as evidence of legislative intent.  See Wisc. Pub. 
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (all then sitting justices 
except Scalia rejecting interpretation of statutes without reference to legislative 
history). Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 818 F. Supp. 623, 628 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Justice Antonin Scalia=s A>plain meaning= theory of statutory 
interpretation is dangerous precisely because it can be used to frustrate 
Congressional purpose...@); Lawrence Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of 
Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 235, 263-70 (1997) 
(discussing rejection of new textualism and continued use of legislative history in 
interpreting statutes).  
62
. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (declining to 
assess legislative history because statute is unambiguous); Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994) (Awe do not resort to legislative history to 
cloud statutory text that is clear@); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401 (1992) 
(A[A]ppeals to statutory history are well taken only to resolve >statutory 
ambiguity=@); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (AThe language of ' 109 
is not unclear. Thus, although a court appropriately may refer to a statute's 
legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity, there is no need to do so here@).
63
. This may have been exactly what happened in the litigation over the national >do 
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This last maneuver, of course, is the inescapable deception.  The term Aabusive@ in the 
statute is undeniably subject to multiple plausible interpretations.  It might reasonably take on the 
broad meaning advanced by the court=s interpretation.  But it might also take on the narrower 
meaning suggested by legislative intent.  Only by indulging the fiction that the term Aabusive@ is 
free of ambiguity, and then selecting one of several plausible readings, can the court avoid 
reference to legislative intent and thereby preserve the anti-spam regulation.64
The approach is doubly dishonest in that the opinion no doubt will be written as opinions 
are almost always written B  as if the conclusion were determined by neutral rules of legal 
interpretation and not by an exercise of judicial discretion aided by manipulation of interpretive 
principles.65  The court, in other words, will not (and indeed cannot) admit that the court has 
not call= registry regulations.  See supra text accompanying note 10 and note 10. 
64
. Courts regularly avoid reference to legislative history with a questionable 
determination that the text of a statute is unambiguous.  See, e.g., Sutton v. United 
Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 482, 497-99 (1999) (adopting interpretation of ADA at 
odds with legislative intent and refusing to consult legislative intent on ground 
that statute was unambiguous despite patent ambiguity and fact that eight of nine 
circuit courts and three executive agencies had read statute contrary to supposedly 
unambiguous meaning adopted by Court). More generally, courts often find that a 
statute is unambiguous when in fact subject to more than one plausible meaning.  
See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Systs., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1248 (2004) 
(despite patently ambiguous statutory meaning and reasonable EEOC 
interpretation to the contrary, Court held that the ADEA does not prohibit 
favoring older workers over younger workers based on theory that statute was 
unambiguous).
65
. On rare occasions courts will admit that legal norms are subject to multiple 
plausible interpretations and that factors beyond the substantive and interpretative 
law in question dictate which interpretation a court adopts.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1331 (7th Cir.1990) (Posner, J., dissenting) 
(admitting that meaning of ambiguous sentencing statute regarding sentencing for 
sale of LSD is not determined by the legal material but should be driven by 
pragmatic considerations of equal treatment).  Such frank honesty, however, is the 
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chosen to adopt the broad meaning of Aabusive.@  To the untrained or careless eye, it appears as 
though the decision is rule driven rather than judicial discretion driven.  In reality, however, the 
opinion is more opaque and obfuscatory than transparent and honest.  The desire to avoid an anti-
democratic outcome, not objective interpretive rules, motivates the outcome.   
The possibility of judicial deception, coupled with the unappealing anti-democratic 
outcome that would result from straightforward application of the extant system, generates value 
conflict.  On the one hand, courts profess (and presumably at some level actually desire) to
decide cases in accord with applicable legal principles.  On the other hand, courts know that 
straightforward application of the axiomatic meta-norms governing adjudication of conflicting 
legal norms will result in nullification of a legal norm that enjoys solid popular support.  The 
dissonance between these competing considerations provokes the Hobson=s choice B either 
honestly preserve the statute of dubious democratic legitimacy or dishonestly preserve the 
regulation of presumably stronger democratic legitimacy.  
The straightforward and honest opinion would admit the statutory ambiguity, refer to the 
record of legislative intent, find the regulation in conflict with the statute, and then nullify the 
regulation.  Many courts will stoicly and straightforwardly apply the extant system to nullify the 
regulation and leave the anti-democratic outcome to be repaired by Congress.  In a case like the 
anti-spam regulation illustration, however, congressional repair will not likely be forthcoming.66
exception rather than the rule.  
66
. Congress is not even aware of many statutory interpretation decisions.  See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
409 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing disappointing results of ACorrections Day@ process 
in House of Representatives under which Congress may consider and correct 
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Other courts, however, will choose the path of benign dishonesty.   Flexible and often 
contradictory interpretive rules offer courts sufficient material from which to contrive an opinion 
which avoids nullification of the popular regulation.  In cases where the extant system would 
instruct nullification of norms of strong democratic legitimacy, the temptation to exploit that 
flexible interpretive discretion grows strong.67  Rather than nullify a popular legal norm, a court 
can twist the meaning of norms and break interpretive rules in a benign dishonesty aimed at 
major judicial statutory interpretations); John Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1281-82 (1996) (A[M]any admitted statutory mistakes 
remain uncorrected. Moreover, the corrections that do occur are often random, or 
conversely, dependent on who has the greatest access to Congress@); Abner J. 
Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. 
L. REV. 587, 609 (1983) (arguing that "most Supreme Court decisions never come 
to the attention of Congress@); Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference 
of the District of Columbia Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 323-24 (1988) (arguing that 
congressional staff was unaware of most significant circuit court statutory 
interpretation decisions).  But see William N.  Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 341-44 (1991) 
(presenting evidence suggesting that Congress monitors statutory interpretations). 
 Even if aware of the decision, for a variety of reasons, Congress often does not 
overturn statutory interpretation decisions.  Id. at 343-53 (presenting evidence 
showing that Congress does override Supreme Court statutory interpretation 
issues regularly, but also declines to override vast majority of such decisions).  
Finally, in this case, committee gatekeepers have already blocked efforts to enact 
statutes permitting regulation of spam e-mail.  The same forces that produced this 
blockage would block any effort to respond to judicial pleas for congressional 
revision of the statute. 
67
. I do not posit courts as single-minded maximizers of the democratic legitimacy of 
the law.  Many factors influence judicial decision-making, including the nature of 
the applicable legal rules and the social, political, and/or legal ideology of the 
judge (which may include attitudes about rule-following).  See JEFFREY A.  SEGAL 
& HOWARD J.  SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 86-97 (2002) (leading publication supporting attitudinal model thesis 
that ideology is primary determinant in judicial decision making).  I only argue 
that avoidance of anti-democratic outcomes is one of those factors.  All other 
things being equal, many courts prefer not to nullify popular legal norms.      
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preserving the norm of high democratic legitimacy.68
C.  The Dimensions of the Problems: Big Issues in a Few Cases
Most cases will present no real threat that a norm of low democratic legitimacy will end 
up trumping a norm of high democratic legitimacy.  Most legal norms simply do not register one 
way or the other with the inattentive public.69  Even if the public or segments of the public are 
attentive, most often there will exist no obvious differentiation in the democratic legitimacy of 
two conflicting legal norms.  One norm will be favored by one set of interest groups, and the 
other favored by another set of interest groups.  No clear cut majority preference will emerge.  In 
most cases, therefore, the extant system will produce neither decidedly anti-democratic 
outcomes, nor unusually strong incentives for judicial manipulation or bias in application of 
68
. Conscious judicial dishonesty in the form of twisting or breaking interpretive 
rules constitutes one extreme end of a spectrum.  Lesser forms of manipulation at 
different points on the spectrum, however, can have the same effects.  The desire 
to avoid nullification of a norm of relatively high democratic legitimacy may 
produce conscious or unconscious biases in interpretation of possibly conflicting 
legal norms.  Courts may emphasize certain interpretive principles and de-
emphasize others in an attempt to preserve a preferred legal norm.  On this 
scenario, the court need not actually twist or break standing interpretive rules.  
Instead, the varied arsenal of interpretive rules available to judges are applied 
selectively in order to reach some desired substantive outcome.  One interpretive 
principle may be helpful to achieving the desired substantive outcome and another 
harmful.  The desire to reach a certain substantive outcome consciously or 
unconsciously influences the court=s selection of interpretive principles.  The 
dishonesty lies in deploying the helpful interpretive rule while conveniently 
failing to apply or discuss the harmful interpretive rule.
69
. See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A 
New Perspective on the ACentral Obsession@ of Constitutional Theory, George 
Mason University Law and Economics Working Paper Series, __ IOWA L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2005, available on SSRN) (pointing out that the public is often 
ignorant of legal and political issues). 
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interpretive discretion.  In these cases, the extant system operates adequately.  Where the public 
is ignorant and/or indifferent, or where potentially conflicting legal norms stand in a rough 
democratic legitimacy equilibrium, preservation of the norm created by the entity of greater 
democratic legitimacy is not an entirely unsatisfactory way to run the show.   
When the prospect of a truly and decidedly anti-democratic outcome does present itself, 
however, the problems precipitated by the extant system are quite serious.  As the anti-spam 
regulation illustrates, in these cases the extant system is most likely to produce the Hobson=s 
choice between nullification of the more democratically legitimate legal norm and dishonest 
manipulation of interpretive discretion aimed at avoiding an anti-democratic outcome. 
Moreover, because the extant system sometimes forces courts into a Hobson=s choice 
between two extremes, it produces substantial unpredictability.  For some judges rule-following 
will prevail over the desire to enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy of law.  Other 
judges place less value on rule-following and more on reaching the >right= outcome, which in 
some cases will mean evading nullification of norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy.  
These judges will take advantage of the flexible and frequently contradictory nature of 
interpretive rules.  They will exercise a benign manipulation aimed at avoiding nullification of 
legal norms that, regardless of source, bear the marks of strong democratic legitimacy.  Indeed, 
the same judge may vacillate between straightforward and honest norm interpretation and benign
manipulation of interpretive discretion from one case to the next.70
70
. It is not uncommon for judges to vacillate from one interpretive approach to 
another from case to case.  F.D.A. v.  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000), 
for example, reveals Justice Scalia joining an opinion driven exclusively by 
reliance on the record of legislative history and contradicted by clear statutory 
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The inevitable mix of approaches creates tremendous uncertainty.   The problem is not 
only that the axioms encourage the judicial white lie, but also that benign judicial prevarication is 
applied in a haphazard and uneven manner.  Consequently, the outcome of a case in which two 
legal norms may conflict will ultimately depend not on the axioms governing such cases, but 
rather on the attitude or approach of the judges deciding the case.  Ex ante, the litigant can never 
really know whether a court will handle a case by straightforward application of the extant 
system, or by interpretive manipulation aimed at avoiding the discretion-denying rigidity of the 
extant system.  
This is ironic.  The very purpose of rigid axioms which offer no room for judicial 
discretion and no exceptions is to control judicial discretion.71  Yet the very discretion-denying 
rigidity of the axioms provokes courts to seize upon and manipulate their flexible interpretive 
discretion as a strategy aimed to frustrate and defeat the axioms.  Why bother with the discretion-
denying rigid formalism of the axiomatic meta-norms when judges are eternally free to apply 
text.  Id. at 125-161.  In most cases, however, Scalia is a committed textualist and 
vocal critic of reliance on legislative history.  See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 
U.S. 380, 404-17 (1991) (Scalia, J.,  dissenting) (Scalia castigating Court=s 
opinion for following indicia of legislative intent over contrary clear statutory 
text).  Likewise, in Brown & Williamson, Justice Stevens joins a dissent that 
advocates interpretation of statute in accord with clear text and rejection of 
contrary legislative history.  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161-192.  In other 
cases, however, Stevens frequently relies on legislative history when interpreting 
statutes.  See, e.g., W. Va. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 108-111 (1991) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens advocating 
interpretation of statute based on record of legislative history rather than text of 
statute).
71
. See Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term - Forward: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (stating that rules bind 
decisionmakers and confine decisionmaker=s discretion).  
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open ended interpretive discretion circumventing the axioms= rigid formalism?
The failing of the extant system is not that it resolves the majority of cases in an 
unsatisfactory manner.  The failing of the extant system is that when it matters most it performs 
at its worst.  Ideally, the system governing adjudication of conflicts between legal norms would 
perform at least satisfactorily when performance really matters.  A better system would allow 
courts to reach democracy-reinforcing outcomes in cases like the anti-spam regulation illustration 
without resort to obfuscatory manipulation of interpretive discretion and opacity in written 
opinions.  What is needed is a set of rules for adjudicating cases involving conflicting legal 
norms without facing the Hobson=s choice.  What is needed is a set of rules that will allow courts 
to avoid nullification of individual norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy within the 
rules rather than via interpretive manipulation aimed at subverting the rules.  
IV .   Alternative System for Mediating Conflicts Between Legal Norms
The fundamental features of the extant system governing adjudication of conflicting legal 
norms are deeply ingrained in the unconscious conceptions of practicing lawyers.  Yet the extant 
system is nowhere written in stone.  There is nothing sacrosanct or unalterable about the peculiar 
features of the extant system.  Alternative systems are easily imaginable.72  Might a different 
system perform better than the extant system?
This Section discusses several alternatives to the extant system governing adjudication of 
72
. The Athenian legal system, for example, did not involve the kinds of divisions 
and hierarchies that modern legal systems employ.  Notably, while Athenian law 
did come to include constitutional norms, the Athenian system did not treat them 
as a separate category of higher order norms.  MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE 
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cases involving conflicting legal norms.  Some of the alternative systems are advanced primarily 
for the purpose of highlighting certain features of the extant system.  Many of the proposed 
alternatives seek to ameliorate the extreme rigidity of the extant axiomatic meta-norms and/or 
broaden the narrow focus on the democratic legitimacy of the entities that create legal norms 
marking the extant system.  Some of the alternatives would significantly alter traditional 
institutional roles and relationships.  
As we will see, it is possible to construct systems for dealing with irreconcilable conflicts 
between legal norms that perform better than the extant system in terms of enhancement or 
preservation of the democratic legitimacy of law.  It is also possible to construct systems which 
do not force courts into a Hobson=s choice between democracy-enhancing outcomes and 
manipulation of interpretive discretion.  It may even be possible to construct systems with both of 
these salutary features.  All systems, however, entail both benefits and drawbacks.  The optimal 
system will depend upon which benefits one wishes to maximize and which drawbacks one 
wishes to minimize.  
A.  Radical Departures from the Extant System
I begin with a trio of alterative systems that would work radical alterations to the extant 
system.  Though it is hard to imagine adoption of these radical systems, they can teach us 
something about the extant system and what we might want from more probable alternatives.  
ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES 165 (1991).
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1. The Purely Chronologic System
One possible alternative system would base adjudication of cases involving irreconcilably 
conflicting legal norms on a variant of the chronologic axiom.  This system would eliminate the 
source, hierarchic, and categoric axioms.  There would exist no practical differences between 
kinds of norms, no hierarchy of kinds of norms, and no trump of norms belonging to 
superordinate categories over norms belonging to subordinate categories.  Under the purely 
chronologic system, whenever two norms are found in a posture of irreconcilable conflict, the 
norm created later in time would trump the norm created earlier in time. 
The correlation between the democratic legitimacy of sources and the democratic 
legitimacy of the particular norms they create is often weak.73  If chronology is a more accurate 
indicator of democratic legitimacy than source, a purely chronologic system could do better at 
preserving norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy than the extant source-centric 
system.74    The link between chronology and democratic legitimacy is often quite strong in cases
73
. Thus, while legislatures in general may score relatively high on the democratic 
legitimacy scale, in any given particular instance the statutes passed by 
legislatures may score very low on that scale.  A legislative body, for example,  
sometimes will pass a special interest oriented statute that goes against 
majoritarian preferences, or what would be majoritarian preferences were the 
public well informed and able to deliberate on the issues.  In other instances, a 
statute that may have scored high on the democratic legitimacy scale early in its 
existence may, over time, have grown outmoded and out of synch with present 
majority preferences.  See supra note 26.      
74
. In the anti-spam regulation illustration, for example, the recency of the norm 
better correlates with the democratic legitimacy of the norms involved than does 
the source which generated the norms.  See supra text accompanying notes 48-59. 
  Contrary to  the extant system, a purely chronological system would demand 
preservation of the popular anti-spam regulation and nullification of the 
conflicting special interest oriented statute.
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involving conflicts between constitutional provisions and statutes.  Recently passed statutes 
frequently manifest, from most perspectives, greater democratic legitimacy than do antiquated 
constitutional provisions.75  Because the purely chronologic alternative would incorporate no 
hierarchy of kinds of legal norms, it would work to preserve recent statutes and nullify (or 
modify) conflicting old constitutional provisions.  In so doing, the purely chronologic system 
would, over the run of cases, tend to preserve norms of greater democratic legitimacy more often 
than does the source-centric extant system.   
Consider the Commerce Clause and the countless federal statutes passed under its 
authority.  Indulge the assumption for a moment that, as some scholars argue, the original 
Commerce Clause offered Congress a relatively restricted zone of legislative power.76  If this 
assumption is correct, much modern federal legislation stands in conflict with the original 
Commerce Clause.  Under the extant source-centric system, vast swaths of statutory law created 
75
. This phenomenon gives rise to the counter-majoritarian difficulty.  See
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) (discussing counter-majoritarian nature of 
judicial review).   
76
. See Randy Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, 55 ARK. L.  REV. 847 (2003) (presenting evidence supporting thesis that 
original intent of Commerce Clause was to grant Congress narrow power to 
regulate only Atrade and exchange@); Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) (same).  The notion that the 
original Commerce Clause granted narrow legislative powers is not without 
controversy.  See Robert J.  Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S.  Nelson, A Critique of the 
Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW.U. L. REV. 695 (2002) 
(disputing narrow meaning of original Commerce Clause); Grant S. Nelson & 
Robert J.  Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to 
Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social 
Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999) (same).  Justice Thomas has advanced the 
narrow original meaning of the Commerce Clause in his opinions.  See, e.g., 
United States v.  Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1985) (Thomas, J., concurring).     
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in recent decades establishing national policies on everything from economic, product, and 
workplace safety regulations, to environmental protection, stand at risk of nullification.  The 
Commerce Clause emanated from We the People, while the statutes in question emanated from 
Congress, the legislative agent of the principal People.  When in conflict, norms of superordinate 
kind trump norms of subordinate kind.       
Abolition of these statutes would produce the classic anti-democratic dead hand of the 
past problem B ancient and no longer majoritarian constitutional norms frustrating modern 
statutes which better reflect current majority preference.  The purely chronologic system would 
completely eliminate the dead hand of the past problem.  Under such a system, recent statutes 
embodying current majoritarian preferences would trump conflicting and no longer majoritarian 
constitutional provisions, such as the original Commerce Clause.  The will of the current 
generation, expressed in modern statutes, would trump that of a generation dead for over two 
centuries, expressed in ancient constitutional provisions.          
Courts operating under the extant system, of course, have blunted the dead hand of the 
past problem via judicial revision of constitutional norms.  Returning to the Commerce Clause,  
the Supreme Court in the 1930s could have straightforwardly applied the extant axiomatic meta-
norms and continued striking down federal statutes as beyond the scope of narrow Commerce 
Clause powers.77  This path, however, would have entailed the democratically illegitimate 
77
. This is exactly what the Court did up until 1937.  See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936) (striking down Bituminous Coal Conservation 
Act because regulation of coal mining not within scope of Commerce Clause 
powers); Schecter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) (holding 
regulation of poultry operation by National Recovery Industrial Act beyond scope 
of Commerce Clause powers); United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 12 
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prospect of an unelected Supreme Court nullifying statutes embodying policies endorsed by 
elected officials on the winning side of landslide elections in 1934 and 1936.78  Rather than 
continue the anti-democratic path, starting in 1937, the Court supplanted the narrow Commerce 
Clause with a spacious judicially reinvented Commerce Clause.79  In other words, rather than an 
outcome that would be perceived as anti-democratic, the Court eventually opted for the arguably 
lesser evil of judicial reformulation of a constitutional provision.80
(1895)  (holding Sherman Antitrust Act inapplicable to sugar manufacturers 
because regulation of manufacturing was not within scope of Commerce Clause 
powers).
78
. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 289-90, 306-11 
(1998) (explaining that landslide mid-term congressional elections of 1934 and 
presidential election of 1936 signaled overwhelming popular support for 
expanded regulatory powers of federal government and rejection of traditional 
constitutional limits on federal government power). 
79
. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120-28 (1942) (upholding Agricultural 
Ajustment Act on theory that Commerce Clause grants Congress power to 
regulate even negligible impacts on interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100, 113-15 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act on theory that 
Commerce Clause grants Congress power to regulate shipment of manufactured 
goods); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) 
(upholding National Labor Relations Act on theory that Commerce Clause grants 
Congress power to regulate activities burdening or obstructing commerce).  
80
. I make no statement on whether judicial reformulation constitutes a positive or 
negative, or a legitimate or illegitimate event.  Given the apparent preferences of 
the electorate for a more energetic federal government, however, judicial 
reformulation of the Commerce Clause is certainly defensible.  As Bruce 
Ackerman has argued, judicial reformulation of the Commerce Clause was not an 
instance of a loose canon court acting alone to alter the Constitution.  It instead 
was the final step in an extended political process involving electoral processes 
and the political branches of government.  The judicial reformulation of the 
Commerce Clause was more an instance of the Court lagging behind the 
electorate and the political branches.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 78, at 279-382 
(defending judicial reformulation of Commerce Clause by arguing that judicial 
revision was part of larger multi-step pattern involving other branches of 
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The final outcome obtained under the extant system was no different, and no less in 
conformity with the will of the then current generation, than that which would have resulted 
under a purely chronologic system.  The purely chronologic system, however, would not have 
required resort to judicial modification of the original Commerce Clause.  A Supreme Court 
operating under the purely chronologic system could have admitted that New Deal statutes stood 
in conflict with the narrow Commerce Clause, but held that the recently passed statutes (which 
better reflected modern majoritarian sentiment than the narrow Commerce Clause) trumped the 
narrow and outdated Commerce Clause.81   The Commerce Clause, for all intents and purposes, 
would have been modified by the passage of statutes, or in other words, by legislative action.  
Certainly this is unorthodox.  On the other hand, as history played out, and as it often plays out, 
the modification was effectuated via Supreme Court reinvention of the meaning of the commerce 
Clause.82  Between alteration of constitutional norms by legislative action or by judicial 
government and electoral processes which demonstrated that We the People 
sanctioned such revision).   
81
. Of course it must be recognized that under any system the pre-1937 Supreme 
Court may very well have sought to manipulate its interpretive discretion in order 
to perpetuate a narrow reading of the Commerce Clause.  The majority of the 
Court, in other words, may have been more motivated by a desire to effectuate 
certain federalism and congressional power policies than any desire to either 
enforce the original Commerce Clause or bend the law to fit the popular will of 
the time.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY 243 (2d ed.  2002) (observing that pre-1937 Commerce Clause decisions 
were produced by justices committed to laissez-faire economic theory and 
opposed to government economic regulation).  If correct, the purely chronologic 
system might not have stopped the Court from perpetuating a narrow Commerce 
Clause.    
82
. The Supreme Court=s alteration of the Commerce Clause is not unique.  
Constitutional change via judicial reinterpretation is far more common than 
constitutional change via formal Article V amendment.  David A. Strauss, The 
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reformulation, the former may be more palatable.83
The Commerce Clause example underscores the possibility that a purely chronologic 
system might (1) do better at promoting outcomes perceived as democratically legitimate than the 
extant system, and (2) might in turn reduce the need or incentive for dishonest judicial 
manipulation aimed at avoiding anti-democratic outcomes.  Despite these possibilities, several 
caveats apply. 
In the first instance, the chronologic system would at best make marginal improvements 
on the extant system.  The purely chronologic system, like the extant system, fixates on only one 
indicator of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms.  The extant system fixates on the sources 
of legal norms.  The purely chronologic system fixates on the chronology in which norms are 
created.  Any system which fixates on only one indicator is bound to produce abundant false 
positives B instances where the indicator wrongly indicates that a given legal norm possesses 
greater democratic legitimacy than some conflicting legal norm.84  Whether chronology or source 
is a better indicator of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms is an empirical question to which 
there exists no definitive answer.  If chronology is better, it is only marginally better.  Both are 
Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV  L. REV. 1457, 1459-62 
(2001) (arguing that Constitution has been informally amended by Supreme Court 
decisions more than by formal Article V processes).
83
. See Katyal, supra note 33, at 1358-94 (advocating enhanced congressional power 
to interpret constitutional norms).
84
. The extant system ends up privileging, for example, an outdated or a special 
interest statute contrary to current popular will over a regulation that happens to 
reflect current majoritarian sentiment.  Likewise, the chronologic system would 
end up privileging, for example, the new special interest statute contrary to current 
popular will over an old constitutional norm which, despite its age, coincides with 
current majoritarian preferences.
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exceedingly crude instruments by which to assess a puzzle as complex and multifaceted as the 
democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms.  Both the entity that created a given legal norm, 
and the chronology of its creation, plus a host of other factors, usually will be germane.  
Reduction of such a complex question to any single metric is thus bound to produce frequent 
false positives.
Relatedly, a shift to a chronologic system would at best work a minor reduction in the 
incentive for dishonest judicial bias and manipulation.  The purely chronologic alternative would 
be every bit as rigid and exceptionless as the extant system.  Just as under the extant system, 
courts placing comparatively low value on rule-following would resort to dishonest manipulation 
of interpretive discretion as a safety valve against nullification of norms of relatively strong 
democratic legitimacy.  
A chronology-based system, for example, would call for preservation of a recently created 
special interest oriented regulation and corresponding nullification of an old, but still 
majoritarian, conflicting statutory norm.  Dishonest manipulation of flexible interpretive 
discretion would be the only way to avoid such an outcome.  At least some courts would strive 
mightily to pick and choose among available interpretive rules, or to subtly and covertly 
manipulate interpretive rules, in order to find that the more democratically legitimate statute does 
not stand in conflict with the new special interest driven regulation.  In other words, the Hobson=s 
choice between interpretive honesty and democracy-reinforcing outcomes would still present 
itself at regular intervals.  
Another possibly problematic feature of a purely chronologic system relates to stability of 
existing law.  One feature of the extant system is that it makes alteration or abolition of existing 
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law  relatively difficult.  It accomplishes this by permitting alteration or abolition of existing 
legal norms only by the entities that created those norms or by superordinate entities.  For 
example, a statute can be altered or abolished only by the passage of a conflicting statute by 
Congress or the ratification of a conflicting constitutional amendment by We the People.  An 
administrative agency, in contrast, may not alter an existing statute by promulgating a new 
conflicting regulation.85
The purely chronologic system, in contrast, would permit any norm-generating entity to 
alter or abolish existing law simply by creating a new conflicting legal norm.  Congress could 
alter a constitutional norm by passage of a new statute.  An agency could abolish an existing 
statute by promulgation of a new conflicting regulation.  By allowing all norm-generating entities 
to alter all kinds of legal norms, the purely chronologic system would make alteration of existing 
law far easier than is currently the case.  Multiple avenues would be open to any interest group 
wishing for change in the state of the law.86  Those seeking change in the law would seek the
85
. Of course, existing statutes, or other forms of existing law, can always be altered 
via judicial manipulation or reinterpretation.  This method of alteration, however, 
operates not as part of or within the extant meta-norms, but as a way to subvert 
them.    
86
. Thus, in a world governed by a purely chronologic system, a change in existing 
statutory law would not require running the gauntlet of the legislative process, but 
rather prompting an administrative agency to promulgate a new conflicting 
regulation or a court to issue a new common law rule.
To some extent such prompting already ocurrs under the extant system.  
Rather than seek a statutory amendment, for example, an interest group seeking to 
alter existing statutory law may try to convince a court to issue a new and more 
favorable interpretation of the existing statute.  Or the interest group may pursue 
the promulgation of a new favorable regulation that is based on a new 
administrative reinterpretation of the statute.  Still, there are limits as to how far 
the bounds of judicial or administrative reinterpretation of existing statutes can or 
will be stretched.  Under a purely chronologic system there would be no such 
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path of least resistance by focusing their efforts on the entity most likely to respond to a plea for 
change.  The end result would be an accelerated pace of legal change, and far less stability than 
prevails under the extant system.
Moreover, the dynamic of creating and changing law would be completely altered in a 
way that would systematically favor entities that can most easily create new legal norms.  There 
seems to be a reverse correlation between the democratic legitimacy of a norm-generating entity 
and the ease with which that entity may create new legal norms.  At the top of the hierarchy, it is 
nearly impossible for We the People to ratify new constitutional norms.87  At the bottom of the 
hierarchy, creation of a new common law rule is as easy as announcing it in a judicial opinion.88
In the middle range of the hierarchy, passing statutes and promulgating new regulations is easier 
than ratifying constitutional amendments but harder than announcing new common law rules.  
Moreover, assuming an equal institutional will to create a new legal rule, it is usually easier to 
push a new regulation through the rule making process than it is to push a new statute through 
the gauntlet of multiple committees, both chambers of Congress, and Chief Executive approval.89
limits.  
87
. Thousands of amendments have been proposed.  JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING 
ISSUES, 1789-1995, at 362 (1996) (appendix listing number of proposed 
constitutional amendments by decade).  Only twenty-seven, however, have 
become part of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amends. I-XXVII.
88
. Whether a newly created common law rule spreads to other jurisdictions, 
however, is another question.  While an appellate court can easily establish a new 
common law rule within its own jurisdiction, it will have no power over whether 
that new rule becomes dominant via adoption in most other jurisdictions.  
89
. See ESKRIDGE ET.AL., supra note 66, at 66-67 (discussing legislative process as 
series of vetogates and hurdles).
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Thus, under the purely chronologic system, Congress, with its cumbersome processes, 
would suddenly operate at a tremendous disadvantage against agencies and the courts.  Given the 
relative ease in the promulgation of new regulations and announcement of new common law 
rules, more often than not it would be relatively easy for agencies and courts to impose their 
policy preferences over those of Congress.  Congress, however, would find it comparatively 
difficult to overrule the regulations and common law rules created by agencies and courts.90
Given the above discussed considerations, the risk-benefit calculus disfavors the purely 
chronologic system.  The benefits of greater more outcomes that enhance or preserve the 
democratic legitimacy law, and reduced incentives for judicial manipulation of interpretive 
discretion, are both uncertain and minimal.  The risks inherent in unstable law and disturbance of 
the dynamics of legal change are considerable.  Nonetheless, consideration of the purely 
chronologic system has yielded some important insights.  First, the extant system is not the only 
system that will preserve legal norms of lesser democratic legitimacy and nullify conflicting legal 
norms of greater democratic legitimacy.  Any system which relies on overly simplistic metrics for 
assessing the democratic legitimacy of legal norms will suffer this weakness.  Second, though 
90
. If passing new statutes were not substantially more difficult than promulgating 
new regulations or establishing new common law norms, the purely chronologic 
system might produce another disturbing phenomenon B a never ending cycling of 
legal rules.  An agency could freely alter an existing statute by promulgating a 
new conflicting regulation.  Congress could then overrule the new regulation by 
passing a new conflicting statute reimposing the original rule.  The courts could 
then overrule the statute by announcing a new and conflicting common law rule.  
Because any norm-generating entity would be empowered to alter any kind of 
existing legal norm, there would be little to stop a constant battle between 
Congress, agencies, and the courts over the composition of the law.  The extant 
system=s limits on avenues for alteration of existing law works to discourage the 
emergence of the cycling scenario.  
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preservation of the democratic legitimacy of law constitutes the centerpiece of the extant system, 
a measure of legal stability counts as an important side benefit.  Any viable alternative to the 
extant system must do a better job of enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the law than the 
extant system.  In addition, any viable alternative should maintain an appropriate degree of legal 
stability and avoid undue disturbances in the dynamics of legal change.    
2.  The Inverted System
So far I have spoken of the extant set of axiomatic meta-norms governing adjudication of 
conflicting legal norms as justified by its (imperfect) tendency to enhance or at least preserve the 
democratic legitimacy of law.  The extant system, however, does have a secondary purpose and 
rationale: enforcement of separation of powers values.  This Section introduces a second 
alternative system aimed at explicating the separation of powers effect, and demonstrating that 
enforcement of separation of powers is only of secondary import to the extant system.  
a. How the Extant System Enforces Separation of Powers
Before turning to the second alternative, I must clarify exactly how the extant system 
enforces separation of powers values.   At its most basic level, separation of powers requires that 
different parts of government be responsible for different tasks or functions.91  We the People 
91
. See JETHRO K.  LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION 457 
(1999) (stating that the Constitution secures separation of powers by requiring that 
Athe legislative executive and judicial branches of the federal government exercise 
different powers@); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) 
(invalidating Line Item Veto Act on grounds that it permitted the Chief Executive 
to exercise legislative powers).
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ratify constitutional norms.92  Legislatures pass statutes.93  Agencies promulgate regulations.94
Courts announce common law doctrinal rules.95  Taken together, the source, hierarchic, and 
categoric axioms have the effect of protecting the separation of powers boundary lines which 
separate the four principal norm-generating entities. 
The way that the extant system safeguards separation of powers boundary lines is a bit 
more subtle than it may first appear.  Legal norms created by different norm-generating entities 
are treated as different in kind or category.96  Formal distinctions between kinds of legal norms, 
however, are not enough to safeguard separation of powers boundary lines.  In order for these 
boundary lines to have any real consequence the kinds of norms that each norm-generating entity 
creates must differ in meaningful practical ways.  This is exactly the effect that the extant system 
produces and exactly how it protects separation of powers values.  
To see the point, return to the purely chronologic system, which quite obviously does not 
protect separation of powers boundary lines.97  Under that system, there would be no meaningful 
92
. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; Martin v. Hunter=s Lesee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 324 (1816) 
(AThe Constitution of the United States was ordained and established...as the 
preamble of the constitution declares, by >the people of the United States.=@). 
93
. U.S. CONST. art. I, ' 1.
94
. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 91, at 31 (explaining that administrative agencies 
promulgate regulations with the force and effect of law); CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, 
RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 4 
(1994) (explaining that agencies make rules).  
95
. U.S. CONST. art. III, ' 1.  
96
. This is the result of the source axiom.  See supra text accompanying note 25.
97
. For those who view separation of powers as an independent value, this feature 
will count as another strike against the purely chronologic alternative.  
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difference between each of the four formally distinct kinds of legal norms.  We could give the 
norms created by the four norm-generating entities different names B constitutional, statutory, 
regulatory, and common law.  Beyond nomenclature, however, all four would have the exact 
same practical consequence.  All would have the power to trump any conflicting preexisting legal 
norm regardless of source.  
Accordingly, there would be no meaningful division of norm-generating tasks among 
norm-generating entities.  We the People, Congress, administrative agencies, and the Federal 
Courts would all be assigned the task of creating what, for all practical intents and purposes, 
would constitute a single kind of legal norm.  An administrative agency, for example, which 
promulgates a legal rule labeled a regulation would be doing something essentially 
indistinguishable from a legislature which passes a legal rule called a statute.  Both would be 
creating a legal norm with the power to trump any and all preexisting conflicting legal norms.  
Any talk of assigning Congress the task of passing statutes, or assigning administrative agencies 
the task of ratifying constitutional provisions, would be completely void of substantive practical 
difference or consequence.  
Working in conjunction, the extant system=s four axioms produce the exact opposite 
effect.  The extant system preserves separation of powers boundary lines by ensuring that each of 
the four principal kinds of legal norms differ not only formally, but also in terms of their practical 
consequences.  This, in turn, makes the assignment of different norm-generating tasks to 
different norm-generating entities a phenomenon with real, tangible, and practical (as opposed to 
merely nominal) consequences.  The extant system accomplishes this by granting norms a trump 
only over conflicting norms that are subordinate in kind or of the same kind.  Stated more 
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generally, the extant system differentiates norms by ensuring that norms possess dissimilar 
trumping powers.  The statutory norm differs from the regulatory norm, for example, in that the 
former will trump conflicting regulations, common law rules, and preexisting statutes, while the 
latter will only trump conflicting common law rules and preexisting regulations.  
By enabling dissimilar trumping powers, and thereby creating real as opposed to merely 
nominal differences between types of norms, the extant system ensures real differences in the 
norm-generating tasks of each of the four norm-generating entities.  Thus, an administrative 
agency which promulgates something called a regulation does something very different than a 
legislature which passes something called a statute.  The agency creates a legal norm capable of 
trumping conflicting common law norms and preexisting regulations.  The legislature, in 
contrast, creates a legal norm capable of trumping not only conflicting common law norms and 
regulations, but also preexisting statutes.  
The end result of the extant system is that any given norm-generating entity creates 
something genuinely different from that which all other norm-generating entities create.  We the 
People are assigned the task of ratifying the norms that trump all other conflicting norms.  
Congress is assigned the task of passing the norms that trump regulations and common law rules. 
 Administrative agencies are assigned the task of promulgating the norms that trump conflicting 
common law rules.  The Federal Courts are assigned the task of announcing common law rules 
that trump no other kind of legal norm. 
Obliterate the difference in practical impacts of legal norms, and you will have obliterated 
the separation of powers assignment of distinct norm-generating tasks to distinct norm-
generating entities.  This is what the purely chronologic system would do.  Create some 
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mechanism for preserving meaningful practical differences in the consequences of different kinds 
of norms, and you will have preserved a separation of powers that goes beyond empty formality.  
This is what the extant system does.  
b.  The Secondary Importance of Separation of Powers Elements
Though unmistakably present, the separation of powers protecting elements of the extant 
system are  of secondary importance.  The (imperfect) democracy-reinforcing tendencies serve as 
the paramount justification for use and perpetuation of the extant system.  A second alternative 
system will demonstrate the primacy of democratic legitimacy over separation of powers 
enforcing ends.  
This second alternative, which I will call the inverted system, would make only one minor 
modification to the extant system.  This small modification, however, would produce radically 
unconventional outcomes.  The extant system=s hierarchic axiom ranks the different categories of 
legal norms in a rigid hierarchy corresponding with the democratic legitimacy of the entities that 
generate legal norms.98  The norms sanctioned by the entity of greatest relative democratic 
legitimacy B We the People B sit at the top of the ordering.  Statutes, regulations, and common 
law rules, each generated by entities of decreasing democratic legitimacy, occupy descending 
positions in the ordering.  
Under the inverted system this ordering would be reversed.  Common law rules would sit 
at the top of the hierarchy and trump all other kinds of conflicting legal norms.  Regulations 
would occupy the second rung and would trump conflicting statutes and constitutional norms.  
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Statutes would come next and would trump conflicting constitutional norms.  Constitutional 
norms would come to rest at the bottom of the hierarchy and trump no other kind of legal norms. 
 Other than this single modification, the inverted system would work exactly the same as the 
extant system.  
Obviously, the inverted system is utterly unacceptable.  The reasons that it is 
unacceptable, however, is the interesting information.  First, there is nothing awry in the inverted 
system=s treatment of separation of powers boundary lines.  Just as much as the extant system, the 
inverted system would protect the assignment of different norm-generating tasks to different 
norm-generating entities.  Just like the extant system, the inverted system would give each kind 
or category of legal norms different trumping powers.  And, just as under the extant system, each 
norm-generating entity would be charged with the task of creating, in very real and practical 
terms, different kinds of legal norms.  In short, as far as protecting separation of powers boundary 
lines is concerned, the inverted system is the equal of the extant system. 
The problem with the inverted system lies not in any failure to protect separation of 
powers.  The problem is that it would be indefensible in terms of democratic legitimacy.  A legal 
system worthy of respect offers losing interests defensible reasons for outcomes and decisions.  
Consider the consolation offered to losing interests under the extant system in the anti-spam 
regulation illustration.99  A court which straightforwardly and without interpretive manipulation 
applies the extant system will strike down the popular anti-spam regulation.  
The losing interest B  the public B will not be pleased with the outcome.  At least, 
98
. See supra text accompanying note 25.
99
. Supra pp. 31-38.
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however, the court operating under the extant system can offer a reasonable justification.  The 
justification begins along separation of powers lines:  Legislatures make statutes.  Agencies make 
regulations.  When in conflict the former trumps the latter.  If regulations could trump statutes, 
agencies would be empowered to create norms that are in essence no different than the norms 
created by Congress.100   The justification then takes a democracy-reinforcing turn:  Statutes 
trump conflicting regulations because statutes are created by the elected (relatively strong 
democratic legitimacy) Congress, while regulations are created by unelected (relatively weak 
democratic legitimacy) agencies.  In a case like the anti-spam regulation illustration, the more 
democratically legitimate norm (the popular regulation) will be been nullified.  At least, however, 
100
. When refusing to strike down or modify popular or problematic statutes courts 
regularly evoke the separation of powers rationale.  See, e.g., Lamie v. U. S. 
Trustee, 124 S. Ct. 1023, 1034 (2004) (when interpreting statutes A>[i]t is beyond 
our province to...provide for what we might think...is the preferred result.=
[citation omitted].  This allows both of our branches to adhere to our respected 
and respective, constitutional roles@); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 
(1985) (refusing to correct apparent statutory drafting error on grounds that Court 
may not Asoften the clear import of Congress= chosen words whenever a court 
believes those words lead to a harsh result@); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1980) (stating that statute did not make for Aa sensible 
means of conserving energy@ but refusing to invalidate or alter statute because Ait 
is up the legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of 
legislation@);  T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978) (enforcing statute 
requiring halt of construction of multi-million dollar dam to save snail darter on 
grounds that Ain our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of 
powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially 
decreeing what accords with >common sense and the public weal.=@); Mobile Oil 
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (arguing that though Court 
could do a better job than statute Court cannot alter statute because Court has no 
authority to substitute its views for the view of Congress expressed in statute); 
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941) (A[I]t is not our [the 
Court=s] function to engraft on a statute additions which we think the legislature 
logically might or should have made@); Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 
F.3d 502, 507-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that courts cannot legislate additional 
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the more democratically legitimate entity B Congress B has prevailed.101  While not ideal, the 
losing interests are offered a justification of plausible persuasive power.  
Compare the wholly unsatisfactory justification that would be offered by a court 
operating under the inverted system.  Reverse the polarity of the anti-spam regulation illustration, 
and assume that Congress acts in accord with majoritarian sentiment while the agency is 
responsive to anti-majoritarian special interests.  Prompted by strong majoritarian desires and 
resisting special interest lobbying, Congress passes a new statute requiring the FTC to 
promulgate comprehensive anti-spam regulations.  Captured by Internet advertizing special 
interests, however, the FTC promulgates a watered-down set of regulations that end up protecting 
spammers by imposing trivial fines, disallowing private suits for money damages, and denying 
private causes of actions no matter how good a policy choice it may be).
101
. The democracy-reinforcing aspect of the justification is almost always implicit 
and understood.  Sometimes, however, courts spell it out.  See, e.g., Parham v.  
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (A[A] court is not free...to substitute its 
judgment for the will of the people...as expressed in the laws passed by their 
popularly elected legislatures@); Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 
1203, 1213 (10th Cir.  2000) (when interpreting statutes Athe court weighs the 
words of elected legislators  to resolve their meaning. This court must go 
wherever the language and intent of the statute take us. Should our interpretation 
cause public discomfort or impose undesired burdens, it is to the source of the 
enactment, Congress, that those who are discomforted or burdened must turn for 
relief@); In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1987) (recognizing 
that statutes overrule common law precedent because Ain a democracy the 
legislature may be the more appropriate branch to draw classifications based on
public policy. As a popularly elected body, the legislature is in a position to tap 
the thinking of its constituency and has the resources to secure data generally not 
available to the courts@); Planned Parenthood Fed=n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. 
Supp. 1465, 1473 (D. Colo. 1988) (holding that agency interpretation in conflict 
with statute must be nullified because Avalue judgments which amount to changes 
in a statute, which are what the new regulations represent, should be made by the 
elected, accountable Congress and not by the Executive branch@).
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all but token agency enforcement resources.  The regulations stand in conflict with the statute.  A 
court operating under the inverted system will (if acting straightforwardly and without 
interpretive manipulation) nullify the popular and democratically legitimate anti-spam statute and 
preserve the unpopular special interest-favoring regulations.  
Again, the losing interest B the public B would not be pleased with the outcome.  Worse 
than under the extant system, however, the rationale would offer no meaningful consolation.  The 
justification would rely solely on separation of powers arguments and would lack the democracy-
reinforcing turn that underlies the extant system:  Agencies make regulations.  Legislatures make 
statutes.  The laws that agencies make trump conflicting laws made by legislatures (or at least 
they do in the anti-matter world governed by the inverted system).  In short, the rules are the 
rules.  Deal with it.  There is no democracy-reinforcing rationale, not even an imperfect one, to 
justify the regulation over statute ordering.   
When it comes to justifying outcomes in individual cases involving conflicting legal 
norms, the separation of powers argument only goes so far.  The argument that a statute must 
trump a conflicting regulation because Congress is superior to administrative agencies really does 
not work as a satisfactory justification.  It is closer to a restatement of the statute over regulation 
rule than a satisfactory justification for that rule.  The notion that a statute must trump a 
conflicting regulation because Congress, the creator of the statute, possesses greater democratic 
legitimacy than the agency, the creator of the regulation, begins to sound like a viable 
justification.  The extant system works to advance both separation of powers and democracy-
reinforcing ends.   The inverted system would be its equal in terms of enforcing separation of 
powers but would completely lack the democracy-reinforcing ingredient.  Comparison of the two 
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systems demonstrates that the democracy-enforcing element, rather than the separation of powers 
protecting feature, is what really does the work of justifying the outcomes produced by the extant 
system.  
No doubt, the extant system is structured to protect separation of powers boundary lines.  
It, in other words, is structured so that different norm-generating entities create norms of different 
trumping powers.  More importantly, however, the extant system is structured so that the norm-
generating entities of greatest democratic legitimacy are charged with creating the norms of 
greatest trumping powers, and vice versa.  This crucial feature, and not the separation of powers 
feature, does the work of justifying the outcomes the extant system produces.  The extant 
system=s tendency to enhance or at least preserve the democratic legitimacy of law is highly 
imperfect.  As the inverted system shows, however, an imperfect democracy-reinforcing 
justification is much better than no democracy-reinforcing justification at all. 
3. The Multi-Factor System
Though different in many ways, the extant system and each of the two alternatives 
discussed so far are rule-based systems.102  This Section introduces an alternative system which 
102
. Because rules are over- and under- inclusive relative to their purposes, rule-based 
decision making periodically produces outcomes at odds with underlying 
purposes.  FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 31-34 
(1991).  Resolution of conflicts between legal norms in a way that enhances or 
preserves the democratic legitimacy of the law is the primary goal of the extant 
system.  The extant system=s rules, however, regularly produce outcomes which 
do the exact opposite.  One way to improve the performance of rule-based 
decision making is to refine the rules with an eye towards minimizing their over-
and under-inclusiveness relative to their purposes.  Another strategy involves 
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would depart from the rule-based tack by sweeping aside the axiomatic meta-norms.  Rather than 
adjudicating conflicting legal norms under a set of axiomatic rules, this alternative would call on 
courts to adjudicate such cases by directly assessing the democratic legitimacy of individual 
conflicting legal norms.  Courts would perform this assessment with the assistance of a list of 
relevant factors or considerations.103  As is usually the case with multi-factor analysis, the list of 
factors would serve as a guide rather than a narrowly constraining command.  While courts 
would be obliged to consider the entire list of factors, no specific formula or method for applying 
the factors would exist.  The norm judged to possess greater democratic legitimacy would be 
preserved and the norm judged to be of lesser democratic legitimacy would be nullified.
One obvious charge against the multi-factor alternative is that, like the purely chronologic 
and inverted alternatives, it would fail to protect separation of powers boundary lines.  Under the 
multi-factor system the trumping powers of constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common 
law norms would not differ in any meaningful way.  A regulation of high democratic legitimacy, 
discarding rule-based decision making altogether.  
103
. This assessment would open up an entirely new form of legal discourse.  Under 
the extant system legal discourse revolves exclusively around norm interpretation 
and whether two norms do or do not stand in a posture of irreconcilable conflict.  
Once a court interprets norms and finds them to stand in a posture of 
irreconcilable conflict, the four axiomatic meta-norms produce conclusive and 
unquestionable results.  There can be no argument over whether a norm of 
superordinate kind trumps a norm of subordinate kind, or whether a newer norm 
trumps an older norm of the same kind.  
Under the multi-factor alternative, however, courts would entertain two 
distinct lines of argumentation.  As always, courts would be charged with 
determining whether two legal norms stand in conflict.  Once two norms are 
determined to stand in conflict, however, the absence of the four axioms would 
force courts to decide which of the two norms ought to prevail.  Under the extant 
system the four axiomatic meta-norms conclusively resolve this issue.
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for example, could trump a statute of low democratic legitimacy (and vice versa).   As such, the 
norm-generating tasks assigned to each of the four norm-generating entities would also be 
undifferentiable.  Each entity would create legal norms possessing equivalent trumping powers.  
A second objection to the multi-factor alternative is that it would fail to constrain judicial 
discretion in any meaningful way.  As with any pliable multi-factor analysis, willful courts could 
back into pre-selected outcomes by stressing certain factors and soft-pedaling others.  Ultimately, 
this objection may not substantially differentiate the multi-factor alternative from the extant 
system.  The multi-factor alternative would not tightly constrain judicial discretion.  The extant 
system, however, also fails to constrain judicial discretion.104  Rigid, formalistic, and rule-based 
as it may be, there is little to prevent a court operating under the extant system from controlling 
substantive outcomes via manipulation of flexible interpretive discretion.105  On this score, the 
104
. Though neither the extant system nor the multi-factor alternative can constrain 
courts from exercising discretion aimed at selecting substantive outcomes, the 
multi-factor system would channel legal discourse in useful ways.  Courts 
operating under the multi-factor alternative would be forced to publicly address 
and apply the factors relevant to assessing the democratic legitimacy of competing 
legal norms.  Under the extant system, in contrast, when a purposeful court seeks 
to manipulate the substantive outcome, it does so under the cover of neutral legal 
interpretation.  In its public justification a court  need not reveal its thinking on the 
democratic legitimacy of the norms involved. 
105
. As we have seen, courts that so wish often can use their ample interpretive 
discretion to evade the discretion-denying rigidity of the extant system.   In some 
cases, of course, legal norms may be too tightly drawn to permit judicial 
interpretive manipulation.  Yet a similar phenomenon would prevail under the 
multi-factor alternative.  In some cases, courts operating under the multi-factor 
alternative would find it exceedingly difficult to back into outcomes via 
manipulation of the relevant factors.  Where one of two conflicting legal norms 
obviously possesses far greater democratic legitimacy than the other, a judicial 
ruling to the contrary would be easily detected and revealed as judicial 
manipulation.      
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multi-factor alternative would not be significantly inferior to the extant system.106
Beyond the separation of powers and judicial discretion issues, would the multi-factor 
alternative perform better than the extant system?  Would it, in other words, more consistently 
and more often than the extant system prevent norms of suspect democratic legitimacy from 
trumping norms of solid democratic legitimacy?  The multi-factor alternative would not strap 
courts with a rigid and simplistic rule-based approach.  It would instead offer courts a flexible set 
of factors they could use on a case-by-case basis to pick and choose norms of relatively strong 
democratic legitimacy for preservation.  For this reason, the multi-factor alternative holds out the 
promise of superior performance.  However, a closer look substantially clouds the picture.  In the 
end, the drawbacks of the multi-factor system probably outweigh any advantages it might have 
over the extant system.
The principal problems with the multi-factor alternative grow out of the difficulties that 
106
. Perhaps the most significant difference would lie in the location of exercises of 
judicial discretion.  Under the extant system courts exercise discretion only in the 
interpretation of legal norms.  In the context of the anti-spam regulation 
illustration, the purposeful court wishing to preserve the popular regulation simply 
interprets the statute and/or the regulation such that they do not stand in conflict.
Judicial manipulation under the multi-factor alternative would work in a 
different way.  First, as under the extant system, courts could manipulate the 
meaning of legal norms and whether two norms stand in conflict.  Indeed, because 
courts always must determine whether two legal norms stand in conflict, almost 
any imaginable system for dealing with conflicting legal norms will be subject to 
judicial manipulation.  Second, however, courts could manipulate the factors 
guiding assessment of the democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal norms.  
Turning again to the anti-spam regulation illustration, a court ideologically 
opposed to government regulation might wish to nullify the anti-spam regulation.  
To reach this result, it could place greater emphasis on certain factors and less on 
others to find that the regulation does not possess greater democratic legitimacy 
than the statute. 
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courts would face in determining which of two legal norms possesses greater democratic 
legitimacy.  The multi-factor alternative would require courts to engage in a form of analysis that 
lies outside their traditional areas of expertise.  Courts are expert in interpreting and applying 
legal norms.  They possess no special expertise in evaluating the democratic legitimacy of 
individual legal norms. 
There is something to this problem, but not as much as one might think.  First, pointing to 
the imperfections or limitations of courts is but half of the analysis.  The relevant question is not 
whether courts are good or bad at evaluating the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms. 
 The relevant question is whether they are better at that task than the crude source-centric metric 
used by the extant system.  Courts may not possess any special expertise in evaluating the 
democratic legitimacy of legal norms.  In many cases, however, special expertise is probably not 
needed to outdo the extant system. 
Second, courts are institutionally well positioned to make comparatively impartial 
evaluations of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms.  Conventional wisdom maintains that 
the entities closer to an electoral connection are better at detecting majoritarian sentiment than 
the unelected federal courts.107  Often, however, Congress and agencies lack incentives to reform 
107
. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 718 
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that non-delegation doctrine is 
based on idea that Athe most fundamental decisions will be made by Congress, the 
elected representatives of the people, rather than by administrators@); Boys Mkts., 
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 258 (1970) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (AIt is the Congress, not this Court, that responds to the pressures of 
political groups, pressures entirely proper in a free society.  It is Congress, not this 
Court, that has the capacity to investigate the divergent considerations involved in 
the management of a complex national labor policy.  And it is Congress, not this 
Court, that is elected by the people.  This Court should, therefore, interject itself 
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legal norms of suspect democratic legitimacy or even the ability to identify norms of suspect 
democratic legitimacy.  Legislators often have little incentive to alter or repeal special interest 
statutes that may benefit their reelection.108  Agencies that have been captured by the subjects 
within their regulatory jurisdiction are also not likely to modify regulations favoring narrow 
interests.109  Similar problems affect non-governmental institutional actors.  Organized public 
interests opposing extant constitutional, statutory, and regulatory norms have a strong incentive 
to point out the suspect democratic legitimacy of the norms they oppose.  Because they are 
organized interests, however, their assertions may be viewed as untrustworthy and can easily be 
painted as efforts to advance their own narrow anti-democratic interests.  The same logic applies 
as little as possible into the law-making and law-changing process@); CBS Inc. v. 
Prime Time 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1227 (11th Cir. 2001) (arguing for 
adherence to text of a statute over legislative history because A[w]hen a statute is 
passed by Congress, it is the text of the statute...that has been voted on and 
approved by the people's elected representatives for inclusion in our country's 
laws@); Allman v. Eastern Co., 849 F.2d 608 [table], No. 87-3322, 1988 WL 
60729, at *5 (6th Cir. 1988) (Apolicy questions of this sort are not to be decided, 
under our form of government, by an unelected judiciary.  Our task is to apply the 
laws that the people's elected representatives have actually adopted; we are not 
here to pass laws that Congress has failed to pass@); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 
152, 184 (2d Cir. 1978) (ACongress is the elected voice of the people@ and 
"presumptively has popular authority for the value judgment it makes@).
108
. See JOHN L. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND INFLUENCE (1995) (explaining disproportionate influence of 
interest groups in Congress); William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of 
Individuals= Rights in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 981 
(1996) (political pressure of organized interest groups prevents legislative revision 
of obsolete statutes).
109
. See Thomas Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1039, 1050-53 (1997) (discussing theory of agency capture); Richard 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1684-85 (1975) (explaining that agencies act in ways Aunduly favoring 
organized interests@). 
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to political parties that point to the anti-democratic nature of legal norms that run contrary to the 
party line.  Only the federal courts are sufficiently independent to engage in disinterested 
evaluations of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms.110
Third, courts are very familiar with multi-factor analysis.  Whether in common law, 
statutory, or constitutional areas, courts are constantly required to apply multi-factor tests.111
Uneven or unintentional misapplication of a multi-factor test for assessing the relative 
democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms is no more problematic than it is when courts 
apply multi-factor tests in other contexts.  
Admittedly, the analysis required of courts by the multi-factor approach would pose 
unique challenges.  In most instances where courts perform multi-factor analysis, courts must 
make determinations and judgments that are legalistic in nature.112  The factors courts would 
110
. To say that courts are better positioned to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of 
legal norms than other available institutional actors is not to say that courts would 
perform that task perfectly.  As always, idiosyncratic ideological biases, uneven 
assessments of legal norms, and even manipulation of discretion would affect 
their judgement.  These problems, however, will exist under any alternative and 
already exist under the extant system.  There is nothing in the multi-factor system 
that would exacerbate these issues.
111
. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943, 964-65, 971-72 (1987) (arguing that constitutional law has become 
dominated by balancing tests).
112
. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs certification of class actions, is 
typical.  It asks courts to weigh legalistic factors such as whether the class 
representative=s claims are typical of the class members= claims, and whether 
individual litigations would create a risk of inconsistent outcomes.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23.  On the other hand, when applying multi-factor or balancing tests, courts are 
sometimes asked to weigh factors that are not legalistic in nature.  The well-
known Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test for determining whether sufficient 
administrative process has been afforded, for example, asks courts to consider the 
fiscal cost of additional procedural safeguards.  424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).    
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apply under the multi-factor alternative, in contrast, lie outside the legal realm.  Courts may be 
familiar with multi-factor analysis.  But are they equipped to adequately perform this particular 
kind of multi-factor analysis?   I would suggest that the answer is >yes,= but only sometimes.  
In order to address the issue in greater depth, we will need to get more specific about the 
configuration of the multi-factor alternative.  Throughout the Article I have hinted at various 
factors relevant to assessing the democratic legitimacy of legal norms.  I do not envision these 
factors as anything approaching an exhaustive enumeration of the factors that might be part of a 
multi-factor system.113  We can use them, however, to get a sense of the sorts of judgments that 
courts operating under a multi-factor system would have to make.  The factors are summarized 
below: 
1. The popularity or current majoritarian support (or lack thereof) for a given legal 
norm or for the policy effectuated by a legal norm.114
113
. Devising such an enumeration is not a goal of this Article.  The extant system is 
so crude that even a highly imperfect multi-factor system could yield vast 
improvements.  Courts do not need to know with great precision exactly what it 
means for a particular legal norm to possess or lack democratic legitimacy, or 
exactly which factors are relevant to assessing the democratic legitimacy of 
individual legal norms.  All they need is a set of factors that allows them to make 
a more precise estimation than is possible under the highly imprecise extant 
system. 
114
. In assessing majoritarian support, it may be permissible to consider only the 
portion of the public that has formed an opinion.  A very large portion of the 
electorate is aware of and has formed an opinion on certain issues, such as spam 
e-mail.  Schultz, supra note 58, at 1 (citing study finding that 83 percent of 
respondents dislike spam e-mail).  On other issues, however, only small portions 
or constituencies of the electorate may be affected and only that portion will form 
any opinion. 
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2. What most likely would be the majoritarian sentiment for a given legal norm or 
for the policy effectuated by a legal norm given sufficient information and public 
rumination and discourse.115
3.  The compatibility of a particular legal norm and the policies it effectuates with the 
consensus values and views of the current generation. 
4.  The democratic legitimacy of the entity that created a particular legal norm.116
Are courts equipped to evenly and accurately predict and determine the current majority
position regarding particular legal norms, or even more difficult, what the majority sentiment 
would be given sufficient information and public discourse?  Are they prepared to identify the 
social consensus of the current generation?   
In truth, courts are already somewhat familiar with these kinds of non-legal issues.  
Courts are not blind to factors beyond formal legal rules.  Most courts are attuned to a variety of 
extra legal factors, including possible public perceptions of their rulings.117  When they come up 
115
. This factor could be relevant when there is no discernable majoritarian position on 
a given law or the policy it effectuates, or when there is a discernable majoritarian 
position but where that majoritarian position results from limited public 
information and/or discourse.  
116
. In isolation this factor is a crude predictor of the democratic legitimacy of 
individual legal norms.  Nonetheless, it is relevant and useful.   
117 See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH.  L.  REV.  
2596, 2606-09 (2003) (reviewing empirical data indicating that courts tend to 
reflect public opinion and that Amood swings in the general public are mirrored in 
the output of the Supreme Court@); Michael J. Gerhardt, The End of Theory, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 283, 311, n.137 (2001) (mentioning concept that Afederal courts 
often track majoritarian sentiments@ and asserting that Asome Justices have even 
acknowledged the relevance of consulting majoritarian sentiments in interpreting 
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against a legal norm of suspect democratic legitimacy B  a special interest statute or a no longer 
popular constitutional provision B  they will usually recognize the problem.  Courts employ a seat 
of the pants, informal, unregulated judgment regarding the democratic legitimacy of individual 
legal norms in such cases.  In a sense, therefore, the multi-factor alternative would merely 
formalize and regularize an informal and concealed multi-factor analysis that at least some courts 
already perform.118
That courts may be already be familiar with (informally) assessing the democratic 
legitimacy of legal norms, however, does not necessarily mean that they perform that task well.  
Ultimately, whether courts could competently apply a multi-factor system depends more on the 
nature of the cases at issue than the nature of judicial abilities. 
Cases in which legal norms stand in conflict are divisible into two principal groups.  First, 
there are the easy cases.  By easy cases I do not mean cases where the meanings of the legal 
norms are easily discernable and beyond reasonable dispute.  I instead mean cases in which it is 
easy to discern a marked difference in the democratic legitimacy of the norms involved.  The 
anti-spam regulation illustration presents the paradigmatic easy case.  The statute was enacted 
and perpetuated at the behest of narrow special interests.  If honestly and straightforwardly 
interpreted, the statute prohibits not only very popular telemarketing regulations, but also popular 
anti-spam regulations.  The anti-spam regulation, in contrast, is immensely popular with a strong 
the Constitution@).
118
. Moreover, even if courts currently lack special expertise in evaluating the 
democratic legitimacy of legal norms, it is at most a short term transition problem. 
 Once operating under the multi-factor alternative, courts would work their way 
up the learning curve and develop the necessary expertise.
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majority of the public.  
At the other extreme lie the hard cases.  By hard cases I do not mean cases in which the 
meaning of the legal norms involved is difficult to discern or stands open to reasonable 
disagreement.  I instead am referring to the cases in which it is difficult to discern any significant 
discrepancy or difference in the democratic legitimacy of the legal norms involved.  Whether a 
case involving two conflicting legal norms is an easy case or a hard case (as I use those terms) is 
the key factor determining whether courts would competently and evenly apply a multi-factor 
alternative, and more broadly whether the multi-factor alternative would perform better than the 
extant system.   
The extant system performs at its worst in easy cases, such as the anti-spam regulation 
illustration.  As demonstrated by the anti-spam regulation illustration, in the easy cases the extant 
system regularly calls for nullification of the all-things-considered more democratically 
legitimate legal norm.  Foreknowledge of this possibility provokes biased and manipulative 
interpretive strategies.  In order to avoid the anti-democratic outcome, many courts will twist 
interpretative rules, often beyond the breaking point, with the aim of finding that no conflict is 
present.  The easy cases, in other words, are most likely to produce the Hobson=s choice between 
interpretive honesty and nullification of the more democratically legitimate norm.  
The multi-factor alternative, in contrast, could perform quite well in easy cases.  It would 
permit judges to apply a comparatively subtle analysis (almost any list of factors would be more 
subtle than the extant system) permitting preservation of norms of relatively strong democratic 
legitimacy.  Most courts facing the anti-spam regulation illustration would be more than capable 
of applying a multi-factor analysis to rightly determine that the regulation possesses substantially 
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stronger democratic legitimacy than the conflicting statute.  
Moreover, because courts could legitimately perpetuate norms of strong relative 
democratic legitimacy, the multi-factor alternative would generate minimal incentive for 
dishonest judicial manipulation.  The artifice and opacity encouraged by the extant system would 
be unnecessary.  Judgment on whether the two legal norms stand in conflict would not be colored 
by extraneous factors and considerations.  Judicial opinions would include frank and direct 
factor-by-factor analysis of the relative democratic legitimacy of the norms in question.    
In cases where it is hard to differentiate conflicting norms in terms of degrees of 
democratic legitimacy, the performance of the two systems is reversed.  Asking courts to apply a 
multi-factor analysis to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of legal norms in the hard cases is 
asking for trouble.  Some cases are hard cases because they offer no clear answers to the 
questions presented by the enumerated factors.  Thus, in many instances the public will not have 
formed any discernible will regarding particular legal norms or the policies they embody, and 
there will be no way of confidently predicting majoritarian preferences given adequate 
information and public discourse.  In these cases two conflicting legal norms do not really 
register one way or another on any measure of relative democratic legitimacy.  Any attempt to 
appraise or compare degrees of democratic legitimacy makes little sense.  Use of the multi-factor 
system would force courts to concoct distinctions in degrees of democratic legitimacy where 
none exist. 
Other cases are hard cases because the two conflicting norms at issue present roughly 
equal claims to democratic legitimacy.  What should a court operating under the multi-factor 
alternative do when two factors suggest that one norm is of greater democratic legitimacy, while 
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the other two factors suggest the opposite?  The multi-factor approach offers no clear solution.  
Where the relative democratic legitimacy of two conflicting legal norms boils down to an all-
things-considered toss-up, the multi-factor approach would produce an unacceptable level of 
unpredictability and uneven adjudication.  One court would decide that one conflicting norm 
possesses (slightly) greater democratic legitimacy, while the next court would find that the other 
conflicting norm possesses (slightly) greater democratic legitimacy.  
Under either hard case scenario the multi-factor approach is problematic.  Judicial 
inability to deal well with the hard cases, however, would not stem from any lack of special 
expertise or training.  It would instead stem from the reality that in hard cases neither norm can 
make a substantially stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than the other.  Courts are quite 
competent to apply a multi-factor approach and to usually get the >correct= result in the easy 
cases.  At the very least, courts operating under the multi-factor alternative would do a better job 
with the easy cases than they can under the extant system.  The problem for the multi-factor 
alternative is that most cases are hard cases, at least in terms of figuring out which norm 
possesses greater democratic legitimacy.  Thus, in most cases of conflicting legal norms the 
multi-factor alternative would produce great uncertainty and instability of outcomes.  
The extant system remains problematic.  It is least problematic, however, in the hard 
cases where it is difficult to discern any meaningful difference in the democratic legitimacy of 
two conflicting norms.  It is least problematic in these cases because the threat of an anti-
democratic outcome is minimal.  The possible outcomes in these cases could be classified as 
democratic legitimacy neutral.  Though overly simplistic and uni-dimensional, the source-centric 
extant system cannot work too much damage.  Indeed, where two conflicting norms make 
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roughly equal claims to democratic legitimacy, it makes sense to resolve the conflict by 
preferring the norm created by the more democratically legitimate entity.
In discussing the multi-factor alternative, the main objective has been to present the polar 
opposite of the extant system.  Where the extant system is built on extremely rigid and 
formalistic rules, the polar opposite multi-factor system is based on open-ended standards.  
Comparison of the two systems presents the age old rules versus standards debate in its starkest 
form.119   Both extremes imply certain drawbacks and benefits.  The extreme rule-based extant 
system (purportedly) denies courts discretion and thereby produces both sub-optimal outcomes 
and an incentive to avoid sub-optimal outcomes via dishonest manipulation of open-ended 
interpretive discretion.120  The extreme standards-based system would breed unpredictable and 
uneven application in many cases or would simply not make much sense in an entire range of 
hard cases.121  Criticism of the multi-factor approach does not suggest that courts cannot play a 
119
. See Sullivan, supra note 71, at 57-70 (discussing the rules versus standards 
debate).
120
. See id. at 58 (AA legal directive is >rule=-like when it binds a decisionmaker to 
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.  Rules 
aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and 
subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere...the rule's force as a rule is 
that decisionmakers follow it, even when direct application of the background 
principle or policy to the facts would produce a different result@).
121
. See id. at 58-59, 62 (AA legal directive is >standard=-like when it tends to collapse 
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or 
policy to a fact situation.  Standards allow for the decrease of errors of under- and 
over-inclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules.... 
The argument that rules are fairer than standards is that rules require 
decisionmakers to act consistently, treating like cases alike.  On this view, rules 
reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias by preventing decisionmakers 
from factoring the parties' particular attractive or unattractive qualities into the 
decisionmaking calculus@). 
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productive role in weeding out anti-democratic legal norms.  However, asking courts to do so by 
a straight out judgement on the relative democratic legitimacy of two conflicting legal norms, 
even if assisted by a defined set of relevant factors, is asking for trouble.  
B. Moderate Modifications to the Extant System
This Section introduces alternatives to the extant system that retain many or most of the 
features of the extant system but make key modifications.  Most of the modifications are aimed at 
improving the ability to resolve conflicts between legal norms in ways that enhance or at least  
preserve the democratic legitimacy of law.  The ancillary considerations B protection of 
separation of powers values, stability and predictability, and sound performance in both easy and 
hard cases B  will be addressed as well.  
As we have seen, rigidity and uni-dimensional focus on the democratic legitimacy of the 
sources of legal norms hamper the extant system.  Swinging to the opposite extreme of great 
flexibility, multi-factor analysis of the relative democratic legitimacy of legal norms offers no 
panacea.  The alternatives discussed in this Section are all attempts to balance the various values 
at play.  Relatively moderate adjustments to the extant system may bring significant 
improvement in terms of outcomes that enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy of law 
without significantly degrading separation of powers, stability and predictability, and 
performance in both hard and easy cases.     
1.  The Presumption System
One promising alternative, which I will call the presumption system, would combine the
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extant system, the multi-factor system, and a pair of rebuttable presumptions.  Under the 
categoric axiom, when two conflicting norms belong to different legal categories, the norm from 
the higher order category always and unconditionally trumps the norm from the lower order 
category.  Likewise, under the chronologic axiom, when two conflicting norms belong to the 
same legal category, the newer norm always and unconditionally trumps the older norm.  
Under the presumption system, however, rebuttable presumptions would modify the 
chronologic and categoric axioms.  When two conflicting norms belong to different legal 
categories, the presumption would be that the norm from the higher order category would trump 
the norm from the lower order category.  Likewise, when two conflicting norms belong to the 
same legal category, the presumption would be that the newer norm would trump the older norm. 
 Upon a sufficient evidentiary showing, however, these presumptions could be rebutted.  Courts 
would use multi-factor analysis similar to that discussed in the immediately previous Section to 
determine whether the presumptions have been rebutted.  When rebutted, courts would nullify 
the legal norms determined to possess relatively weaker claims to democratic legitimacy.    
To see how the presumption alternative might work in practice, return to the anti-spam 
regulation illustration. Upon determining that the regulation and statute stand in conflict, a court 
would assess the democratic legitimacy of both norms.  The assessment would include the taking 
of evidence relevant to an inventory of predetermined factors for assessing the democratic 
legitimacy of legal norms.  If a court were to find that the regulation and statute both make solid 
claims to democratic legitimacy, the court would resolve the conflict between the two under the 
standard categoric axiom.  The superordinate statute would trump the subordinate regulation.  
If, however, a court were to find that the regulation possesses a substantially stronger 
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claim to democratic legitimacy than the statute, the court could rule that the normal presumption 
that statutes trump conflicting regulations has been rebutted.  Once the categoric axiom and its 
statute over regulation ordering has been rebutted, the court would be free to uphold the 
regulation and nullify that portion of the statute that stands in conflict with the regulation.  A 
similar process would be used with conflicting norms of the same kind.  Thus, if a new and a 
preexisting statute stand in irreconcilable conflict, and the preexisting statute possesses a 
substantially stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than the new statute, the court could hold 
that the presumption in favor of application of the chronologic axiom has been rebutted and 
nullify the newer statute.  
The presumption alternative blends the best of the extant system with the best of the 
multi-factor system.  The extant system would operate unchanged in cases where the 
presumptions in favor of the categoric and chronologic axioms are not rebutted, or in other 
words, in cases where the discrepancy in the democratic legitimacy of the conflicting norms is 
not substantial.  In the cases where the discrepancy in the democratic legitimacy of the 
conflicting norms is substantial, however, the presumptions would be rebutted, and multi-factor 
analysis would govern which of two conflicting norms shall survive.  The presumption system 
promises democracy-enhancing or -preserving outcomes at a higher rate than that produced by 
the extant system, and a consequent reduced incentive for judicial dishonesty, artifice, and 
opaque reasoning in written opinions.  Moreover, unlike both the extant system and the multi-
factor alternative, the presumption system would perform well in cases where it is easy to 
determine which of two conflicting norms possesses greater democratic legitimacy, as well as 
those where such determinations are quite difficult.
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The potential gains in terms of democracy-enhancing or -preserving outcomes would be 
realized in cases such as the anti-spam regulation illustration, where it is fairly obvious that a 
lower order norm exhibits greater democratic legitimacy than a conflicting higher order norm.  
The extant system performs at its worst in these cases.  Its rigidity locks courts into the Hobson=s 
choice between honest and straightforward application of the extant axioms versus benign 
dishonesty aimed at avoiding anti-democratic outcomes.  When courts opt for honest and 
straightforward norm interpretation, the extant system nullifies the norm of stronger democratic 
legitimacy.  
In cases similar to the anti-spam regulation illustration, however, courts operating under 
the presumption system could preserve norms of strong democratic legitimacy without resort to 
interpretive artifice.  Manipulation of meaning and whether two legal norms stand in conflict 
would be unnecessary.  Instead, in appropriate cases courts would consult the relevant factors for 
assessing the democratic legitimacy of two legal norms and hold that the normal categoric and 
chronologic presumptions have been rebutted.  This possibility, in turn, would dissipate much of 
the impetus for interpretive bias and subterfuge engendered by the extant system=s discretion-
denying rigidity.  
The presumption alternative would also produce a salutary effect on legal discourse and 
justification.  Under the extant system an informal and sub rosa evaluation of the democratic 
legitimacy of competing legal norms can bias norm interpretation.  Yet the surface of legal 
discourse does not reflect this evaluation.  The presumption alternative would force courts to 
make a threshold determination on whether a substantial disparity in the democratic legitimacy of 
two conflicting legal norms is present.  In attempting to convince a court that the categoric and
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art7
87
chronologic axiom presumptions should or should not be rebutted, litigants would brief and 
argue the various factors relevant to assessing the democratic legitimacy of individual norms.  
Hidden motives and artifice in judicial opinions would be replaced with open and public analysis 
on the democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal norms.   This may be the most important benefit 
of the presumption alternative.122
The potential benefits of the presumption alternative B reduction in anti-democratic 
outcomes, reduction in incentives for dishonest judicial manipulation, and enhanced transparency 
in judicial opinions B are no different than the potential benefits of the multi-factor alternative.  
Unlike the multi-factor alternative, however, the presumption system would not run into 
problems when dealing with cases where it is hard to differentiate the democratic legitimacy of 
two conflicting legal norms.  In cases where neither conflicting legal norm clearly possesses 
greater democratic legitimacy than the other, the multi-factor alternative would force courts into 
hair-splitting exercises.  In cases where norms simply do not register one way or another on the 
democratic legitimacy scale, the multi-factor alternative would force courts to conjure up 
differentiations in relative democratic legitimacy where none exist.123  The presumption system, 
122
. Thus, the real difference between the extant and presumption systems might lie 
not in outcomes, but rather in the stated reasoning behind outcomes.  The benign 
dishonesty used to circumvent the rigidity of the extant system pushes many of the 
considerations truly motivating judicial decisions out of written opinions and legal 
discourse.  Courts operating under the extant system write opinions as though 
neutral and objective interpretive rules both dictate the meaning of legal norms 
and determine whether those norms stand in conflict.  Beneath the surface, 
however, an unstated desire to reach a certain substantive outcome B avoiding 
anti-democratic outcomes B biases judicial choice, use, and misuse of interpretive 
rules.  
123
. See supra pp. 81-83.
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in contrast, would deal well with both kinds of hard cases because in the hard cases the categoric 
and chronologic axiom presumptions would not be rebutted and would therefore operate exactly 
as the extant system operates.  In hard cases default to the chronologic and categoric axioms 
constitutes a reasonably satisfactory solution consistent with democracy-reinforcing ends.
So far the presumption alternative looks like a system with no real drawback.  It promises 
more democracy-enhancing outcomes, less impetus for dishonest judicial manipulation or bias, 
greater transparency in legal reasoning, and an ability to deal well with both hard and easy cases. 
There are, however, several caveats. 
One area of concern relates to predictability of outcomes in individual cases and stability 
of existing law.124  The flexibility of rebuttable presumptions may constitute an invitation to 
judicial manipulation or at least a recipe for unintentional but nonetheless radically uneven 
judicial application.  One court might freely allow rebuttal of the chronologic axioms, while the 
next court might permit rebuttal of the presumption only in the most extreme cases.   This 
unpredictability could lead to an erosion of the stability of existing law.   If some courts 
generously permit rebuttal of the categoric and chronologic axiom presumptions, subordinate 
norm-generating entities would have incentives to create new norms that conflict with 
preexisting norms created by superordinate entities.125
124
. As we have already seen, negative effects on the predictability and stability of law 
could plague the purely chronologic and multi-factor alternatives.  See supra pp. 
57-60, 82.   
125
. Using the anti-spam regulation illustration, the administrative agency would 
recognize the inconsistency of court decisions on rebuttal of presumptions 
favoring the axioms.  The possibility that a new regulation in conflict with the 
existing statute might land in a court that frequently rebuts the presumption in 
favor of the categoric axiom may prompt the agency to promulgate such a 
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On the other hand, any concern over an erosion of predictability and stability under a 
presumption alternative ought not be overinflated.  First, under the extant system the 
unpredictability of outcomes already may erode the stability of existing law.  Just as courts 
operating under the presumption alternative might unevenly apply the presumptions or even 
manipulate them, courts operating under the extant system may be uneven and manipulative in 
their application of interpretative rules.126  It is not at all clear that outcomes would be much less 
predictable or that law would be much less stable under the presumption alternative than they 
now are under the extant system.  
Moreover, even if the presumption alternative would diminish predictability and stability, 
this may be a positive development.  Do we really want a system that perpetuates predictability 
of anti-democratic outcomes and stability of anti-democratic legal norms?  Because the categoric 
and chronologic axiom presumptions would be rebutted only in cases where it is easy to detect a 
marked difference in the democratic legitimacy of two norms, the presumption alternative would 
weed out only existing legal norms that are comparatively very weak in terms of democratic 
legitimacy.  In all other cases B the hard cases B the categoric and chronologic axioms would 
operate exactly as they do under the extant system, and predictability and stability would remain 
unchanged. 
regulation, thereby altering the contours of existing law.  
126
. Using the anti-spam regulation illustration, the agency is aware that, despite the 
clear meaning of the statute=s text and legislative intent, a court may use its broad 
interpretive discretion to find that the regulation and statute do not stand in 
conflict.  The agency, therefore, may promulgate the new regulation in the hope 
that it will be tested in a court willing to use interpretive subterfuge to uphold it 
against an arguably conflicting statute.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
90
Another caveat relates to separation of powers values.127  In the easy cases the 
presumption system would permit norms belonging to nominally subordinate categories to take 
on the same trumping powers as norms belonging to nominally superordinate legal categories.  
What this means for separation of powers is that a normally subordinate norm-generating entity 
may create norms with trumping powers ordinarily associated with the norms created by a 
superordinate norm-generating entity.  Again, consider a regulation and statute example.  If the 
presumption in favor of the categoric axiom is rebutted, a regulation will take on the trumping 
powers normally associated with statutes B the power to trump common law and regulatory 
norms as well as existing statutes.  Under the extant system only Congress creates norms with the 
power to trump nothing more and nothing less than conflicting common law rules, regulations, 
and preexisting statutes.  Under the presumption system agencies also would create norms with 
the power, at least in the easy cases, to trump conflicting common law rules, regulations, and 
preexisting statutes.  Permitting an agency to create norms with the trumping powers ordinarily 
associated with statutes blurs the sharp separation of powers boundary lines maintained by the 
extant system.  
Similar to concerns over predictability and stability, however, concerns over blurring of 
separation of powers boundary lines ought not be overstated.  First, in hard cases the extant 
127
. As we have seen, the extant system protects separation of powers boundary lines 
by insuring that the different kinds of norms possess different trumping powers.  
See supra pp.  61-65.  This insures that each of the four principal norm-generating 
entities are charged with creating norms that differ in terms of substantive 
trumping powers.  The purely chronologic and multi-factor alternative would all 
but erase separation of powers boundary lines.  Under those alternatives, whether 
labeled constitutional, statutory, administrative, or common law norms, all legal 
norms would possess the same trumping powers.  
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system would operate as normal and there would be no blurring of separation of powers 
boundary lines.  This differentiates the presumption alternative from the purely chronologic 
alternative.  Second, even in the easy cases any blurring of separation of powers boundary lines 
would not be so different from what already informally occurs under the extant system.  Indeed, 
subordinate norm-generating entities operating under the extant system already find ways to 
informally trump the norms created by nominally superior entities.  
To see the point, imagine a case involving a constitutional norm that has been given a 
settled doctrinal reading but can no longer make a credible claim to strong democratic legitimacy. 
 Further, imagine that Congress passes a new statute of strong democratic legitimacy which, in 
the eyes of most expert observers, stands in conflict with the settled doctrinal reading of the 
constitutional norm.  A straightforward and honest interpretive approach under the extant system 
would result in nullification of the statute.  It would surprise absolutely no one, however, if a 
court facing such a scenario were to save the statute from nullification by reshaping the contours 
of the constitutional norm more narrowly (or with more exceptions and/or more expansive 
exceptions) than had previously been the case.128  This strategy would avoid any conflict between 
the statutory and constitutional norms and thereby preserve the statute.    
In this kind of case, the practical difference between constitutional amendment via Article 
128
. Similarly, posit an older statute that from most perspectives boasts high 
democratic legitimacy and a recently passed statute that alters the older statute, 
but which reeks of special interest politics.  No one would be surprised if a court 
operating under the extant system were to strive mightily to narrowly construe the 
more recent statute, thereby limiting the impact of the anti-democratic legal norm. 
 Indeed, if the newer statute did not contain specific language requiring partial 
repeal of the preexisting statute, it would come as no surprise if a court were to 
find that the older and newer statute did not conflict at all. 
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V and legislative and judicial collaboration to reshape the contours of extant constitutional 
provisions is less than might be imagined.129  Under the extant system, congressional passage of 
a statute in conflict with the extant doctrinal construction of a constitutional provision operates as 
an informal legislative request for judicial reshaping of that constitutional provision.  When the 
federal courts respond to that request by altering the contours of the constitutional norm to 
accommodate the new statute, the Constitution, for all intents and purposes, has been modified.  
Prior to passage of the statute the constitutional provision in question meant one thing.  After 
passage of the statute and judicial consideration the constitutional provision is reshaped to mean 
something different.  The formal distinctions between the law creating tasks assigned to We the 
People, Congress, and the federal courts remain intact.  Passage of the statute, coupled with 
judicial reshaping of the constitutional norm, amounts to a legislative and judicial collaboration 
to engage in an informal law creating task formally assigned to We the People B  alteration of the 
Constitution.130
129
. See Strauss, supra note 82, at 1459-62 (arguing that Constitution has been 
informally amended by Supreme Court decisions more than by formal Article V 
processes).]
130
. A similar informal blurring of the boundary lines between legislatures and 
agencies takes place when an agency promulgates a new regulation that 
contradicts and replaces a preexisting regulation.  A court could strike down the 
new regulation as arbitrary and capricous.  See e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of 
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983) (striking down new 
regulation replacing preexisting regulation because agency failed to sufficiently 
explain the change with Areasoned analysis@).  If, however, a court upholds the 
new regulation, the end effect is an agency and court informally cooperating to 
alter the contours of existing law.  See, e,g., N.A.A.C.P. v. F.C.C., 652 F.2d 993, 
998-1004 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that new regulation properly replaces 
conflicting preexisting regulation); Meriden Cmty. Action Agency v. Shalala, 880 
F. Supp. 882, 886-88 (D.D.C. 1995) (same).  Though statutory law remains 
formally unchanged, the effect on regulated entities is no different than if 
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Under the presumption alternative the same outcome would be achieved by more open 
and honest means.  Passage of a statute in conflict with a no longer democratically legitimate 
constitutional norm would cause a court to directly and publicly evaluate the democratic 
legitimacy of the statutory and constitutional norms in question.  If the court were to determine 
that the statute makes a substantially stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than the conflicting 
constitutional norm, the court would (1) find that the presumption in favor of the categoric axiom 
has been rebutted and (2) would accordingly trim back the contours of the constitutional norm in 
order to preserve the statute fully intact.  
In short, a shift to the presumption system may do little more than place an imprimatur of 
legitimacy and formality on the irregular and informal blurring of separation of powers boundary 
lines that already occurs under the extant system.  Still, formal appearances matter.  The formally 
legitimized transgressions of separation of powers boundary lines permitted by the presumption 
system would constitute a considerable impediment to its adoption.  Some may be willing to 
admit that an informal erosion of separation of powers boundary lines already occurs under the 
extant system, yet may also be hesitant to endorse a formal legitimization and institutionalization 
of that erosion under the presumption alternative.131
Congress had amended the statute.  Under the preexisting regulation the agency 
had interpreted the statutory requirements to mean one thing.  Under the new 
regulation the agency (with the approval of a court) has interpreted the statutory 
requirements to mean something completely different.  
131
. Moreover, there is some risk that the difference between the extant and 
presumption systems would go beyond apparent or psychological impact and 
bring about a substantial change in substantive outcomes.  Transgressions of 
separation of powers boundary lines may fall under the category of things that 
operate best if not formally or officially acknowledged.  Under the extant system 
subordinate norm-generating entities may find ways to formally respect but 
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Though not touching on separation of powers values, a similar caveat applies to cases 
involving conflicting norms created by the same entity.   Rebuttal of the presumption in favor of 
the chronologic axiom would permit older legal norms to trump newer legal norms of the same 
kind.  In a case involving two statutes, for example, the preexisting statute (and the long-retired 
Congress that passed it) would trump the new statute (and the current or more recent Congress 
that passed it).  
As with cases of conflicting norms of different kinds, something very similar already 
occurs in cases involving norm of the same kind under the extant system.  Consider a new statute 
providing special interest benefits and a preexisting statute that, despite its age, is public 
regarding and still boasts strong democratic legitimacy.  Faced with these two norms, a court 
operating under the extant system will surprise no one if it gives the narrowest possible 
construction to a new special interest statute, thereby avoiding any possible conflict with the 
preexisting statute of high democratic legitimacy.132  Though the older statute does not formally 
informally subvert separation of powers boundary lines.  So long as formal 
violations of those boundary lines remain verboten, however, the informal 
violations are kept to a minimum.  Allowing formalized and legitimized violations 
of separation of powers boundary lines under the presumption alternative, in 
contrast, might lead to far more frequent transgressions of the boundary lines than 
currently occurs.  Once formally legitimized by adoption of the presumption 
alternative, courts might be emboldened to permit norms of subordinate kind to 
trump norms of superordinate kind at a far higher rate than what they permit 
informally under the extant system=s nominal prohibition on such phenomenon.  
In short, keeping the phenomenon informal and extra-legal may hold back the 
flood waters.  Formal recognition and legality, in contrast, might rupture the dyke.
132
. Thus, a court concerned about full or partial repeal of the preexisitng statute of 
high democratic legitimacy might be particularly demanding in requiring an 
unequivocally clear statement of intent to repeal in the new statute.  See Petroski, 
supra note 39, at  497 (pointing out that courts will adopt strained statutory 
interpretations in order to give effect to older statutes that seemingly stand in 
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trump the newer statute, the practical effect is as though it had done just that.133  The presence of 
the preexisting statute of high democratic legitimacy prompts the court to shape the contours of 
the new special interest statute more narrowly than it would if not facing possible nullification of 
a statute of high democratic legitimacy.
A shift to the presumption alternative would yield the same outcome via a different path.  
Rather than acting to bias norm interpretation, a substantial disparity in the democratic legitimacy 
of the old and new statutes would lead to a rebuttal of the chronologic axiom.  In the end, the 
practical trumping power of newer and older norms probably would not differ all that greatly 
under the extant and presumption systems.  Whether prompting a court to narrowly shape the 
contours of the new norm (subversion of extant system) or formally trumping the new norm 
(presumption system), the older norm has the ultimate effect of eclipsing the new norm.134
conflict with new statutes).
133
. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (most cited federal case for 
presumption against implied repeals in which Court adopts strained reading of 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 in order to preserve Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934).    
134
. As with rebuttal of the categoric axiom and separation of powers issues, formal 
recognition and legitimization of inversions of the new norm over old norm axiom 
constitutes a considerable impediment to implementation of the presumption 
alternative.  Realizing that older norms can prompt courts to emasculate new 
norms to the point where the new norms are, for all intents and purposes, fully or 
partially nullified is one thing.  Granting old norms the formally legitimized 
power to trump new norms is altogether different, if not in terms of outcomes, 
then certainly in terms of psychological impact.
Moreover, as with rebuttal of the categoric axiom, it is possible that the 
extant system  suppresses the frequency of informal inversions of the chronologic 
principle.  The formally legitimized inversions of the chronologic axiom 
permitted by the presumption alternative might embolden courts and result in a 
much higher rate of older norms trumping newer norms than now occurs. See 
supra note 131. 
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A final caveat relates to judicial competence.  The presumption alternative, like the multi-
factor system, would require courts to analyze the democratic legitimacy of individual legal 
norms.  As with the multi-factor alternative, there will be concern that courts are not well 
equipped to perform this task.135  One key advantage of the presumption system, however, is that 
it makes this task as simple as possible.  Unlike the multi-factor system, the presumption 
alternative would require a dispositive judicial determination on the democratic legitimacy of 
legal norms in only the easy cases, or in other words, in the cases where the difference in 
democratic legitimacy between two conflicting legal norms is substantial.  The hard cases would 
be adjudicated under the categoric and chronologic axioms.  Courts operating under the 
presumption alternative would never have to make the fine-grained distinctions regarding the 
democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal norms that would be required by the multi-factor 
alternative.  Instead, they would be called on only to engage in a simple comparative analysis:  
Does one norm possess substantially greater democratic legitimacy than another?  Comparative 
analysis between significantly incommensurate objects is far easier and less conducive to error 
than the sort of fine-grained analysis required by the multi-factor alternative.  
Though the presumption alternative greatly simplifies the task, courts will still make 
errors.   The important question, however, is whether judicial evaluations under the presumption 
system are more likely to get the democratic legitimacy question right than the extant or the 
multi-factor systems.  In the cases where conflicting norms are hard to differentiate in terms of 
democratic legitimacy, the extant system performs acceptably and so too would the presumption 
system.  The multi-factor system, in contrast, would perform poorly in the hard cases.  In cases of 
135
. See supra-pp 74- 83.
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clear and substantial imbalance in the democratic legitimacy of two conflicting legal norms, on 
the other hand, it would not be hard for courts operating under the presumption system to outdo 
the performance of the extant system.136
The chief advantage of the presumption system is that it would work well in both easy 
and hard cases.  In cases like the anti-spam regulation illustration, the presumption alternative 
would allow a more subtle and multi-faceted analysis of the relative democratic legitimacy than 
is currently possible.  The potential gains include fewer anti-democratic outcomes, less incentive 
for judicial dishonesty or bias, and more transparency in  judicial opinions.  In cases where the 
relative democratic legitimacy of legal norms is a closer call, however, the presumption system 
would work exactly as does the extant system.  This feature avoids the pitfalls of the multi-factor 
alternative.  
Against these substantial advantages weigh the various caveats.  Perhaps most 
importantly, many reasonable minds will conclude that the presumption alternative would greatly 
enhance the power of the judiciary, of subordinate norms and norm-generating entities, and older 
136
. Moreover, any judicial evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of individual legal 
norms would be embedded in a larger process involving other norm-generating 
entities.  The presumption alternative does not envision courts as open-ended 
inquisitorial boards unilaterally plucking norms from the sky to pass judgment on 
their democratic legitimacy.  Courts would be asked to evaluate the democratic 
legitimacy of legal norms only when two legal norms stand in conflict.  This 
means that only the action of a coordinate norm-generating entity would open the 
door to judicial evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms.  For 
example, in order for a court to determine that a new regulation possesses 
substantially greater democratic legitimacy than a preexisting conflicting statute, 
an agency must have first determined that the statute was of suspect democratic 
legitimacy and have promulgated the new regulation.  
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norms and long-retired norm-generating entities.137  My own judgment, however, is that a shift to 
the presumption alternative would not radically transform the practical power of subordinate or 
older norms and norm-generating entities; in particular it would not substantially amplify the 
power of the courts.  
The reason for this is simple.  Both the extant and presumption systems afford courts 
137
. If this line of thinking is correct, the caveats are of great weight.  However, for 
those who believe that the presumption alternative grants subordinate norms, 
preexisting norms, and courts too much power, the system could be configured to 
provide additional safeguards against frequent rebuttals of the presumptions in 
favor of the categoric and chronologic axioms.  One possibility would be to grant 
the categoric and chronologic axioms super-strong presumptions of applicability.  
Another possibility would be to require more than a substantial disparity in the 
democratic legitimacy of two conflicting legal norms.  Rebuttal of the categoric 
and chronologic axioms might also require a showing that the norms of 
superordinate category or the newer norm makes an exceedingly weak claim to 
democratic legitimacy.  These additional requirements would limit rebuttals of the 
two axioms to those cases where their ordinary application would result in an 
flagrantly anti-democratic outcome. 
Of course, the additional requirements would come at the cost of a higher 
rate of anti-democratic outcomes and a stronger incentive for resort to judicial 
manipulation aimed at avoiding anti-democratic outcomes than would otherwise 
be the case.  There exists a value trade off between preservation of separation of 
powers boundary lines and achieving outcomes that enhance or preserve the 
democratic legitimacy of law.  The harder it is to rebut the presumptions in favor
of application of the categoric and chronologic axioms, the more likely that norms 
of  relatively superior democratic legitimacy will be nullified by norms of 
relatively low democratic legitimacy.  
The extant system in effect operates with an irrebuttable presumption that 
norms belonging to higher order categories and newer norms are more 
democratically legitimate than norms belonging to lower order categories and 
older norms.  It always insures that separation of powers boundary lines remain at 
least formally intact.  In so doing, however, the extant system is forever 
condemned to produce a relatively high rate of anti-democratic outcomes B
instances, for example, where a norm of relatively high perceived democratic 
legitimacy belonging to a lower order legal category is nullified by a conflicting 
norm of relatively low democratic legitimacy belonging to a higher order legal 
category.
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broad discretion.  Under the extant system judicial discretion is channeled through biased and 
manipulated application of free-ranging interpretive discretion.  Under the presumption 
alternative, in contrast, discretion would be channeled (at least in the easy cases) through factors 
for assessing the democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal norms.  Though the locus of judicial 
discretion is different, the presumption alternative would not give courts substantially more 
discretion than courts operating under the extant system already exercise.   In other words, the 
presumption alternative would grant courts, subordinate norms and the entities that create them, 
and older norms and the entities that create them, certain powers that they do not now formally 
possess.  Often, however, these powers already may be expressed in informal and irregular ways 
under the extant system.  
Though outcomes and judicial power might not differ substantially under the two 
systems, the presumption alternative likely would engender greater judicial honesty and more 
openness of reasoning in judicial opinions than does the extant system.  Under the extant system, 
 courts that seek to avoid nullification of norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy via 
benign interpretive dishonesty or interpretive biases leave important reasons motivating 
outcomes out of written opinions.  Courts operating under the presumption alternative, in 
contrast, would have reason to state, confront, and publicly discuss the democratic legitimacy 
concerns motivating outcomes in their written opinions.  Honesty and openness in the 
justification of judicial decisions is always to be preferred over opaque obfuscation.  
This honesty, however, comes at a price.  Formally legitimized transgressions of 
separation of powers boundary lines, inversions of chronologic orderings, and exercises of 
judicial power make for formidable psychological impediments to adoption.  It is hard to imagine 
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courts proclaiming for themselves a formal power to trump regulations and statutes that they find 
democratically suspect.  It is equally hard to imagine Congress seeking a formally recognized 
power to alter the Constitution without recourse to We the People.138  Though informal practices 
may not be so different, the unorthodox features of subordinate norms trumping superordinate 
norms, older norms trumping newer norms, and judicial power determining when these events 
take place, almost certainly would provoke concentrated opposition.     
2. The Institution Prompting System
The previous Section suggested that a legislature may informally invite courts to reshape 
a constitutional norm by passing a statute at odds with the standing doctrinal meaning of a 
constitutional norm.139  Sometimes, however, the tables are turned.  Courts may informally invite 
legislative reformulation or even repeal of a statute.  In these cases, a court will enforce a statute 
despite troubling features, but include in the text of an opinion a written plea for legislative 
reconsideration.140  This informal judicial signaling appears to have provoked legislative reform 
in at least some cases.141  A second alternative system retaining most features of the extant 
138
. A constitutional amendment would be needed for Congress to exercise such a 
formally recognized power.  See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 427 
(2000) (holding that Congress does not have the power to alter procedural rules 
required by the Constitution). 
139
. See supra pp. 93-94.
140
. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (concurring with holding that federal ERISA statute preempts claims 
allowed by state law but encouraging Congress to Arevisit what is an unjust and 
increasingly tangled ERISA regime@).
141
. See Eskridge, supra note 66, at 337-38, (presenting evidence suggesting that 
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system would regularize and expand this informal judicial practice.  
Under what I will call the institution prompting alternative, courts adjudicating cases 
involving conflicting legal norms would identify norms of suspect democratic legitimacy and 
would formally invite or even compel reconsideration of those norms by the entities that created 
them.  The system responds to the notion that the presumption system would grant too much 
power to subordinate norms, older norms, and the federal courts.   
The key to the institution prompting alternative lies in a formal process for notifying 
coordinate norm-generating entities that a court has identified a situation where the extant system 
will produce nullification of a norm of relatively strong democratic legitimacy.  Once provided 
formal notice, the entity that created the suspect norm would have a full and open opportunity to 
do one of two things.  First, it could eliminate any conflict between the two norms by altering or 
abolishing the norm of suspect democratic legitimacy.  Second, it could leave the suspect norm 
unchanged.  
Offering the entity that created the norm of suspect democratic legitimacy the chance to 
alter or abolish the norm, or to leave the norm unchanged, would recast the roles of the various 
institutional players.  First, unlike what would occur under the presumption system, courts would 
be relieved of unilateral or monopoly power to determine when the categoric or chronologic 
axioms should be discarded.  Instead, courts would function primarily as identifiers of norms of 
suspect democratic legitimacy and as signalers to coordinate norm-generating entities.  Second 
and relatedly, the institution prompting alternative would give the norm-generating entities that 
created norms of suspect democratic legitimacy a substantial role in the resolution of  conflicts 
Congress sometimes alters statutes in response to Supreme Court constructions).  
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between legal norms.
Consider how the system would operate in the context of the anti-spam regulation 
illustration.  Faced with a difficult to avoid conflict between the popular regulation and the 
special interest statute, a court would first apply multi-factor analysis to assess the relative 
democratic legitimacy of the two legal norms.  If the court finds that the disparity in democratic 
legitimacy between the statute and the regulation is not too pronounced, the court would apply 
the categoric axiom to nullify the regulation.  If, however, the court finds the disparity in 
democratic legitimacy between the subordinate regulation and the superordinate statute 
sufficiently substantial, it would refrain from applying the categoric axiom. 
At this point, the presumption system would permit a court to simply uphold the 
regulation and nullify the suspect statute.  Under the institution prompting alternative, however, 
the court would be required to formally inform Congress, the entity that created the statute of 
suspect democratic legitimacy, that the court has identified a situation in which a statute of 
apparently questionable democratic legitimacy stands in conflict with a regulation of solid 
democratic legitimacy.142
Upon receipt of formal notice, Congress could amend or repeal the suspect statute in 
order to preserve the regulation, or could elect to leave the statute unchanged, thereby nullifying 
142
. The formal notice envisioned would take the form of an official judicial decree 
and would be transmitted to appropriate personnel within the entity that created 
the norm of suspect democratic legitimacy.  In this case, for example, the system 
might require that formal notice be delivered to the chairperson and ranking 
minority member of the House and Senate legislative committees responsible for 
passage of the statute of suspect democratic legitimacy.  
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the regulation.143   Either way, the ultimate responsibility for resolution of the statute-regulation 
conflict would lie not with a court, but rather with the entity that created the norm identified as 
suspect in terms of democratic legitimacy.  The judicial role would shift from ultimate decider to 
that of signaler and prompter.144
Notice the altered dynamic that would prevail under the institution prompting alternative. 
 Under the extant system a legal norm of suspect democratic legitimacy can be formally altered 
only by the entity that created the norm or a superordinate entity, or informally altered by a court 
willing to deploy interpretive manipulation.  This state of affairs leaves many legal norms of 
suspect democratic legitimacy invulnerable to elimination or alteration.  The same special 
interests that achieved passage of a special interest statute, for example, can often prevent its 
alteration.145  Moreover, courts may be either unable or unwilling to deploy interpretive 
143
. Presumably, acceptance of the new regulation and consequent full or partial repeal 
of the conflicting statute would require approval of both chambers of Congress as 
well as approval by the Chief Executive.  Any other formula would require a 
Constitutional amendment or modification in the doctrinal interpretation of the 
Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses.  See I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) 
(holding that bicameralism and presentment must be satisfied to create new 
statutory law).  
144
. I have so far discussed the institution prompting system within the context of 
statutes and regulations.  The system could be adapted to apply to cases involving 
other types of legal norms as well.  Consider cases involving conflicts between 
statutes and constitutional norms.  Thus, an agency or Congress could create legal 
norms in conflict with a constitutional norm.  If the Federal Courts were 
convinced that the new regulation or statute possesses substantially greater 
democratic legitimacy than the constitutional norm, the issue could somehow be 
referred to We the People.  One possibility would be to refer the new regulation or 
statute to Congress for compulsory consideration of a constitutional amendment 
that would eliminate any conflict between the Constitution and the regulation or 
statute.
145
. Even without the intervention of special interests, legislative inertia may result in 
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manipulation aimed at eviscerating the special interest statute.  Facing these realities, an agency 
may be hesitant to expend time and resources promulgating a new regulation at odds with the 
special interest statute. 
The institution prompting alternative offers a set of institutional arrangements that could 
break this logjam.  It offers courts a device for provoking congressional reconsideration of the 
suspect special interest statute.  Even if reconsideration does not result in repeal or alteration of 
the special interest statute, the system would obligate Congress to face the issue and therefore 
accept ultimate responsibility for the result.  The possibility that Congress could be forced to 
confront the special interest statute that it created would encourage an administrative agency to 
promulgate a public-regarding regulation in conflict with the special interest statute.
Moreover, the institution prompting alternative would generate less incentive for judicial 
manipulation of interpretive discretion than does the extant system.  Courts operating under the 
extant system know that in some cases, but for interpretive manipulation, norms of suspect 
democratic legitimacy will nullify norms of strong democratic legitimacy.  Under an institution 
prompting alternative, in contrast, courts will know that partial or even full responsibility for an 
anti-democratic outcome will fall to a coordinate norm-generating entity.  By offering courts an 
aboveboard option for dealing with norms of suspect democratic legitimacy, the institution 
prompting alternative reduces the temptation to resort to interpretive subterfuge and 
manipulation. 
the perpetuation of the special interest oriented statute.
An institution prompting alternative could be configured in several different ways.  At 
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one extreme the system could involve nothing more than a compulsory formal judicial notice 
requesting reconsideration of a norm of suspect democratic legitimacy by the entity that created 
the norm.  The entity that created the norm, however, would not be required to respond in any 
official way to the formal notice.  If configured in this fashion, the system would closely 
resemble current informal practices.  The key difference, of course, would be the compulsory 
requirement that courts undertake a signaling function by issuing formal notice.  Any informal 
judicial signaling that now occurs is irregular and haphazard.  Some courts may be highly attuned 
to the democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal norms, while others may completely tune out the 
issue.  Some courts may habitually include an informal plea for reconsideration of norms of 
suspect democratic legitimacy in their written opinions.  Other courts may never use informal 
signaling.  Institution of a formalized notice requirement would substantially reduce, if not 
eliminate, this inconsistency.  It would direct all courts to be cognizant of norms of suspect 
democratic legitimacy and require that they signal coordinate norm-generating entities in 
appropriate cases.  
Moreover, a shift from informal to formal signaling would ensure that the intended 
recipients pick up the signal.  Any informal signaling that now takes place depends upon the 
active surveillance of judicial opinions by Congress, regulatory agencies, and interest groups.146
The formal notice process envisioned by the institution prompting alternative, in contrast, 
demands no action on the part of norm-generating entities or interest groups.  The notice would 
be directed to key persons within norm-generating entities and therefore could not be missed.
146
. See Eskridge, supra note 66, at 341-43 (discussing congressional monitoring of 
statutory interpretation decesions).
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Perhaps most importantly, a shift from informal to formally required judicial signaling 
would alter the atmospherics surrounding norms of suspect democratic legitimacy.  Any informal 
signaling that courts currently undertake comes in the form of dicta and is therefore easy to 
ignore.  Issuance of a formal notice, however, would be a far more serious matter, perhaps 
similar in gravity to the exercise of judicial review.  Though recipient entities would not be 
required to respond, the fact that a court has taken the serious step of issuing such a notice would 
make ignoring the matter more difficult than is now the case.
At the other extreme the institution prompting system could be configured to require any 
norm-generating entity receiving a formal notice to respond in some official way.  Such a 
requirement might demand a specific determination from the recipient entity on whether the 
suspect norm should remain unchanged, or should be repealed or altered.  Alternatively, the 
system could require merely that the recipient entity explain why it ought not reconsider the 
suspect norm.  If the recipient entity were to respond by offering reasons why reform or abolition 
of the suspect norm is not needed, it will have extended its blessing to judicial determination of 
the issue in accord with the extant axiomatic meta-norms.  On the other hand, if the recipient 
entity were to respond by directly addressing the suspect norm B by nullifying or modifying the 
suspect norm or by specifically rejecting the need  for nullification or modification B the court 
will have been relieved of sole power and responsibility for the ultimate outcome. 
Either way, the effect would be to shift more of the ultimate responsibility for the 
outcome of cases involving conflicting legal norms away from courts and onto superordinate 
norm-generating entities.  Whatever action the superordinate entity might ultimately take, the 
judicial role would be limited to identifying the likely anti-democratic outcome and prompting 
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another norm-generating entity to address the problem.  Those other norm-generating entities, in 
contrast, would take on either full or partial responsibility for ultimately determining which of 
two conflicting norms ought to prevail.  Under the extant system the courts often end up as the 
only entity practically capable of preventing the nullification of a norm of relatively strong 
democratic legitimacy.  Under the institution prompting alternative, courts could shift that burden 
onto coordinate and superordinate norm-generating entities. 
Another variable in configuring an institution prompting system relates to the impact of 
inaction by the entity that created a norm identified by a court as suspect in terms of democratic 
legitimacy.147  When a court has decided that it must issue a formal notice to a coordinate norm-
generating entity and the recipient entity fails to take any official action, what should the 
institution prompting system permit a court to do?  
One option would be to require a court to apply the categoric or chronologic axiom.  This 
configuration works minimal change to the extant system because, as under the extant system, 
the court would be denied formal power to disregard the categoric and chronologic axioms.148
The other option, of course, would be to permit courts to disregard the categoric and chronologic 
147
. In cases where a court issues notice to a coordinate norm-generating entity, and 
the recipient entity takes some official action, that action would determine the 
issue.  Thus, in the context of the anti-spam regulation illustration, if a court were 
to issue a formal notice and finding to Congress claiming that the statute is of 
suspect democratic legitimacy, and if Congress were to officially decide to leave 
the statute unchanged, the statute would trump the regulation.  Conversely, if 
Congress were to decide that the statute should be repealed or amended to 
eliminate any conflict with the regulation, the regulation would survive.  
148
. Thus, in the context of the anti-spam regulation illustration, if Congress were to 
completely ignore a formal judicial notice, the court would be required to rule that 
the statute trumps the conflicting regulation.  
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axioms.  Under this configuration, a court could disregard the categoric axiom and provisionally 
nullify the suspect statute, for example, if it were to find that a popular regulation possesses 
substantially greater democratic legitimacy than a special interest statute.  The court would then 
formally notify Congress that it has found the statute problematic in terms of democratic 
legitimacy and that it has provisionally nullified the statute.  Congress would then have the 
opportunity to reaffirm the suspect statute and thereby reverse the court=s provisional nullification 
of the statute.  If, however, Congress were to fail to respond to the notice, the provisional judicial 
ruling would stand and the suspect statute would be nullified.  
The key difference between these two options lies in the consequences of inaction by the 
entity that has created the norm identified as suspect in terms of its democratic legitimacy.  
Under the first configuration, inaction leaves the suspect norm in place.  At least, however, the 
process creates an opportunity for a court to formally identify a norm as suspect and a mechanism 
that pressures the entity that created the suspect norm to address the issue.  Under the second 
configuration, inaction results in judicial nullification of the suspect norm. The judicial 
nullification, however, occurs in an environment where the entity that created the suspect legal 
norm is given formal notice and an opportunity to Acorrect@ or reverse the preliminary judicial 
nullification of that norm.149
Regardless of the different configuration options, the essence of the institution prompting 
alternative lies in assigning courts two roles.  First, courts would take on an active role in 
149
. Another configuration question centers on which courts would be granted the 
power to issue formal notice to coordinate norm-generating entities.  One option 
would empower any federal court to issue formal notice.  Another option would 
limit the notice power to appellate courts, or even the Supreme Court, with district 
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designating norms as suspect or lacking in terms of democratic legitimacy.  Second, courts would 
play a role in prodding coordinate norm-generating entities to face and/or address the norms of 
suspect democratic legitimacy that they have created or allowed to persist.150  Unlike the 
presumption system, however, the institution prompting alternative would not grant courts a 
formally legitimized monopoly power to determine when the categoric or chronologic axiom 
should be ignored.151   Instead, it would set in motion a process under which courts, coupled with 
courts limited to a fact finding role. 
150
. As with the multi-factor and presumption alternatives, the institution prompting 
alternative would cast courts in a new role.  Rather than merely interpreters of 
legal norms and deciders of individual cases, courts operating under the institution 
prompting alternative would also be assessors of the democratic legitimacy of 
legal norms.  All of the pros and cons associated with this new role covered in the 
discussions of the multi-factor and presumption alternatives applies to the 
institution prompting alternative as well.  See supra pp. 74-83, 97-98.
The institution prompting alternative, however, would be less problematic 
on this front than are the multi-factor and presumption alternatives.  Any 
erroneous judicial determinations would be of lesser consequence under the 
institution prompting alternative than under the multi-factor and presumption 
alternatives.  Rather than inversions of the categoric axiom and reversals of the 
chronologic axiom by judicial fiat, under the institution prompting alternative 
misguided judicial assessments of the democratic legitimacy of individual legal 
norms would merely result in issuance of formal notices to coordinate norm-
generating entities.  The coordinate norm-generating entities would bear all or 
most of the ultimate responsibility for the nullification or preservation of legal 
norms identified by courts (rightly or wrongly) as suspect in terms of democratic 
legitimacy.
151
. Even if configured so that inaction would permit a court to disregard the axioms, 
the court alone does not have the power to ignore the axioms.  First, it could only 
act in cases involving conflicting norms.  This means that some other norm-
generating entity must have created a norm of substantially greater democratic 
legitimacy than the suspect norm in question.  See supra note 136.  Second, the 
court could ignore the categoric and chronologic axiom if the entity that created 
the suspect norm fails to act and thereby gives a tacit consent to judicial 
resolution.  
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subordinate norm-generating entities, could stimulate superordinate norm-generating entities to 
address the norms of suspect democratic legitimacy that they have created.
Thus, against the persistence of a statute of suspect democratic legitimacy that Congress 
has failed to amend or repeal, a court and an administrative agency could cooperate to spur 
congressional action.  First, an administrative agency would promulgate a regulation of solid 
democratic legitimacy designed to stand in conflict with the statute.  Next, the courts enter the 
process.  If a court were to find the statute and regulation in conflict, but also find that the 
disparity in democratic legitimacy between the statute and the regulation is not too substantial, 
the court would simply apply the categoric axiom.  In short, if the court does not agree with the 
agency, the subordinate regulation would be nullified by the superordinate statute, as under the 
extant system.  If, however, the court were to agree with the agency and find that the regulation 
makes a substantially stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than the suspect statute, the court 
would issue a formal notice memorializing its finding to Congress.  The important point is that 
only concurrence by two subordinate norm-generating entities B  the agency and the court B could 
result in judicial notice aimed at stimulating action by the superordinate entity B Congress.152
The institution prompting alternative promises many of the advantages of the presumption 
system but offers greater protection for separation of powers boundary lines and an automatic 
152
. A similar sequence would play out in cases involving old and new norms of the 
same kind.  Consider a new special interest statute in conflict with a preexisting 
statute of solid democratic legitimacy.  If the disparity in democratic legitimacy 
between the new and the old statute were not too substantial, the court would 
apply the chronologic axiom, and the new statute would fully or partially repeal 
the old statute.  If, however, the court were to find the disparity between the 
democratic legitimacy of the old and new statutes sufficiently substantial, the 
court would issue formal notice of the finding to Congress.
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check on judicial power.  Recall that the presumption alternative could result in a blurring of the 
separation of powers boundary lines maintained under the extant system.153  In cases where a 
court determines that the presumption in favor of application of the categoric axiom is rebutted, a 
subordinate norm takes on the trumping powers possessed by a superordinate norm.  The new 
regulation of solid democratic legitimacy, for example, is permitted to trump the conflicting 
statute of suspect democratic legitimacy.  
The same blurring of separation of powers boundary lines scenario would also be possible 
under the institution prompting alternative.  Any blurring, however, would hinge not exclusively 
on a judicial determination, but rather on a judicial determination followed by explicit or implicit 
(depending on the configuration chosen) consent by the entity charged with creating the norm of 
superordinate kind.  In the regulation-statute context, the regulation could trump the conflicting 
statute, but only if Congress has explicitly or implicitly acquiesced to such an outcome.   In short, 
many of the concerns over separation of powers values implicated by the presumption system are 
allayed by the fact that the institution prompting alternative would not give courts the last word.  
153
. Under the multi-factor and presumption alternatives any legal norm would have 
the potential to trump any other legal norm.  An administrative regulation, for 
example, could trump a conflicting statute whenever a court finds that the former 
possesses greater (multi-factor alternative) or substantially greater (presumption 
alternative) democratic legitimacy than the latter.  Under the institution prompting 
alternative all four kinds of norms would retain distinct trumping powers.  The 
regulation would never have the power to trump a conflicting statute.  At most, 
the entity that created the statute would have the power to alter the statute so that 
it does not nullify a conflicting regulation, and the power to explicitly or implicitly 
consent to nullification of the statute by a regulation of substantially stronger 
democratic legitimacy.  There is a huge difference between permitting a regulation
to trump a statute and permitting Congress to consent to permitting a regulation to 
trump a statute.  In the former case, the regulation itself possesses the power to 
trump the statute.  In the latter case the regulation possesses no such power.  The 
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The institution prompting alternative is not without limitations and drawbacks.  First and 
foremost, it would not always save norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy from 
nullification by conflicting norms of suspect democratic legitimacy.  The addition of formal 
mechanisms aimed at forcing norm-generating entities to confront the suspect norms they created 
or allowed to persist cannot force those entities to abolish or amend those norms.  In many 
instances, therefore, the special interest statute would still nullify the popular public-regarding 
regulation.   
Moreover, there may exist incentives deterring subordinate norm-generating entities from 
even setting the wheels of an institution prompting alternative in motion.  Consider incentives 
facing an agency operating under powers delegated by a special interest oriented statute.  Under
the institution prompting alternative, the agency could promulgate a conflicting public-regarding 
regulation.  Such a regulation could cause a court to issue formal notice to Congress finding the 
statute to be of suspect democratic legitimacy.  Before setting these wheels in motion, however, 
the agency would have to consider the realities of its institutional place and the realities of 
congressional oversight.  If the agency were to promulgate such a regulation, Congress might 
retaliate by limiting growth of the agency=s budget or even by stripping the agency of jurisdiction 
over certain matters.154  In at least some instances, the balance of incentives would deter the 
agency from promulgating a public-regarding regulation designed to prompt congressional 
reexamination of a special interest statute.
power instead lies with the entity that created the statute.
154
. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS ' 3.1, at 42-43 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing 
congressional oversight of agencies). 
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Of course, these limitations do not mean that the institution prompting alternative would 
be without merit or consequence.  The institution prompting alternative would not force entities 
to reform the norms of suspect democratic legitimacy that they have created.  In many cases, 
however, it would create the opportunity and therefore the possibility of reform, and in other 
cases actually prompt such reform.  No doubt subordinate entities would refrain from setting the 
wheels of the institution prompting alternative in motion under certain circumstances.  Still, in 
other circumstances, subordinate entities would set those wheels in motion.  
No system could results that enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy of law in all 
cases.   The question, however, is one of comparison.  Considering all of the above factors, 
would the institution prompting alternative operate better than the extant system, the presumption 
alternative, or the other alternatives?  Ultimately the answer may depend upon one=s preferences. 
 For those inclined to place high value on eradication of norms of suspect democratic legitimacy, 
the presumption alternative may work best.  For those inclined to favor eradication of norms of 
suspect democratic legitimacy, but also concerned about granting courts too much formal power, 
the institution prompting alternative may function best.  For those who place less value on 
eradication of norms of suspect democratic legitimacy, but high value on simplicity, continuity, 
and maintenance of traditional institutional roles, the extant system may suffice.  
C. Minor Modifications to the Extant System
The final two alternative systems are aimed at addressing the problems of anti-democratic 
outcomes and the Hobson=s choice produced by the extant system, while simultaneously 
minimizing disruption to traditional institutional roles.  The first of these final two alternatives 
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modifies the institution prompting alternative discussed in the previous Section.  The second 
would leave the extant system unchanged but would add a pair of norm interpretation canons to 
assist courts facing norms that might be read as standing in irreconcilable conflict.  
1.  The Institution Option System
The institution prompting alternative permits two subordinate norm-generating entities to 
collaborate in prompting a superordinate entity to reconsider legal norms of suspect democratic 
legitimacy.  One possible concern with this arrangement is that it would unsettle traditional 
institutional roles and upset the primacy of superordinate entities over subordinate entities.155
Sticking with the regulation and statute illustrations, though offering Congress the last word, the 
institution prompting alternative gives subordinate courts and agencies license to provoke 
congressional action.  Rather than merely appliers and interpreters of legislative commands, 
agencies and courts would become legitimized critics of legislative output.156
The next alternative responds to this concern by changing the timing and authority to 
decide whether institution prompting steps may be undertaken.  Under what I will call the 
>institution option= alternative, the power to decide whether institution prompting processes may 
155
. See supra pp. 91-92 and text accompanying note 137.
156
. The same sort of difficulty arises in cases involving norms other than statutes and 
in cases in which the norms in question are of the same kind.  For example, where 
a new special interest statute stands in conflict with a preexisting statute of strong 
democratic legitimacy, the institution prompting alternative would permit what 
amounts to a collaboration between the congress that passed the preexisting 
statute and a court that would prompt the current congress to reconsider the more 
recently created statute.  This arrangement upsets the normal primacy of today=s 
congress over long-retired congresses.
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occur would be taken away from subordinate entities and place it in the hands of superordinate 
entities.  Moreover, the timing of that decision would be shifted from some point after a given 
legal norm has been in force to the time that a given norm is created.   
Under the institution option alternative, when creating a given legal norm entities would 
either grant or deny pre-consent to application of institution prompting processes to that legal 
norm.  For example, when passing a statute Congress would have the option of including a clause 
expressly permitting an appropriate agency to promulgate regulations in conflict with the 
statute.157  The express permission could include limiting requirements, such as a requirement 
that the agency make specific findings establishing that the statute lacks a solid claim of 
democratic legitimacy, or findings establishing that the new regulation makes a substantially 
stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than the statute.158
Assuming that Congress has pre-consented, the institution option system would operate 
just as would the institution prompting alternative.  Thus, if an agency has promulgated a 
regulation in conflict with a statute of suspect democratic legitimacy, a court would then make an 
independent assessment of the democratic legitimacy of the statute and the regulation.  If the 
court were to determine that, despite the agency finding, the new regulation does not possess 
157
. Clearly, adoption of this system would necessitate a constitutional amendment or 
modification of existing separation of powers doctrine.  See Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that Congress may not 
delegate legislative powers); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) 
(same).
158
. Similarly, a constitutional amendment could include a clause permitting future 
modifications to the amendment via legislation, or a new regulation could include 
a clause permitting judicial modification, if it appears that the amendment or 
regulation no longer can make a strong claim to democratic legitimacy. 
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substantially greater democratic legitimacy than the statute, the regulation would be vacated and 
the statute would continue unchanged.  If, however, the court were to agree with the agency 
determination, the court would then issue a formal notice to Congress of its finding, thus 
providing Congress with an automatic opportunity to reconsider the statute.  As under the 
institution prompting alternative, Congress could then either accept or reject the new 
regulation.159
The key point is that the institution option alternative would give norm-generating entities 
greater control over the norms they create than would the institution prompting alternative.  The 
institution prompting alternative would give subordinate norm-generating entities unfettered 
authority to undertake an institution prompting process.  Under the institution option alternative, 
in contrast, subordinate norm-generating entities could undertake institution promting activities 
159
. All of the configuration permutations at play with the institution prompting 
alternative are also possible for the institution option alternative.  See supra pp. 
106-110. Thus, the institution option alternative could either permit or require a
response when an entity is formally notified that a norm of its creation has been 
identified as suspect in terms of democratic legitimacy.  Also, the effect of no 
response could be either that the standard categoric and chronologic axioms will 
govern the case or that the axioms may be ignored.  
In addition, however, another important configuration choice arises.  On 
one configuration, subordinate norm-generating entities would be prohibited from 
undertaking actions provoking reconsideration of legal norms by the entities that 
created them unless the entity that created the norm had explicitly so consented.  
Thus, where Congress creates a statute that does not specify whether subordinate 
entities are permitted to undertake institution prompting activities, agencies and 
courts would be forbidden to undertake those activities.  On the other 
configuration, the default rule could be set in the opposite direction.    Subordinate 
norm-generating entities would be permitted to undertake actions provoking 
reconsideration of legal norms unless the entity that created a norm explicitly so 
prohibits.  Thus, where Congress creates a statute and does not specify whether 
subordinate entities are permitted to undertake institution prompting activities, 
agencies and courts would be permitted to undertake those activities. 
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only when a superordinate entity has pre-consented.  Simply stated, the institution prompting 
alternative would give superordinate entities the last word, while the institution choice alternative 
would give them both the first and the last word regarding the fate of legal norms of arguably 
suspect democratic legitimacy.  
The pre-consent feature should defuse criticism that some might level against the 
institution prompting alternative.  If, for example, Congress has pre-consented to a process under 
which agencies and courts can take steps to provoke congressional reconsideration of statutes of 
suspect democratic legitimacy, concerns over unsettling the primacy of Congress over agencies 
and courts are diminished.   Similarly, reservations over whether courts are up to the task of 
evaluating the democratic legitimacy of legal norms would be ameliorated by the pre-consent 
feature.  If Congress were to offer pre-consent, presumably the thinking would be that courts (and
also agencies) are capable of assessing the democratic legitimacy of the particular norm in 
question.  
The institution option alternative, however, may throw the baby out with the bath water.  
In an effort to minimize and cabin any unorthodox role for courts and other subordinate norm-
generating entities, much of the potential for improvement on the performance of the extant 
system might be lost.  In the first instance, pre-consent may be a rare occurrence.  One would 
expect that in the vast majority of situations norm creating entities would prefer that the norms 
they create not be subjected to institution prompting scrutiny by subordinate norm-generating 
entities.  Usually, those pushing for the creation of a new legal norm prefer to entrench the norm 
as much as possible against future nullification or revision.  Pre-consenting to institution 
prompting actions works against entrenchment because it permits subordinate norm-generating 
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entities to unleash a process that may prompt alteration or nullification of the norm in question.
In the legislative context, for example, assembling a minimum winning coalition and 
navigating the legislative labyrinth to secure passage of a new statute is usually extremely 
difficult.160  Those pushing for passage of a new statute would usually prefer to entrench the 
statute against alteration.  Pre-consent to formally legitimized agency and court questioning of 
the democratic legitimacy of the statute, however, exposes that statute to alteration by coordinate 
branches of government.  The same logic holds for constitutional and administrative norms.  In 
most cases, therefore, pre-consent to institution prompting actions would be denied, and conflicts 
between legal norms would be adjudicated under the extant axioms.  Most of the problems of 
anti-democratic outcomes, incentives for bias and dishonest judicial manipulation, and opacity in 
judicial opinions, would remain.  
Still, the institution option alternative could constitute an improvement over the extant 
system.  The extant system offers no options.  When a norm-generating entity creates a legal 
norm it knows that it can be formally altered only by that same entity or by a superordinate entity. 
 The institution option alternative, in contrast, would at least offer a choice.  In some instances 
norm-generating entities would choose to subject the norms they create to formally legitimized 
scrutiny by subordinate entities.  For example, Congress sometimes might actually prefer pre-
consent to institution prompting processes over the probable alternative B informal judicial and 
agency manipulation.  The former allows subordinate entities to merely pressure Congress to 
reconsider its own norms when they are of suspect democratic legitimacy.  Congress, however, 
160
. ESKRIDGE ET. AL., supra note 66, at 66-67 (discussing legislative process as series 
of vetogates and hurdles).
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retains the last word.  The latter results in subordinate entities manipulating and reshaping legal 
norms when they are of suspect democratic legitimacy.161  In other instances, inclusion of pre-
consent to institution prompting alternatives might be needed to assemble a minimum winning 
coalition in Congress for passage of a statute.  Fence sitting legislators might be persuaded to 
vote for a bill only if courts and agencies are authorized to prompt a legislative reexamination of 
the statute at some future date.  Provisions pre-consenting to institution prompting might also 
become a chip deployed in legislative bargains and logrolls.  For example, in exchange for a 
legislator=s support on one bill, the legislator might demand the inclusion of a pre-consent 
provision in another bill.162
In the end, the institution alternative probably promises less improvement on the 
performance of the extant system than some of the other alternatives.  On the other hand, it 
would not unsettle the primacy of superordinate norm-generating entities over subordinate norm-
161
. It is also possible that pre-consent to institution prompting will lessen incentives 
for judicial manipulation of the meaning of legal norms.  Under the extant system 
courts recognize that they alone can prevent nullification of a norm of relatively 
strong democratic legitimacy via manipulation of interpretive discretion.  This 
creates a strong incentive for resort to interpretative manipulation.  Where pre-
consent to institution prompting has been extended, in contrast, courts will know 
that ultimate responsibility will lie with a superordinate norm-generating entity.  
This may lessen the incentive for resort to interpretive manipulation.  
162
. The issue of pre-consent to institution prompting would operate as an issue over 
which legislative gate-keepers bargain and logroll.  Proponents of a bill struggling 
to assemble a minimum winning coalition in Congress might offer a clause 
consenting to institution prompting as a way to convince fence sitters to vote for 
the legislation.  See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive 
Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1433-35, 1439-43 
(2003) (discussing how passage of legislation requires coalition building and 
bargaining and how Apivotal legislators@ may demand concessions in exchange for 
support of bill).      
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generating entities as much as some of the other alternatives.  Whether one finds the institution 
option alternative appealing will depend on the strength of one=s preferences for improved 
performance versus tolerance for novel and unorthodox institutional relationships.  
2.  The Interpretive Canon Alternative
A final alternative would leave all four extant axioms completely unchanged but would 
add two related canons of interpretation.  One canon would instruct courts to interpret norms, 
when possible, to avoid conflict if conflict would result in nullification of the norm of 
substantially greater democratic legitimacy.  A second canon would instruct courts to interpret 
norms, when possible, to embrace conflict if conflict would result in nullification of the norm of 
substantially lesser democratic legitimacy.163  The first canon would signal courts to identify and 
protect norms of strong democratic legitimacy and to use their interpretive discretion to ensure 
that norms of strong democratic legitimacy are not nullified.  The second canon would signal 
courts to identify and destroy norms of suspect democratic legitimacy and to use their 
interpretive discretion to ensure that norms of weak democratic legitimacy are nullified.  The 
proposed canons may be reduced or simplified to a presumption against norm interpretations that 
would substantially diminish the democratic legitimacy of law. 
For the most part, the proposed canons of interpretation would not stand out as oddities 
among the existing stock of norm interpretation rules.  We already have dozens of interpretive 
163
. Courts could be required to apply a predetermined multi-factor analysis similar to 
that discussed previously when determining whether a norm of strong democratic 
legitimacy stands at risk of nullification by a legal norm of substantially lesser 
democratic legitimacy.  See supra Section IV.A.3.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art7
121
canons that, for one reason or another, instruct courts to adopt norm interpretations that diverge 
from the most natural textual meaning and/or most probable legislative intent.164  The well 
known rule of lenity, for example, instructs courts to interpret ambiguous criminal law statutes 
with a bias that favors criminal defendants.165  A lesser known substantive canon instructs courts 
to interpret ambiguous statutes with a bias favoring the rights of Native Americans.166  These are 
just two of many interpretive rules that ask courts to favor particular substantive outcomes over 
the most natural meaning and most probable intent when interpreting legal norms.167
The proposed canons even bear a striking likeness to existing coherence-oriented 
interpretive rules and canons.  One such canon instructs courts to avoid conflicts between 
statutes.  Even where the most natural reading of the text and/or intent of two statutes would 
suggest a conflict, courts are instructed to select plausible interpretations that avoid the 
conflict.168  Another canon instructs courts to avoid reading legal norms in a way that would 
164
. See William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term B
Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 97-108 (1994) (appendix 
listing canons of legal construction used by Rehnquist Court) 
165
. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980) (leading federal case for rule of 
lenity under which ambiguous criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of 
lenity towards defendant).
166
. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (Astatutes are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their 
benefit@).
167
. ESKRIDGE ET. AL, supra note 66, at appendix B 21-23 (listing substantive canons 
of statutory construction).
168
. This is the well known rule of statutory construction which imposes a rebuttable 
presumption against full or partial repeal of the preexisting statute by a new 
statute.  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (most cited federal case for 
presumption against implied repeals).
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result in conflict with a constitutional norm.  Thus, rather than read a given statute in accord with 
its most natural textual meaning or most probable legislative intent, the so called avoidance 
canon instructs courts to adopt an interpretation that avoids conflict with the Constitution.169 A 
third analogous principle, the Chevron doctine, instructs courts to find no conflict between 
statutes and regulations so long as the regulation adopts a plausible interpretation of the 
statute.170   Consider how the proposed canons would work in a case involving a new special 
interest statute (suspect democratic legitimacy) and preexisting public-regarding regulations 
(strong democratic legitimacy).  Assume that the preexisting regulations establish product safety 
standards of broad public benefit.  The record of legislative history, however, indicates that in 
passing the new statute Congress intended to provide special interest benefits by exempting 
certain manufacturers from the regulations.  The text of the statute is open textured and 
compatible with contradictory interpretations.  It could plausibly be read as congruous with the 
intended exemptions, but also could plausibly be read as not permitting any exemptions from the 
public- regarding safety regulations.  
On this scenario, the proposed canons of construction would instruct a court to bend the 
meaning of the norms to avoid conflict between statutes and regulations, thereby preserving the 
public- regarding regulations.  To achieve this end a court would ignore the record of legislative 
history and seize upon a plausible reading of the statutory text that would not permit any 
169
. ESKRIDGE ET. AL, supra note 66, at appendix B 20-21 (listing Acontinuity in law@
canons of statutory construction and other canons such as canon calling for 
interpretation of same terms in similar way).
170
.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding that 
courts must uphold agency statutory interpretation if reasonable).
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exemptions to the public-regarding regulations.  This exercise would not differ in essence from 
what courts often do when applying the rule against implied repeal of statutes, the avoidance 
canon, or the Chevron doctrine rule requiring courts to uphold reasonable agency interpretations 
of statutes.  In all instances, courts embrace not the most natural textual or most likely intended 
interpretations of legal norms, but instead embrace the interpretations that avoid conflicts
between norms.  Courts do this even if the chosen interpretation is located on or even beyond the 
outer edges of plausible meaning.171
In other cases, however, the proposed canons of interpretation would call on courts to do 
something that the existing >coherence= rules do not dictate B bend the meaning of legal norms to 
embrace conflicts between legal norms.  To see the point, reverse the polarity of the previous 
example.  Assume that an agency captured by the industry it regulates has issued a set of weak 
product safety regulations.  The regulations fail to provide meaningful protection to the public 
and instead provide substantial benefits to the regulated industry.  If aware of the lax nature of 
the regulations and the benefits to the regulated industry, the public would surely disapprove.  
Concerned legislators introduce a new bill in Congress that would stand in conflict with the 
171
. See Petroski, supra note 39, at 497; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court=s 
New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the 
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 779-80 (1995) (discussing theory 
that use of textualist interpretation when reviewing agency interpretations is 
attributable to ideology or political preferences of judges); Sidney A. Shapiro & 
Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of 
Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L. J. 1051, 1067-72 (1995) (arguing that when 
reviewing agency decisions courts are Aresults-oriented@ despite Chevron
doctrine); William S. Jordan, III, Deference Revisited: Politics as a Determinant 
of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. 
L. REV. 454, 486-90, 515 (1989) (arguing that politics of judge influences judicial 
application of Chevron doctrine).
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existing regulations.  
If passed as introduced, the statute would force the agency to promulgate a new set of 
more rigorous and public-regarding regulations, and the special interest benefits to the regulated 
industry would be eradicated.  Legislators under the influence of lobbyists and campaign 
contributions from the affected industry, however, advance amendments rendering key 
provisions of the bill vague and ineffectual.  In order to secure passage through the maze of 
committees, sub-committees, and both chambers of Congress, proponents of the bill must accede 
to many of the amendments.  Because the statute=s text ends up ambiguous, the captured agency 
is able to adopt a new set of regulations that only minimally diminish the special interest benefits, 
and which nonetheless are compatible with a reasonable reading of the new statute.  Under 
normal Chevron doctrine interpretive rules a court upholds the regulations.172  At the end of the 
process, the bulk of the special interest benefits remain intact.173
The proposed canons of construction, however, would counsel courts to read the norms in 
question not to avoid conflict (as does the Chevron doctrine), but rather to embrace conflict if 
conflict would result in nullification of the norm of substantially lesser democratic legitimacy.  
By interpreting the open textured statute so that it stands in maximal conflict with the special 
interest benefitting regulations, the regulations will be nullified and the special interest benefits 
172
. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (holding that courts must uphold agency 
statutory interpretation if reasonable). 
173
. This outcome assumes that a court would not manipulate the Chevron doctrine, 
would find that the agency interpretation is not reasonable, and would thereby 
strike down the special interest regarding legislation.  It certainly is possible, 
however, that a court operating under the extant system might manipulate the 
Chevron doctrine to find that the regulations do not constitute a reasonable 
interpretation of the new statute.  See supra note 171.
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eliminated or at least minimized.    
Like the multi-factor, presumption, institution prompting, and institution choice 
alternatives, the interpretive canon alternative would ask courts to do something that is at least 
formally new and unfamiliar B evaluate the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms.174
  However, as already mentioned, since many courts already informally assess the democratic 
legitimacy of individual legal norms and bend (and sometimes even break) the meaning of legal 
norms in order to avoid anti-democratic outcomes, the novelty and any transition period 
difficulty would be minimal.175   Like some of the other alternative systems, the proposed canons 
constitute one way of formalizing, legitimizing, and regularizing something that courts already 
informally do, to varying degrees, under the guise of interpretive discretion.
The benefits of the proposed interpretive canons are plain.  First, formal adoption of the 
proposed canons would homogenize to some degree judicial interpretation in cases involving 
norms that potentially stand in conflict.  Some courts may currently be too hesitant to use their 
flexible interpretive discretion to avoid anti-democratic outcomes.  The proposed canons would 
signal courts these courts that they need not be hesitant.   Unlike the extant system, the 
interpretive canon alternative would minimize the Hobson=s choice between interpretive 
174
. The consequences of such judicial evaluations, however, would differ sharply 
under the various alternative systems.  Under the multi-factor alternative, for 
example, the consequence would be that a court would uphold whichever legal 
norm it finds to possess greater democratic legitimacy.  Under the institution 
prompting alternative, the consequence would be judicial issuance of a formal 
notice to the entity that created a norm of suspect democratic legitimacy.  Under 
the interpretive canon alternative, the consequence would be application of one of 
the two proposed canons giving the court license to bend the meaning of legal 
norms to avoid what would otherwise be an anti-democratic outcome.
175
. Supra text accompanying note 118.
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manipulation and anti-democratic outcomes.  The anti-rule of law stigma of interpretive 
manipulation would be removed (and indeed legitimized).  As for courts currently too willing to 
dishonestly twist interpretive rules in order to avoid anti-democratic outcomes, the proposed 
canons would signal that there are limits to such practices.  The proposed canons do not endorse 
outright judicial dishonesty or the adoption of interpretations that do not find plausible support in 
the text or intent of legal norms.  They only endorse bending the meaning of legal norms within 
the range of plausible meanings.  Adoption of the interpretive canons would not render courts 
fully identical or interchangeable in their treatment of cases involving potentially conflicting 
legal norms.  It could, however, narrow the band of inconsistency.
A second possible benefit of the interpretive canon alternative is that, like some of the 
other alternatives, it could enhance transparency in judicial opinions.176  In order to determine 
whether either of the canons are applicable, courts would be forced to analyze, compare, and 
discuss the democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal norms.  Any informal weighing of such 
considerations currently employed must be camouflaged, only to be expressed through biases and 
manipulation in the interpretation of legal norms.  The democratic legitimacy concerns that may 
drive judicial decisions would be brought out into the open, would become a legitimate part of 
legal argument, and would be expressed on the face of the written opinion.  Again, openness is 
always to be preferred over opacity.
Beneficial shifts in the incentives facing norm-generating entities offer a third possible 
benefit.  Superordinate norm-generating entities would have less incentive to create legal norms 
of suspect democratic legitimacy.  The payoff for creation of a special interest oriented statute, 
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for example, is far less when courts are instructed to interpret with a bias aimed at diminishing 
such norms than when they interpret without this substantive bias.  
Moreover, the costs of securing special interest statutory policy against dilution by 
subordinate norm-generating entities would increase.  Only exceedingly precise and specific 
statutory language would immunize the special interest oriented statute from dilution by courts 
and agencies wielding the proposed canons of interpretation.  In the face of a special interest 
oriented statute of ambiguous or open textured wording, an agency could promulgate a regulation 
that removes or dilutes the special interest favors.  Courts armed with the suggested canons of 
interpretation would have a powerful tool that would permit them to legitimately uphold the 
agency regulation as consistent with the statute.
In addition, the suggested canons would create powerful incentives for subordinate 
entities to create norms of strong democratic legitimacy.  When an agency, for example, 
promulgates a regulation of strong democratic legitimacy, it will know that courts will strive to 
protect that regulation by reading any statutes of suspect democratic legitimacy as not in conflict 
with the regulation.  The creation of such a regulation would have the effect of narrowing the 
impact of statutes of suspect democratic legitimacy.177
176
. See supra note 104 and p. 88.
177
. Thus, an agency could create a new regulation that would conflict with the already 
established and most natural interpretation of some statute.  If that statute is of 
suspect democratic legitimacy and the regulation is of strong democratic 
legitimacy, the agency can depend on a court to reshape the statute in order to 
eliminate any possible conflict and accommodate the regulation.  Similarly, if 
Congress passes a statute of strong democratic legitimacy, it will know that courts 
will strive to interpret that statute and any subsequent agency created regulation 
that is of weak democratic legitimacy to preserve the statute and nullify such 
regulations.
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A practical advantage of the interpretive canon alternative is that it stands a much better 
chance of adoption than any of the previously discussed alternative systems.  Legal change 
usually occurs both incrementally and using existing and therefore known templates.  Not only 
does the interpretive canon alternative work no change in the extant axioms, it also builds on the 
well known template of existing substantive interpretive norms.  Courts dealing with possibly 
conflicting legal norms would merely read those norms with a certain substantive bias.  
Alternative systems ranging from the multi-factor system to the institutional option system, in 
contrast, would erect new formal processes and institutional arrangements.  Even though the new 
processes and institutional arrangements might largely formalize and legitimize what already 
informally may occur under the guise of interpretive discretion, they would work far more 
substantial changes than would the interpretive canon alternative.178
The interpretive canon alternative, like all possible systems, has its potential drawbacks.  
First and foremost, it would not improve on the performance of the extant system in the most 
important cases.  Return to the anti-spam regulation illustration.  In that case, the only way to 
avoid nullification of the popular regulation was to go beyond bending the meaning of the norms 
to actually break interpretive rules and to engage in dishonest interpretation.  The proposed 
canons would not sanction that kind of judicial behavior.  Courts facing cases in which no 
plausible and honest interpretation of the norms in question could avoid an anti-democratic 
outcome would still face the Hobson=s choice between dishonest interpretation and anti-
178
.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to fashion new rules and 
presumptions of legal interpretation aimed at advancing substantive ends.  See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 285 (1994) 
(explaining that Supreme Court has created new substantive canons of 
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democratic outcomes.
Second, the interpretive canon alternative would continue to grant courts primary control 
over the outcomes in cases in which norms of strong democratic legitimacy potentially stand in 
conflict with norms of suspect democratic legitimacy.  Unlike the institution prompting 
alternative, for example, the interpretive canon alternative includes no formal mechanism for 
incorporating the input of coordinate norm-generating entities. 
Third, the proposed canons would (like the last several alternatives) call on courts to 
evaluate the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms.  This turns out to be a central issue. 
 Rather than ask courts to engage in any evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms, 
the extant system tries to keep courts out of this activity.  It instead uses a simple metric B the 
democratic legitimacy of norm-generating entities.  One bottom line question is whether courts 
are better at assessing the democratic legitimacy of legal norms than this simplistic metric.  At 
least in the easy cases B easy because there exists a substantial disparity in the democratic 
legitimacy of two norms B courts employing the proposed canons probably would do a better job 
than the extant system.  Moreover, in the easy cases many courts already informally do what the 
canons would endorse.
Finally, the interpretive canon alternative would fail to resolve a central dilemma of the 
extant system.  Why bother with the rigid, discretion-denying axioms if courts are offered enough 
flexibility in interpreting legal norms to select outcomes in spite of the rigid, discretion-denying 
formalism of the axioms?  Because the interpretive canon alternative does nothing to alter the 
rigid nature of the axioms, it does nothing to address this basic dilemma.  All it really does is 
interpretation in recent decades).  
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formally sanction the broad interpretive discretion already used to undermine the rigidity of the 
extant axiomatic meta-norms.    
If the problem is that the rigid axioms produce too many unsatisfactory outcomes, it may 
be best to introduce a bit of flexibility into the axioms themselves.  This is what alternatives 
ranging from the multi-factor system to the institution option alternative would do.  The 
interpretive canon alternative, in contrast, expects courts to apply the unchanged axioms, but  
instructs courts to bend the meaning of legal norms when failure to do so would, under the 
axioms, lead to an anti-democratic outcome.  If we are willing to add new interpretive rules that 
would, in effect, legitimize and regularize judicial bias and manipulation in the interpretation of 
legal norms, we might as well avoid the gamesmanship and simply alter the axioms themselves.  
V.  Conclusion
A key difference between the extant system and most of the alternative systems offered in 
this Article relates to the publicly enunciated content of judicial opinions.  Several of the 
alternative systems encourage courts to directly and publicly grapple with the issue of democratic 
legitimacy.  Courts operating under the multi-factor, presumption, institution prompting, 
institution option, and interpretive canon alternative systems would have to incorporate into 
written opinions analyses of the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms.  
The extant system, in contrast, discourages public analysis of the democratic legitimacy 
of individual legal norms two ways.  First, it reduces the democratic legitimacy issue to the 
overly simplistic metric of the democratic legitimacy of the entities that create norms.  In so 
doing, it makes it all to easy for rule-following courts to decide cases in accord with the 
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axiomatic meta-norms, and to sidestep any examination of the democratic legitimacy of the 
individual norms involved.  This can lead to outcomes that are, in all but a formalistic sense, 
anti-democratic, such as a special interest-favoring statute trumping a public-regarding and 
popular regulation. 
Second, the extant system denies courts a way to publicly admit and explain how and 
when the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms influences their decisions.  Many 
courts will bend over backwards to avoid judicial nullification of norms of high democratic 
legitimacy.  The rigidly formalistic and source-centric extant system forces these courts into 
interpretive gamesmanship.  Courts that are unwilling to nullify norms of strong democratic 
legitimacy are forced to rationalize their rulings with the obfuscatory language of neutral rules of 
norm interpretation.  While the desire to avoid an anti-democratic outcome may be a prime factor 
motivating outcomes, the reasoning offered in judicial opinion to explain outcomes avoid 
discussion of the issue and mention only of rules of legal interpretation.    
Most of the alternative systems, in contrast, would encourage courts to publicly justify 
their decisions by explaining the democratic legitimacy related factors that actually influence 
their decisions.  In cases where courts see special interest statutes of dubious democratic 
legitimacy in conflict with more public regarding regulations, for example, the alternative 
systems would require courts to discuss and explain how this circumstance influences whether 
the court decides to nullify the public regarding regulation.  Return to the Tenth Circuit=s 
treatment of the >do not call= regulations discussed in the Introduction.179  Though we can never 
know for sure, it is very possible that the strong negative public reaction against lower court 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
132
opinions nullifying the >do not call= regulations was a key factor motivating the Tenth Circuit to 
uphold the regulations.  The extant system governing conflicts between legal norms did not give 
the Tenth Circuit a legitimate way to admit and discuss how the strong democratic legitimacy of 
the regulations might have factored into its ruling.  Most of the alternative systems, in contrast, 
would have required that the Tenth Circuit directly and publicly grapple with this issue.  At the 
very least, we are left with the question of whether the popularity of the >do not call= regulation 
influenced the Tenth Circuit=s decision.  We are probably better off with systems that would 
allow courts to directly, openly, and publicly discuss the factors that influence outcomes, than a 
system which forces courts into interpretive gamesmanship and leaves one wondering what really 
drives outcomes.    
The crux of the problem with the extant system lies in the following: The extant system=s 
rigid formalism seeks to deny courts discretion over the democratic legitimacy of individual legal 
norms.  At the same time, however, the flexible and open-ended discretion afforded courts when 
interpreting norms permits courts to surreptitiously factor the democratic legitimacy of legal 
norms into their decisions.  This coupling of rigid formalism with open-ended anti-formalism is 
the worst of all worlds.    
Some will maintain that courts simply are not equipped to assess the democratic 
legitimacy of individual legal norms and that courts should not allow such factors to influence 
their decisions.  The realities, however, are that such factors do influence judicial decision 
making, and flexible rules of legal interpretation do permit such factors to influence judicial 
decisions.  For those who believe that the extant system is right to attempt to keep courts out of 
179
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the business of assessing the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms, the policy 
prescription will call for less judicial discretion in interpreting legal norms.  In short, if courts are 
using the back door of flexible interpretive discretion to do what the extant system tries to 
prohibit them from doing through the front door, then the back door in flexible interpretive 
discretion should be shut.  
To my mind, however, the opposite path should be explored.  Allowing courts a 
legitimized role in assessing the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms would, over the 
run of cases, produce more outcomes that enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy of law 
than does the extant system.  Moreover, we should structure the systems governing conflicts 
between legal norms in ways that encourage courts to publicly enunciate exactly how the 
democratic legitimacy question influences their decisions.  Courts will use judicial discretion 
whenever, and in whatever form, it is made available.  Because courts are offered flexible 
interpretive discretion, the rigid axiomatic meta-norms governing conflicts between legal norms 
fails to stop courts from exercising discretion on the democratic legitimacy issue.  When a public 
regarding regulation runs up against a special interest statute, courts can and do use their flexible 
interpretative discretion to save the regulation from nullification by reading the norms in ways 
that avoid any conflict.  If courts are going to exercise interpretive discretion, we are better off 
encouraging them to publicly explain the factors motivating their decisions, than forcing them to 
operate through the back door of flexible interpretive discretion.  This is what many of the 
alternative systems offered in this Article would do.  
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